Global environmental governance: the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification by Rechkemmer, Andreas
www.ssoar.info
Global environmental governance: the United
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
Rechkemmer, Andreas
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Rechkemmer, A. (2004). Global environmental governance: the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification.
(Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, 2004-001). Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum
Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-118063
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Andreas Rechkemmer 
 
Global Environmental Governance – 
The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Best.-Nr. P 2004-001 
 
 Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin  
 für Sozialforschung (WZB) 
 
 
 Juni 2004 
 
 Beim Präsidenten 
 Emeriti Projekte 
 
 

Globalisation and the Environment 
 
1
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This discussion paper is about the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification 
(UNCCD) - one of the multilateral agreements that came out of the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. UNCCD is 
based on a conceptualization of international relations that transcends to a large extent 
the traditional notions of inter-governmental treaties. Such policy concepts are known 
under the framework of Global Governance as they allocate political action rather to the 
horizontal level - implying multi-actor-networks and the civil society - than to vertical 
or top-down processes. The paper first shows that - inspired by the Brundtland Report 
and the emerging process of globalization - Rio was the peak season for Global Gov-
ernance concepts that found their way into treaties and triggered structural reform, thus 
shaping a different reality of multilateral cooperation. In a second step, the paper shows 
that the Convention to Combat Desertification is the most Global Governance oriented 
of all of UNCED’s outcomes. Its legally binding text contains a number of pertinent 
elements, ranging from a stringent cross-over of environment and development issues, 
via the ‚bottom-up approach‘, to a mix of policy tools such as mainstreamed national 
action programmes and partnership agreements.   
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PROLOGUE 
Introduction / Methodological remarks 
 
This study is first and foremost on the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertifi-
cation (UNCCD). Since the latter, as the very outcome of the United Nations Confer-
ence on Environment and Development (UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 
June 1992, carries the handwriting of a certain type of conceptualization of international 
relations that I will call as postmodern, it is also on the notions of postmodernity in in-
ternational relations.  
 
While the peace treaties of Westphalia, 1648, are commonly identified with the ar-
chitype of the modern state system, based on concepts such as balance of power, sover-
eignty and territoriality, it is the achievements of the late 20th century - based, inter alia, 
on symbolic structures such as the Charter of the United Nations - that led to another 
conceptualization of international relations referred to as post-Westphalian, or postmod-
ern.  
 
But what exactly is meant by ‚postmodernity in IR‘? Are we speaking of an observable 
fact, or are we dealing with normative blueprints only? I would tend to say: it is both. In 
analogy to the Westphalian concept of IR, whose terms of reference can be grasped 
through the observation of structures and actors, but also refers to an idealized, norma-
tive mental construct, postmodern international relations are firstly normative, but have 
obviously also shaped political practice in terms of actions and structures during the 
second half of the 20th century. 
 
Postmodernity in IR implies the principles of collective political action, expressed in 
regime building processes, delegation of sovereignty to supranational institutions, su-
premacy of international law, and the constructing role of information and knowledge. 
Its overall expression is the concept of global governance, which furthermore implies a 
shift from hierarchical to non-hierarchical, or horizontal authority structures comprising 
a multitude of non-state actors. 
Further subcategorial implications of postmodern international relations are semantic 
cross-overs such as the concept of sustainable development, cross- or inter-sectoral pol-
icy strategies, and reformed decision structures within the network of international insti-
tutions. 
 
My first hypothesis is that, inspired by normative elaborations such as the Brundtland 
Report or the philosophy of a New World Order, and enabled by the changing global 
landscape due to the end of the Cold War and the emerging process of globalization, the 
Rio Earth Summit was a peak season for postmodern concepts, out of which many 
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found their way into treaties and declarations on one side, and triggered structural re-
form on the other, thus shaping a different reality of multilateral cooperation. 
 
My second hypothesis is that the UN Convention to Combat Desertification, whose es-
tablishment was decided upon in Rio, is probably the most postmodern among all of 
UNCED’s outcomes. Its legally binding text contains a number of concepts referred to 
as post-Westphalian, ranging from a stringent cross-over of environment and develop-
ment issues, via a strong focus on global governance rhethorics named the ‚bottom-up 
approach‘, to the subscribtion to a mix of policy tools such as mainstreamed national 
action programmes or partnership agreements. 
 
I will start with providing the background for my elaborations, i.e. summarize the main 
findings deriving from the modernity/postmodernity debate in IR theory, which had its 
origins in some critical articles on the role of international law undertaken in the 1960s, 
and intensified in the early 1990s as a crusade of constructivism vs. (neo)realism. This 
venture aims at clarifying the conceptual origins of my study by understanding the re-
spective notions of the modern vs. the postmodern conceptualization of international 
relations. This will be done in Chapter One, which eventually unveils the concept of 
global governance as the epitome of post-Westphalia. 
 
In Chapter Two, I will deal with the Rio Earth Summit (UNCED) as locus classicus for 
postmodernity. I will name and describe seven phenomena that emerged at UNCED, 
which flag out the various implications of a post-Westphalian understanding of interna-
tional relations for policy making and institution building processes.  
 
In Chapter Three, the conceptual framework of UNCCD will be examined, based upon 
lessons learnt from a previous attempt to multilaterally tackle the issue of desertifica-
tion. Particular emphasis will be laid on the Convention’s bottom-up approach, imply-
ing participatory principles, multi-level and multi-actor concepts, the so-called partner-
ship agreements, and the cross-sectoral orientation towards policy formulation and insti-
tution building. 
 
In Chapter Four, I will provide some examples taken from the implementation process 
of UNCCD, which started with its entry-into-force in December 1996. These examples 
cover the areas of policy formulation and evaluation, cross-sectoral synergies, multilat-
eral assistance, partnership and coherence with world conferences, and comprise con-
ceptual blueprints as well as conference proceedings. They aim to illustrate how a 
largely normative concept frame is being tried to be declinated into reality, facing chal-
lenges, naturally.  
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Chapter Five refers to the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), held in 
Johannesburg, South Africa, in 2002, which was ment as a stocktaking of the Rio proc-
ess. Johannesburg proved to be a reality check, revealing that postmodern ideas about 
international relations are not completely dead, but have to cohabitate with a number of 
conceptual neighbours, particularly unilateralism, type II outcomes and coalitions of the 
willing. Some conclusions will be drawn from and for the further implementation proc-
ess of UNCCD. This final chapter also contains conclusions drawn from the delibara-
tions of this exercice. 
 
Within this study, the Convention is understood as an inscribed case of those concept 
fragments referred to as “postmodern”. It is not perceived as a case study in the classical 
sense of the word, which would aim at allowing to draw generalized conclusions on the 
state of international affairs. Yet, UNCCD is perceived as an interesting political phe-
nomenon, which will be heuristically researched and described as a case of Rio, an in-
ternational legal treaty which is conceptually based on a post-Westphalian understand-
ing of international and also national politics. 
 
The description of UNCCD as a case of postmodern global governance concepts will be 
seconded by the field examples named above. Hereby, the normative concepts will be-
come as evident as the impressions and conclusions deriving from the implementation 
process. 
 
This study is based on: (a) Thorough literature research. A great number of relevant 
scientific articles and books have been systematically studied and comprehensively al-
located into the concept frame of this book. (b) Original documents. Similar research 
was done on UN documents and publications as well as those of a number of states, 
governmental and non-governmental organizations, thinktanks and research networks. 
(c) Conference and field visists. The author participated in a number of relevant meet-
ings, workshops and conferences on national, regional and global level, and engaged in 
a series of field trips to implementation projects. (d) Expert interviews. Such interviews 
were carried out with senior officials and representatives from UN Headquarters, de-
partments and specialized organizations, national governments, scientific bodies and 
NGOs.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
The debate on modernity/postmodernity and how this paper fits in 
 
Westphalia and all that... 
 
Westphalia has been described as locus classicus for modernity in international rela-
tions1, featuring the concepts of sovereignty and balance of power as underlying princi-
ples for a reshaped inter-statehood in Europe, and bringing about a long and durable 
phase of relative stability. Although balance of power and sovereignty had already been 
part of the conceptual matrix of the Augsburger Religionsfriede of 15552, as well as the 
Utrecht Treaty of 15793, it is Westphalia that has been identified with the paradigm shift 
in post-medieval international order, i.e. the transformation of a state system based on 
the principle of hegemonic rule into one based on the principles named above, com-
monly called the modern or Westphalian system.4  
 
It is worthwhile recalling at this point that pre-Westphalian or premodern order should 
not be confused with a technical Hobbesian state5. It can be conceptualized as based on 
hegemonic rule - divide and conquer - rather than on virtual anarchy. Thucydides6 de-
scribes how a quasi-Hobbesian system of small states, under the threat of a foreign su-
per-power - Persia -, transforms itself into a system of order, in which two strong lead-
ers - Sparta and Athens - emerge as hegemons, with the effect that all other states of the 
Hellenic system take the site of either power and thus constitute the state system of 
hegemonic rule, or in short: the hegemonic system.  
 
Thucydides’ narrative reproduction of the said historical phenomena traditionally serves 
as a model for autopoietically self-organizing hierarchical systems7 and thus character-
izes the above-described paradigmatic shift from anarchy to order, the thrust of premod-
ernity. Analoguously, Westphalia became a synonym for a very different concept of 
                                                 
1 The term ‚Westphalia‘ commonly refers to the 1648 peace treaties of Münster and Osnabrück. 
2 Augsburg consisted of a vast compromise between catholic and protestant states, guaranteeing their 
legal equality and transforming the latter into Reichsrecht. Augsburg also established the principle of 
cuius regio cuius religio. 
3 Utrecht proclaimed a union of seven sovereign northern provinces of the Netherlands. See also Ipsen, 
Knut [1999]: Völkerrecht. 4. Auflage. München. (§§ 2, 17) 
4 Much has been written on this subject in the last three decades. As an overall introduction into the 
theoretical framework of this book, I am going to characterize in the present chapter some of the most 
influental contributions to the Westphalia discourse, as long as they relate to the points I would like to 
make. 
5 Reference is made to the classic Hobbes, Thomas [1996]: Leviathan. Ed. By Richard Tuck. Cam-
bridge, Mass. 
6 Thucydides [1989]: The Peloponnesian War. Cambridge, Mass. 
7 The notions of ‚autopoiesis‘ and self-organizing systems have been introduced to IR theory by 
Maturana, Humberto R./ Varela, Francisco J. [1992]: The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots 
of Human Understanding. Boston, Mass. and Luhmann, Niklas [1995]: Social Systems. Stanford. 
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international organization, marking the second significant paradigm shift according to 
international relations theory. But what is it all about?  
 
In short, the peace treaties of Münster and Osnabrück re-established the main provisions 
of Augsburg and extended their validity onto protestant territories. 
The Reichsstände, or free states, were not only granted participation in matters pertain-
ing to the Empire as a whole. They received full sovereignty on their respective territo-
ries, which is best symbolized and expressed in their newly established right to create 
alliances with foreign state entities. The treaties of Westphalia furthermore became a 
main source of the Reichsrecht - the Empire’s legal constitution - and so were turned 
into international law. 
 
Westphalia’s immediate and inter-mediate historical consequences for the European 
continent’s state system were significant. The political as well as the  military power of 
the house Habsburg was diminished for a notable period of time, while the Emperor’s 
influence vanished forever. Altogether, the Empire was weakened by the rise in power 
of the small state units and transformed rather into a federation of sovereign states, 
maintaining its function as a law-protecting community. However, this led to a com-
plete reshuffling of the allocation of power in Europe. At the beginning of the secular 
period, Habsburg was defeated as hegemon, establishing new super-powers, i.e. Swe-
den, France and The Netherlands. The Emperor’s rights were bound to the Reichstag’s 
legislative authority, while, ironically, France and Sweden guaranteed the Empire’s ex-
istence. Collective security and legal order were thus no longer supposed to be provided 
and enforced by a hegemon, and a new matrix for international relations was created 
through Westphalia, as has been said based on sovereignty and balance of power. 
 
Looking closer at the underlying reasons and causes of the Thirty Years War, we realize 
that at the turn to the 17th century, religious polarization added enormous pressure to the 
already fragile political consensus in Germany. The foundation of the Union by Protes-
tant German princes and free cities in 1608 and subsequently of the Catholic League in 
1609 increased this tension significantly until 1618, when war broke out between the 
two camps. But the latter was not caused by religious strain only. Maybe even more 
decisive and grave weighed the struggle between Emperor and estates on their respec-
tive rights. Time was due for a system change, and hegemonic rules seemed to have 
come to an end. 
 
At first, the Emperor and his ally, the King of Spain, both Catholics, fought against 
Protestant estates, which was soon perceived as a threat not only to Protestantism, but to 
the general political order and stability in Europe. As a result, Denmark, Sweden and 
France intervened on behalf of Protestantism, and surely conscious of their opportunity 
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to weaken Habsburg, in 1624, 1630 and 1635 respectively. The war lasted for thirty 
years without bringing forth a clear military or political advantage for one of the camps. 
Even worse, no consensus could be reached.8  
 
In his book The States System of Europe 1640-1990, Andreas Osiander states: “To pro-
mote such consensus was the daunting task of the assembly that ... convened at Münster 
and Osnabrück in Westphalia in 1644.”9 For a period of four years, the two cities be-
came the thrilling stage for a classic performance of pendulum diplomacy, the enigma 
being evident: to bring about a vast political consensus that would be acceptable for 
either party involved, and allow a face-saving solution for the super-powers. Although 
negotiations comprised all, Sweden, France and the Empire were the most important 
negotiators. On January, 30th 1648, Spain signed a treaty with The Netherlands in Mün-
ster, and on October, 24th 1648, two peace treaties between the Empire and Sweden and 
the Empire and France were signed at Osnabrück. No peace was formally reached be-
tween Spain and France.  
Osiander continues:  
 
“The international system that the congress of Münster and Osnabrück undertook 
to reorganize was highly complex... It was in a state of flux and inherently unsta-
ble due to a lack of system-wide consensus... An adequate consensus agenda was 
lacking – one did emerge to some extent as a result of the negotiations, but the 
process was laborious and the result, fragile... On one point, all the participants 
... were agreed that peace was to be declared desirable.”10   
 
“The congress had a double constituency: on the one hand, the European states 
system at large, and, on the other, ist central sub-system, known as the Holy Ro-
man Empire. The consensus inherent in these two structures manifested itself as a 
sense of community which the negotiators could appeal to. It was bound up with 
the concepts of ‘Christendom’ and ‘Germany’ respectively.”11   
 
The author names two consensus principles, based on which this community sense was 
able to be appealed to, despite all conflicting interests: “the inviolability of the struc-
tures ... by which the community was defined, and ... loyalty to the community”12. As 
far as Germany was concerned, no central power with real enforcement qualities had 
                                                 
8 Since this book is not about the Thirty Years War, I aim at simplifying here the complexity of the 
matter, but not without recalling that also other European states, namely The Netherlands and some of 
the Empire’s smaller neighbours, joined the party while it was on. 
9 Osiander, Andreas [1994]: The States System of Europe 1640-1990. Oxford. (here p. 17) 
10 Osiander, Andreas [1994], p. 20-21. 
11 Op. cit., p. 27. 
12 Op. cit., p. 31. It is worth noting here that such principles clearly indicate that a merely generalized 
maximizing power theory as featured by some realists is not able to explain Westphalia. 
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ever been established.13 However, “in their allegiance to established institutions and 
procedures the estates of the Empire found sufficient common ground ... to reach peace 
and to conduct ... mutual relations with a high degree of stability”14. Remarkably 
enough, and contrary to the European states system as a whole, until the uprising of the 
concept of nation-states in the 19th century, the German estates managed to preserve 
both sovereignty as well as their territorial identity. Osiander’s second consensus prin-
ciple, loyalty to Christendom, however constituted a base strong enough for the Euro-
pean powers to reach a settlement.  
 
The modernity-postmodernity shift: two early contributions 
 
We have seen so far that while the Peleponnesian war, as re-narrated by Thucydides, 
serves as the first big paradigm shift in IR theory, Westphalia stands as a synonym for 
the second, referring to the transformation from premodern condition, the so-called sys-
tem of hegemonic rule, to the one named as the modern state system. We should move 
our attention now to the critical question what exactly would be the equivalent for the 
third big shift in conceptualizing international relations, the migration from modernity, 
or Westphalian order, to postmodernity, or post-Westphalian order. Can we figure out 
an analoguous date, event, structure or process which could likewise serve as a syno-
nym? 
 
With a view to historical facts, the Westphalian system lasted for about 300 years. It 
evidently collapsed with the devastating impacts of World War II at the latest.15 How-
ever, scholars have had their arguments on the exact turning point, the birth hour of 
postmodernity. It would be as reasonable to mention the League of Nations as the inau-
guration of the United Nations or the entry-into-force of the UN Charter. A more rigid 
interpretation would instead rather highlight the first application of Article 37 in 1950 or 
even NATO’s operations in Kosovo in 1999. All of these do reflect the spirit of post-
modernity, and yet none is the exact event or entity to be identified with.  
 
Obviously, postmodernity in international relations is a concept rather than a fact. Like 
all other concepts named above, the conceptualization of international order referred to 
as post-modern is a condensed mental construct drawn from the observation of evident 
changes in the way actors organize themselves on the global stage, in both a structural 
as well as a content-driven, or normative dimension. In this sense, we can make out 
various instantiations of postmodernity in the timeline of recent historical develop-
                                                 
13 Osiander calls this the hallmark of the international system. 
14 Op. cit., p. 38. 
15 We have to note here that the rise of nation-states in the 19th century may have changed the inner 
constituency of Germany, but it did never disrupt the European system as a whole.   
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ments. Yet it is more promising to take a look at the core of those structures and norma-
tive patterns that mark the transcend from modern to postmodern conditions in IR.  
 
As early as 1969, in his classic article The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Concep-
tions of International Legal Order, Richard Falk16 draws a comparison between the 
Westphalia conception and the Charter Conception of international legal order, ulti-
mately unveiling the Charter of the United Nations as a paradigmatic expression of the 
postmodern turn.  
 
Falk calls the peace treaties of 1648 a „classical framework of legal constraint postu-
lated to regulate a highly decentralized world of sovereign states ... yielding a permis-
sive, voluntaristic system of law stressing matters of the allocation of competence 
among sovereign states“17. 
 
He continues: 
„The basic formal ordering conception in international society since the 17th cen-
tury has been the coordination of sovereign state units. It is convenient to identify 
this conception with the Peace of Westphalia of 1648... Medieval society was 
dominated by the image of a Christian commonwealth, a world order system hier-
archically organized beneath the sway of the Pope and the Holy Roman Empire. 
Westphalia evolved a new image of coordinated states, each sovereign within its 
territorial sphere... The Westphalia conception - giving legal status to a growing 
exercise of authority on a national level - has provided the main outline of struc-
ture and process in international society up to and including the present period. 
Sovereign states remain the dominant actors in the international society. The 
state, a spatial unit, results in the fundamental ordering of international relations 
through a central reliance on territorial conceptions... Respect for the boundary of 
states is crucial and results in derivative legal ideas of territorial jurisdiction, 
sovereign equality, and nonintervention.“18   
 
On the other side, the so-called Charter conception refers to the UN Charter, which is 
said to constitute a major modification of the Westphalia system, bearing on the status 
of war, the role of national sovereignty, and the degree to which authority structures are 
centralized.19 It centers upon the Charter’s normative provisions and overlaps, according 
to Falk, in some aspects the Westphalia conception, but „complements [it] by centraliz-
                                                 
16 Falk, Richard A. [1969]: The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of International Legal 
Order/ In: Bleck, Lyrich/ Falk, Richard (eds.) [1969]: The Future of the International Legal Order. 
Princeton. 
17 Op. cit., p. 32. 
18 Op. cit., p. 43-44. 
19 See Falk, Richard A. [1969], p. 32. 
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ing some cooperative activities and contradicts [it] to the extent that community-
oriented procedures come to displace sovereignty-oriented procedures“20. 
 
Although „the critical ideas of Westphalia involving sovereign equality and domestic 
jurisdiction are formally perpetuated in the Charter”21, a number of conflicting tensions 
between the two conceptions are easily to be made out, e.g. regarding issues such as the 
status of war and violence, the right for self-defense, the basis for obligation, constitu-
tional authority, the erosion of domestic jurisdiction, and supranational professional-
ism.22 
 
Falk’s article mainly deals with the interplay between the said two conceptions, which 
he calls as of normative orientation. Although it also refers to other ordering concep-
tions such as spheres of influence, rules of the game, deterrence, and decentralized 
modes of law enforcement 23, the author is trying to show how the Westphalian matrix 
has been transcended and transformed into the one referred to here as postmodern, find-
ing its concrete shape in the UN Charter. The approach chosen at that stage – some time 
before political scientists started their intense debate on the matter – is a legal one and 
can be named critical theory of international law.24 
Falk’s classification of the two conceptions and their interplay has become influential 
on any debate on the role of sovereignty, territoriality and legal authority in interna-
                                                 
20 Op. cit., p. 48-49. 
21 Op. cit., p. 49. Reference is made here to Article 2 of the UN Charter: „The Organization shall be 
based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its Members... Nothing contained in the present 
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the do-
mestic jurisdiction of any state.“ (Art. 2 (1), (7)) 
22 See op. cit., p. 49-64. See also some of my own points made in this context in: Rechkemmer, Andreas 
[2003a]: Die Zukunft der Vereinten Nationen. Weltorganisation am Scheideweg – eine deutsche Per-
spektive. SWP-Aktuell 15 (April). Berlin. 
23 See op. cit., p. 33. 
24 The author conceives the international legal order as an aggregate conception comprising structures 
and processes by which authority is created, applied, and transformed. His focus is on the authority 
system as an attribute of the wider extralegal conception of an international system. Authority is un-
derstood to „encompass established expectations and traditions about who is entitled to make and im-
plement decisions”. For Falk, international legal order is „a socio-historical product of convergent 
perspectives of formal authority and actual behavior“. He rejects a legalistic approach, maintaining the 
„distinctiveness of legal order while managing to be responsive to the extralegal setting. The study of 
international law - as the specialized and disciplined inquiry into the structure and process of authority 
- gives the legal dimension in international relations the status of a quasi-dependent variable. By 
quasi-dependence is meant that law both tends to reflect and to be shaped by the international system 
as a whole.“ The author expresses his „unwillingness to accept a conservative interpretation of the 
province of legal authority as delimited by formal expression of consent by sovereign states. The au-
thority system operative in international society is specified here to encompass de facto regimes that 
can come into effective being without any dependence upon the rhetoric or technique of lawyers.“ He 
continues: „It is important to understand that legal order is a quasi-dependent variable in any social 
and political setting... It is a mistake to suppose that the domestic legal order of a modern state is a 
paradigm for any legal system... International society is bound to possess a decentralized form of legal 
order that corresponds to its decentralized social and political structure.“ – The quotes are taken from 
op. cit., p. 33-64. 
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tional order. For the purpose of the present book, it constitutes an early testimony with 
regard to the mentioned paradigm shift to postmodern concepts of IR, preparing the 
ground for three important findings I would like to recall here: 
 
? Contradictory to a realist/positivist perception, international law is not constitutive 
for political order, but rather coincides with a package of socio-historical, extra-
legal patterns that actually both reflect and reshape the so-called political reality 
among states and other actors on the global stage. 
? Postmodernity in international relations is in itself a concept, or rather a label for a 
bunch of conceptual fragments, dealing with attributes and qualities of a changed 
nature of political order compared to the system referred to as Westphalian. In short, 
these attributes and qualities relate to supranationality and transcend the concepts of 
sovereignty, territoriality and balance of power. 
? It is intelligible to perceive the shift from modern to postmodern paradigms as grad-
ual and complementary, i.e. while basic elements of modernity remain vaild – e.g. 
the state as a principal actor in international relations -, others are sacrificed for the 
sake of a new conceptual reality, rating community-oriented values higher. This 
gradual understanding of the paradigm shift in question helps reduce the tension that 
derives from an either-or concept. 
 
The last of these findings is expressed in Falk’s observation that Westphalia is far from 
being fully displaced while the Charter is far from being fully realized - which is still an 
appropriate description of the state of affairs even nowadys. In this light, both concep-
tions are „ideal type characterizations, highly abstract images, intellectual constructs“ 25.   
 
A second godfather of the modernity/postmodernity discourse deriving his argument 
from a critical perspective on the role of international is William Coplin26. Similar to 
Richard Falk, he laments that most writers on international relations and international 
law examine the relationship between the two in terms of the assumption that law either 
should or does function only as a coercive restraint on political action and that interna-
tional law should be examined as a system of coercive norms controlling the actions of 
states, i.e. as a system of restraint, „deriving their conception of the relationship be-
tween international law and political action from their ideas on the way law functions in 
domestic communities ... [i.e.] as an instrument of direct control“27. For Coplin, it is 
desirable to approach the relationship between international law and politics at a differ-
ent functional level: 
                                                 
25 Op. cit., p. 33. 
26 Coplin, William D. [1965]: International Law and Assumptions about the State System/ In: World 
Politics Vol. 17 (Oct.-Jul.). 
27 Op. cit., p. 615-616. In the context of the criticised position it is worthwhile referring to Morgenthau, 
Hans [1961]: Politics Among Nations. New York, N.Y. Named be also the works of Carr and Kennan. 
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„In a domestic society, the legal system as a series of interrelated normative 
statements does more than direct or control the actions of its members through 
explicit rules backed by a promise of coercion. [They also act by] serving as au-
thoritative modes of communicating or reflecting the ideals and purposes, the ac-
ceptable roles and actions, as well as the very processes of the societies... Law in 
the domestic situation is a primary tool in the socialization of the individual ... 
providing an image of both factual and normative aspects... International law 
functions in a similar manner ... as an institutional device for communicating to 
the policy-makers of various states a consensus on the nature of the international 
system.“28  
 
The said relation is thus percieved as a „system of quasi-authoritative communications 
to the policy-makers concerning the reasons for state actions and the requisites for in-
ternational order - quasi because the norms of international law represent only an imper-
fect consensus of the community of states ... expressing generally held ... assumptions 
about the state system“29.   
According to Coplin, there are three basic assumptions inherent to the Westphalian con-
ception that structure the matrix of modernity30: 
 
? The state is perceived as an absolute institutional value. Its security is the one immu-
table imperative for state action. 
? International politics is equal a permanent struggle for power. 
? The prevailing motto is: Preserve the balance of power! State actors see a necessity 
to form coalitions to counter any threat to hegemony and  moderate actions to avoid 
excess of violence that could disrupt the system. 
 
Coplin states that almost every legal aspect of international relations from 1648 to 1914 
reinforced these assumptions. He highlights four concepts that are constitutive for the 
Westphalian system and reflect these assumptions: sovereignty, territoriality, neutrality 
and diplomacy.31 First are treaties as an expression of sovereignty. Statehood is defined 
by the ability to make treaties. „Treaty law also contributed to the evolution of the clas-
sical assumption regarding the maintenance of the international system... [and] re-
minded the policy-maker that the maintenance of the international system was a legiti-
mate and necessary objective of state policy.“ Second is the legal concept of boundaries 
                                                 
28 Coplin, William D. [1965], p. 617. 
29 Op. cit., p. 617. 
30 See op. cit., p. 618. 
31 For these as well as for the following para see op. cit., p. 619-622. 
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being „most discernible of all criteria of a state’s existence” since they define territory.32 
Third is the idea of neutrality as an expression of the principle of balance of power. 
Modernity lays emphasis on the preservation of the international system. Fourth and last 
- but not least - in line comes the law of diplomacy.  
These four concepts together are Westphalia’s threshold.33 Yet with the emergence of 
international actors possessing supranational powers, “the legal idea of self-contained 
units based on territorial control lacks the clear basis in fact that it once enjoyed“ 34. 
Thus, a break has to be witnessed, a shift that marks the end of absolute rule of the 
Westphalian paradigm. A second symptom of the shift towards postmodernity, accord-
ing to Coplin, is the post-World War II practise of questioning the validity of the laws 
of other states. 
 
Already „the League [of Nations] represented a threat to the assumptions of the state 
system“. Its conceptual thrust contained a basic tension between preserving the state and 
subordinating it through a formal institution. Coplin continues that „like the League, the 
UN was to replace the state as the paramount institutional value by establishing a con-
stitutional concert of powers. However, it has succeeded only in underscoring the exist-
ing tension between the drive to maintain the state and the goal of maintaining the sys-
tem. In the Charter itself, [this] ... tension remains unresolved.“35 
  
Summarizing the role of international law for international relations, Coplin views it as 
part and parcel of political reality that “serves as an institutional means of developing 
and reflecting a general consensus on the nature of international reality“36. In this light, 
the above observations concerning the respective blueprints for international legal order 
contained in the Westphalian and the Charter conceptions help us understand some of 
the specific differences of postmodernity vs. modernity. From such perspective, the ar-
ticles of Falk and Coplin show how, in the course of the 20th century, postmodern con-
ceptual elements have gradually altered the modern ones.   
 
                                                 
32 For further reference as far as the concept of territoriality is concerned, see Kratochwil, Friedrich 
[1986]: Of Systems, Boundaries and Territoriality: An inquiry into the Formation of the State System/ 
In: World Politics Vol. 39 (Oct.), and Ruggie, John Gerard [1993c]: Territoriality and beyond. Prob-
lematizing modernity in international relations/ In: International Organization Vol. 47 (Winter). 
33 Coplin reminds us in op. cit., p. 623 that „the assumptions of the state system were reinforced not only 
by the legal practises of states but also by the major international legal theories of the classical period. 
Three general schools of thought developed: the naturalists, the eclectics or Grotians, and the positiv-
ists.“ Particular reference is made to the Grotian concept of the sovereign power of states as expressed 
in: Grotius, Hugo [1901]: The Rights of War and Peace. Ed. with notes by A. C. Campbell. Washing-
ton. (p. 62)    
34 Op. cit., p. 625-626. 
35 See op. cit., p. 627. Explicit reference is made to Art. 25-51 and Art. 2, para. 2-7, UN Charter. 
36 Op. cit., p. 633. 
Global Environmental Governance  
 
13
Elements of a classical debate 
 
In the foregoing sub-chapter we have seen how a critical and comprehensive examina-
tion of the development of international law undertaken in the Sixties helped understand 
the respective notions of modernity and postmodernity in international relations as well 
as the transformatory process, or shift, between them, providing the stage for the later 
debate in IR theory. Consequently, we will now take a more political science oriented 
look at the issue, and recall some of the major findings and tensions of this said moder-
nity/postmodernity discourse in IR theory as unfolded mainly in the Nineties.  
 
We will see that qualitative terms such as stability or security are not to be identified 
exclusively with one of the two named paradigms of international order.37 Those terms 
can be normative as well as descriptive and merely refer to either desirable or estab-
lished qualities of an international system, independantly if that would be named mod-
ern, postmodern or elsewise. In understanding what postmodernity is about and what it 
refers to, will we have to identify other conceptual terms and qualities in use when re-
ferring to international systems.    
 
Andreas Osiander38, for instance, addresses the problem of stability in international 
politics, stating that politics is determined extensively by the framework of terms of 
reference used by the decision-makers so that the focus of analysis should be put on the 
assumptions held by the decion-makers themselves. He calls the autonomous centres of 
decision-making in international affairs international actors, stating: „There is ... no 
strong central authority capable of laying down, and enforcing, the rules that interna-
tional actors will follow... This is what defines the international system, as opposed to 
the sphere of domestic politics.“ Making out the specific difference between these two 
spheres, the author recalls that at the domestic level, the highest political authority is 
centralized, while at international level it is decentralized and distributed. However, 
there is no disorder, the international system is „quite stable“.   
 
It is worth focusing for a moment on the conditions for stability in IP. For Osiander, the 
international system has no physical reality. It “extists exclusively in the mind. It is 
what people think it is. It is a mental construct, resting entirely on shared assumptions... 
Such assumptions are never axiomatic. They are always arbitrary to some extent, and 
capable of modification. The international system as we know it is the sum of elaborate, 
widely shared assumptions.“39 Stability in the international system is thus provided if 
                                                 
37 Realists believed in such exclusiveness as far as their interpretation of the Westphalian system was 
concerned. In this context, reference is to be made again to the already mentioned Morgenthau, Carr 
and Kennan. 
38 Osiander, Andreas [1994]. The quotes in this para and the next are compiled from p. 1-3. 
39 Osiander, Andreas [1994], p. 4. 
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the „principal assumptions on which the system is founded do not clash... The degree of 
stability of the international system will depend on the degree of congruence of the 
principal assumptions on which the system is founded,... on the degree of consensus 
present in the system.“40 
 
Osiander lays emphasis on a type of assumptions called structural principles, and less 
emphasis on another type called procedural rules: 
„Structural principles are assumptions that influence the three basic aspects of 
the structure of the international system: the identity of the international actors, 
their relative status, and the distribution of territories and populations between 
them. Procedural rules influence the way that relations between the actors are 
conducted.“41 
 
For the author, stablity presupposes reliable expectations: “International actors will con-
sider exercising restraint in their mutual dealings only if they can expect such restraint 
to be universal.”42 Stability is explicitly not based on recipocity.43 It will not prevail “if 
the actors make their own abstention from disruptive behaviour depend on what other 
actors have done in this respect rather than on what it is thought that they will do... 
Generalized reciprocity is not the precondition but the result of the acceptance of a code 
of behavoir.”44  
This latter is provided by the sum of the structural principles and of the procedural rules 
that form the object of a consensus among the international actors. Structural principles 
do not promote certain types of action but rather prevent disruptive behavoir. “The in-
ternational system will be stable, provided that it is in conformity with the structural 
principles on which there is consensus in the system, and provided, too, that the consen-
sus on these principles is strong enough.”45 In case these conditions are not fullfilled, 
tension will prompt conflict and lead to either modification of the system or of its un-
derlying principles.  
  
In the light of the above, the insight emerges that qualitative terms such as stability, or 
others, cannot simply be identified with one of the two paradigms in question, and sub-
sequently do not serve as explanatory criteria for the modernity/postmodernity dis-
course. Furthermore, Osiander’s article unveils a typical viewpoint on IR, which is 
postmodern in itself: the constructivist perception of the realm of international politics, 
or relations, as a platform for the emergence of structures and processes based on rules, 
                                                 
40 Op. cit., p. 5. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Op. cit., p. 6. 
43 ...as has been stated by realists and neo-realists. 
44 Op. cit., p. 6. 
45 Op. cit., p. 7. 
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norms and wishful thinking of the actors involved, rather than on hardcore, eternal 
stereotypes such as interest or struggle for power.46 It seems evident that postmodern 
conceptualizations of international relations, e.g. the constructivist school, do nothing 
but reflect the paradigmatic shift being dealt with in this chapter and being both the re-
sult of normative considerations nourished by historical processes as well as a theorecti-
cal conceptualization in itself. 
 
We revert back to the core attributes commonly identified with Westphalia, its thresh-
old, the concepts of sovereignty, territoriality and balance of power. In his article Sover-
eignty as dominium, Friedrich Kratochwil47 argues that sovereignty is not simply an 
observable fact. “The actions and patterns we observe are part and parcel of an institu-
tion that allows us to characterize and appraise our observations in terms of certain 
normative criteria... Institutional behavior is hardly ever as clearly structured as in a 
game and the contestability of such concepts is part of its very function of mediating 
between the realm of is and ought.”48 It is important to understand how institutional 
rules function. Kratochwil refers to an analogy between the institution of sovereignty 
and the one of property, and states that the concept of sovereignty was developed by 
legal scholars49 as a rule-constituted practise analogous to private property in Roman 
law. His investigation starts on the level of actual practice and justification while he 
avoids nominal definitions as well as simple etymologies of the term of sovereignty.  
 
“Only when we consider both practice and its justification can the continuity and 
change of this institution be grasped without succumbing to the fallacy of struc-
tural persistence or to largely platitudinous generalizations.”50 
 
Kratochwil’s argument takes the steps of disentangling the concept of sovereignty 
“from some cognate notions such as will, absoluteness, or possessive individualism” 
and thus rejects any “identification of law with the command of the sovereign”51. The 
added value of this article is that it rescues the concept of sovereignty from conceptual 
mistakes such as its identification with supreme will and with authority above the law. 
Following the initially proclaimed analogy, yet not identity, between sovereignty and 
                                                 
46 See Kratochwil, Friedrich [1989]: Rules, Norms and Decisions. Cambridge, Engl. (here ch. 1) 
47 Kratochwil, Friedrich [1992]: Sovereignty as dominium: Is there a Right of Humanitarian Interven-
tion? Manuscript. University of Pennsylvania (Sept, 16). The author has provided an updated version 
of his views in Kratochwil, Friedrich [2002]: Souveränität und Moderne: Eine begriffliche Analyse 
des semantischen Feldes/ In: Jachtenfuchs, Markus/ Knodt, Michèle (eds.) [2002]: Regieren in inter-
nationalen Institutionen. Opladen. Kratochwil argues therein that the social world does not exist per 
se, but is rather constructed through actions of actors. Therefore, sovereignty has to be conceptualized 
in a generative manner, reflecting it in front of its respective historical backdrops. 
48 Kratochwil, Friedrich [1992], p. 1. 
49 Named be here Grotius, Pufendorf and Selden. 
50 Op. cit., p. 3. 
51 See op. cit., p. 3. The author explicitely refers here to Bodin and Hobbes. 
 Andreas Rechkemmer 
 
16 
property, the term in question should thus better be understood as an institution of a 
normative, or rule-based, nature. 
 
In the light of the foregoing, and understanding sovereignty as a social institution, we 
can grasp its significance for the political order shaped and established through West-
phalia.52 Moreover, the conceptual shift to postmodernity, or post-Westphalian order in 
international relations can subsequently be understood as a process of desired structural, 
or institutional, change due to a gradually transformed shared understanding of the un-
derlying normative terms of reference, institutional rules and/or functional settings of 
the international society. 
 
The process of structural change highlighted by Kratochwil can be further conceptual-
ized in conformity with the findings of Alexander Wendt53, who understands West-
phalian order as functional equality among states, which, as an expression of the mod-
ernity/postmodernity switch, is being transformed into differentiation, while quasi-
anarchic relations among states are at the same time being transformed into authoritative 
ones: 
  
“The structure of a states system is constituted as anarchic by member states hav-
ing and acting on the identity of juridical independence and self-governance... 
Whether or not the structure of a states system is anarchic is intimately tied to the 
distribution of state identities... Structures do not exist except by virtue of the 
agent.”54 
 
States form a so-called anarchic structure if they identify with themselves only, a hierar-
chical one if they identify with a world state, and a decentralized authority system if 
they identify with each other. The latter is called international state, and serves as 
equivalent to the already introduced term postmodern or post-Westphalian system. 
Wendt explores how international states emerge by focusing on the causes of collective 
identity-formation among states. He recalls that neither neorealists nor neoliberals55 
have explored the field of state identity and structural change as they take states and 
interests as given, and argues that this field is exclusively explored by critical or or con-
                                                 
52 Reference is made to Krasner, Stephen D. [1993]: Westphalia and All That/ In: Goldstein, Judith/ 
Keohane, R. (eds.) [1993]: Ideas & Foreign Policy. Ithaca, N.Y., who believes that sovereignty is not 
an invention of Westphalia. See also Kratochwil’s reply in: Kratochwil, Friedrich [1995]: Westphalia 
and all what? (Xerox) Pittsburgh, Penn. 
53 Wendt, Alexander [1996]: Identity and Structural Change in International Politics/ In: Lapid, Joseph/ 
Kratochwil, Friedrich (eds.) [1996a]: The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory. Boulder/ Lon-
don. 
54 Op. cit., p. 47. 
55 Wendt names here Mearsheimer and Waltz. 
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structivist IR theory, choosing a more sociological than economic approach.56 For 
Wendt, the process of internationalization of political authority consists of a “gradual, 
but structural, transformation of the Westphalian states system from anarchy to author-
ity” whose basis is the “institution of sovereignty, which constitutes an anarchy of mu-
tual recognition”, while the international state formation does not mean formal cession 
of sovereignty to supranational institutions. It merely “does relocate individual state 
actors’ de facto sovereignty to transnational authorities”, whose result is neither anarchy 
nor hierarchy, but the “emergence of a new form of state and thus states system, which 
breaks down the spatial coincidence between state-as-actor and state-as-structure. As 
such, the erosion of individual state sovereignty does not imply the erosion of the state.” 
By transferring sovereignty “to a collective, states may actually strengthen their capac-
ity to solve problems. Internationalization is a way of reorganizing and redeploying 
state power, not a withering away of the state.”57 
 
Wendt’s reflections illuminate the transformatory process from anarchy to authority, as 
he calls it, or simply from the Westphalian to the postmodern system, by transcending 
the classical concept of sovereignty, and likewise, implicitely, the concepts of territori-
ality and balance of power, into the realm of inter- or supranationality, without destruc-
tive notions such as loss of sovereignty or decline of the nation-state.   
 
In implicite conformity with Wendt, Daniel Deudney58 critizices Realism as notoriously 
perceiving political order as a dyad, shaping a sharp divide between the domestic and 
interstate realms, and identifying states as dominant units that feature hierarchical order, 
monopoly on legitimate violence and sovereignty as their differentia specifica. More-
over, realists think that outside and between states is anarchy where security is of pri-
mary concern, while interstate unions - or even international states according to Wendt - 
have little staying power beyond self-interest and are related closely to balance and dis-
tribution of power.59 The author further recalls that the most important challenge to real-
ism has come from liberal international relations theory.60 Liberals argue that nation-
                                                 
56 The author refers to some overviews provided by Adler, Keohane, Kratochwil and Wendt. Detailed 
references are given in op. cit., p. 63 (note 2).  
57 Op. cit., p. 61. On the notion of structural change and its implications for the issue duscussed here, see 
also Little, Richard [1993]: Rethinking System Continuity and Transformation/ In: Buzan, Barry/ 
Jones, Charles/ Little, Richard (eds.) [1993]: The Logic of Anarchy. New York, N.Y. 
58 Deudney, Daniel H. [1995]: The Philadelphian system: sovereignty, arms control, and balance of 
power in the American states-union, circa 1787-1861/ In: International Organization Vol. 49/No. 2 
(Spring).  
59 See op. cit., p. 191. Deudney refers here to Waltz, Kenneth [1979]: Theory of International Politics. 
Lexington, Mass., and Jervis, Robert [1983]: Security Regimes/ In: Krasner, Stephen (ed.) [1983]: In-
ternational Regimes. Ithaca, N.Y. 
60 Deudney refers to Baldwin, David (ed.) [1993]: Neoliberalism and Neorealism. New York, N.Y. In-
teresting overviews of and contributions to the debate are also given in Lapid, Yosef [1989]: The 
Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era/ In: International Stud-
ies Quarterly Vol. 33, Waever, Ole [1996]: The rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate/ In: Smith, 
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states internally organized as democratic republics are not likely to wage war against 
one another, and that capitalism creates economic interdependence that moderates con-
flict and empowers inter-governmental actors. So, cooperation can occur despite anar-
chy, and states as well as anarchy can be modified. According to Deudney, Realism 
understands the concept of balance of power as a tool to maintain a plural political order 
by frustrating predatory states and avoiding universal empire.61 
  
The conclusions of the four authors mentioned here are taken as representative for a 
postmodern perspective, in contradiction to a conservative or (neo-)realist one, on IR, 
putting together some of the central puzzles of the modernity-postmodernity debate as 
unfolded originally in the Nineties, and naming important qualities and attributes of the 
post-Westphalian concept framework. Together with the findings of Falk and Coplin, 
they allow us to realize what the two paradigms mean, and what is ment with the shift 
between them. Altogether, the postmodern or post-Westphalian paradigm can be 
grasped as a cognitive framework transcending the nation-state based authority model, 
making evident a significant transformation of Westphalia’s core institutions, sover-
eignty and balance of power, towards a new normative setting named supra-national, or 
multilateral.62 States may remain paramount actors, yet sovereignty looses its territority-
bound nature and experiences an upgrade to the level of institutionalized interstatehood. 
 
Post-nationalism and global governance 
 
We have to admit that at the beginning of the 21st century, and probably as a result of 
the political history of the last one, the term nation-state seems out of order, without 
clear reference to reality. The spatial and ethnic coincidence of nation and state does not 
exist anymore. It can be questioned if it ever existed, or if it was just the virtual con-
struct of the so-called nation-state ideology of the late 18th and 19th century. 
 
“As far as differentiation and the ‘national’ are concerned, one sees ... how costly 
the failure of a clear analytical distinction between ‘nation’ and ‘state’ is for stud-
ies of contemporary world politics. As a matter of fact, the ‘national idea’ was to-
tally absent from the blueprints of Westphalia. The insertion of this idea by the ar-
                                                                                                                                               
Steve (ed.) [1996]: International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. Cambridgs, Mass., and Vasquesz, 
John A. [1997]: The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs/ In: 
American Political Science Review (December). 
61 For this para, see op. cit., p. 192. Further references are provided there. 
62 I would like to provide reference to Ruggie, John Gerard [1993b]: Multilateralism: The Anatomy of 
an Institution/ In: Ruggie, John Gerard (ed.) [1993a]: Multilateralism Matters. The Theory and Praxis 
of an Institutional Form. New York, N.Y., who understands multilateralism as a concept of constitu-
tive rules that order relations in given domains of international life. Particular emphasis is laid on their 
architecture as open networks (see op. cit., p. 12). Further reference is made to Krasner, Stephen 
[1993], who allocates social power to networks of an ideological, economic, military and political na-
ture respectively.   
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chitects of the nation-state (circa 1789) suggests the insufficiency of the state (and 
of ‘territoriality’) as the sole principle of organization of segmented global or-
ders.”63 
 
Differentiation and segmented global orders refer to processes as described as globaliza-
tion or re-configuration of the spatial and social allocation of races, tribes and civiliza-
tions. Lapid and Kratochwil recall that since 1989 world order has known a rapid trend 
of self-transformation towards a fragmented, re-shuffled picture of states as spatial units 
and ethnics as “creatures of time”64.  
 
Anticipating these views, in his article Ethnizität, Nationalismus und multikulturelle 
Gesellschaft, Claus Leggewie65 observes that since the late Eighties, conflicts are 
mostly of an ethnical nature and thus due to criteria that are not dealt with in most con-
stitutional frameworks. The author raises the question how ethnical facts can be brought 
in accordance with other forms of collective, especially national, identity.66 
Leggewie mentions various theories that address this dilemma, ranging from the hy-
pothesis that ethnicity is the consequence of failed states or modernization, respectively, 
to the view of nationalism as an atavism, a means of the power politics fashion of the 
19th century. In any case, the debate shows that, given the contemporary international 
order, identity formation does no longer simply and generally follow the logic of nation-
state-based patterns.  
 
Since a few years, various scholars have brought up the term postnational politics as a 
comprehensive means to grasp the notion of postmodern patterns in international rela-
tions as they relate to the changing nature, structure and functional aspects of so-called 
nation-states. First raised in Jürgen Habermas’ Die postnationale Konstellation67, the 
concept of postnational politics has been thoroughly explored and featured by Michael 
Zürn68. In his article Zu den Merkmalen postnationaler Politik69 he characterizes poli-
                                                 
63 Lapid, Yosef/ Kratochwil, Friedrich [1996b]: Revisiting the ‚National‘: Toward an Identity Agenda in 
Neorealism?/ In: Lapid, Yosef/ Kratochwil, Friedrich (eds.) [1996a]. (here p. 123) 
64 See op. cit., p. 123. 
65 Leggewie, Claus [1994]: Ethnizität, Nationalismus und multikulturelle Gesellschaft/ In: Berdug, Hel-
mut (ed.) [1994]: Nationales Bewußtsein und kollektive Identität. Frankfurt (Main). 
66 See op. cit., p. 46-47. 
67 Habermas, Jürgen [1998]: Die postnationale Konstellation. Politische Essays. Frankfurt (Main). Eng-
lish version: Habermas, Jürgen [2001]: The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays. Cambridge, 
Mass. 
68 Explicit reference is made to his following works: Zürn, Michael [1998]: Regieren jenseits des Na-
tionalstaates. Denationalisierung und Globalisierung als Chance. Frankfurt (Main), Zürn, Michael 
[2000]: Vom Nationalstaat lernen/ In: Menzel, Ulrich (ed.) [2000a]: Vom Ewigen Frieden und vom 
Wohlstand der Nationen. Frankfurt (Main), and Zürn, Michael [2001]: Politik in der postnationalen 
Konstellation. Über das Elend des methodologischen Nationalismus/ In: Landfried, Christine (ed.) 
[2001]: Politik in einer entgrenzten Welt. Opladen. Named be also Menzel, Ulrich [2000b]: Die post-
westfälische Konstellation, das Elend der Nationen und das Kreuz von Globalisierung und Fragmen-
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tics in the times of the postnational constellation, the latter marking a deep and para-
digmatic shift in internatonal order – similar to the one leading from feudal rule to na-
tion-state based order characterized by territoriality and sovereignty70. Subsequently, 
Zürn wants to abandon once and for all what he calls as methodological nationalism, a 
concept, if not an ideology, perceiving states and governments as the sole players in 
international relations and stating that the identity of states is bound to their internal 
formation as nations and their outward function as territorial entities ready to wage war 
against whomever may challenge their boundaries. 
 
Zürn refers to a changed historical context, similar to the one leading to Westphalia, that 
makes any further attempt to maintain general concepts such as the methodological na-
tionalism useless. Governance is traditionally based on security, the rule of law, partici-
pation in decision-making and social welfare. Zürn calls these normative and functional 
goods71. Historically, the Sixties and the Seventies of the 20th century marked their 
prime when the national constellation had reached a peak. National constellation means 
order based on the principles of sovereignty, recognition, material resources such as 
territory, use of force and finance, and the right to formulate policies.72 
 
Nowadays, according to Zürn, this national constellation is no more: we live in a so-
called postnational constellation, where international institutions based on norms, rules 
and procedures have gained significant value, aiming at harmonizing and cooperatively 
streamlining what used to be national politics. This process of denationalization is re-
flected in the growing multitude of multilateral agreements of the past two decades. 
Those feature a shifted nature with different goals. While agreements based on the 
Westphalian paradigm yielded to restrain the actions of states, postmodern ones aim at 
formulating normative goals that comprise more and more non-state actors, thus ad-
dressing societies rather than governments.73 
 
Zürn writes: 
“Supranationale Institutionen entwickeln Normen und Regeln, die gegenüber der 
nationalen Gesetzgebung als vorrangig anerkannt werden ... und beschäftigen Be-
dienstete, die eine relativ hohe Unabhängigkeit von den entsendenden nationalen 
                                                                                                                                               
tierung/ In: Menzel, Ulrich (ed.) [2000a], who calls the postnational constellation postwestphalian 
constellation, and creates linkages with post-nationalism, globalization and growing fragmentation in 
IR. 
69 Zürn, Michael [2002]: Zu den Merkmalen postnationaler Politik/ In: Jachtenfuchs, Markus/ Knodt, 
Michèle (eds.) [2002a]: Regieren in internationalen Institutionen. Opladen. 
70 Zürn may use different language here but obviously refers to the analogy between the pre-
Westphalia/Wetphalia shift and the one leading to postmodernity, too. 
71 See Zürn, Michael [2002], p. 216. 
72 See op. cit., p. 217-218. 
73 See op. cit., p. 218-219. 
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Regierungen haben... Jenseits von und überhalb des Nationalstaats hat sich ein 
dichtes Geflecht von Regelungen und Organisationen entwickelt, das internationa-
le Foren zum vorrangigen Platz für die Formulierung von Politiken macht, die 
den Zielen des Regierens dienen.”74 
 
Further phenomena and epiphenomena of the postnational constellation according to 
Zürn are the lack of a strong central power entrusted with means of enforcement, func-
tional differentiation between international actors and limited authority. Legitimacy, 
previously provided through internal constitutional provisions such as dynasty or elec-
toral vote, is nowadays more approved by consensus of the international community and 
in accordance with the rules and regulations set out by their institutional bodies. The 
motivation of actors to play globally is far more than during the modern period driven 
by an interest to cooperate, or due to an evolved insight that (national) interests are best 
achieved throuh cooperation.75 
 
However, Zürn warns that the end of nation-states, if at all, has not come yet: the para-
digmatic change in question is expressed as a switch of gravity towards postnational 
governance structures and patterns, while states remain partly – mostly as far as their 
internal constitution is concerned – organized along the Westphalian line. The shift to-
wards postnationality is gradual, and the degree of its completion varies on a regional 
basis, and also depending on policy fields. World trade, for instance, is a field where 
denationalization and postnational governance have evolved further than on the security 
one. 
 
Still, Zürn insists that post-nationalism seems to be much more than an episode. The 
patterns and practices described in the foregoing paras, but also the changing notion of 
classic terms like power and resources are indicative for a real shift in progress: whereas 
the classic notion of power means the capacity to force someone, it is now rather the 
privilege not to comply with international standards and agreements. And the term re-
sources nowadays refers to a variety of entities such as education and knowledge, and 
coincides widely with the phenomenon of transnational epistemic communities.76 
 
When Zürn uses governance as a black box concept he merely refers to established hi-
erarchical structures such as states. Traditionally, governance means “die Herbeiführung 
kollektiv verbindlicher Entscheidungen, um in unterschiedlichen Politikfeldern be-
stimmte Ziele zu erreichen”77. According to this definition, governance refers to a con-
                                                 
74 Zürn, Michael [2002], p. 220-221. 
75 See op. cit., p. 225-224. 
76 See op. cit., p. 232. 
77 Beate Kohler-Koch as quoted in Knodt, Michèle/ Jachtenfuchs, Markus [2002b]: Regieren in interna-
tionalen Institutionen/ In: Jachtenfuchs, Markus/ Knodt, Michèle (eds.) [2002a]. (p. 9). 
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scious effort of collective target identification, combined with bundled efforts yielding 
the compliance of all actors involved. But what does it mean in terms of postmodern 
practice? And what does it mean in the context of contemporary international relations 
and in the absence of a central enforcement power? Apparently, also the notion of this 
classical term has witnessed a shift in reference. 
 
IR scholars have more and more argued against the traditional conceptual divide be-
tween the international system as anarchical and the vision of a hierarchical domestic 
state. Not only the emerging problem of failed states leads to this insight, also the inner 
constitution and outer appearance of OECD members hints in this direction.78 Statehood 
is presently diversifying its territorial reference towards regionalization, as far as a 
growing independance of self-governing sub-entities is concerned, and regionalism, 
meaning inter-governmental regimes on a geographical basis, such as trade unions. Fur-
thermore, with a view to the effects of globalization, the significance of boundaries has 
drastically diminished. Such issues have to be dealt with taking into account the 
changed nature of governance – Alberta Sbragia calls this multi-level governance79 and 
mostly points at the mentioned trend towards regionalism as a political process.  
 
But there is more to it: not only statehood and boundaries raise new challenges to the 
concept of governance, the emergence of private actors, or civil society, has trans-
formed the notion of the term discussed here as well. Governance on the international 
scale is therefore mostly seen as a process of regulation beyond the nation-state using 
non-hierarchical, i.e. horizontal cooperation patterns and comprising also a widely 
spread network of international institutions.80 The field sketched out here is commonly 
referred to as international governance or global governance. 
 
Postmodern perspectives on international institutions commonly bring about the view 
that they are social constructs - or institutions in Kratochwil’s sense as described further 
above - that are merely based on ideas and norms rather than on power and interest. 
Given their nature along the semantics of a contrat social, international institutions must 
comprise civil society actors and organize themselves in a horizontal manner, if widely 
spread consensus and compliance to the rules and norms set out by them is to be 
yielded.81 
                                                 
78 See Knodt, Michèle/ Jachtenfuchs, Markus [2002b], p. 10. 
79 Sbragia, Alberta M.: Building Markets and Comparative Regionalism: Governance Beyond the Na-
tion-State/ In: Jachtenfuchs, Markus/ Knodt, Michèle (eds.) [2002a]. (p. 237) 
80 See Knodt, Michèle/ Jachtenfuchs, Markus [2002b], p. 15. 
81 A detailed discussion of the topic of compliance, civil society and international institutions featuring 
the constructivist point of view is provided in Börzel, Tanja A./ Risse, Thomas [2002]: Die Wirkung 
internationaler Institutionen. Von der Normanerkennung zur Normeinhaltung/ In: Jachtenfuchs, Mar-
kus/ Knodt, Michèle (eds.) [2002a]. Recommended articles on constructivism are Kratochwil, Frie-
drich [2001]: Constructivism as an Approach to Interdisciplinary Study, and Zehfuss, Maja [2001]: 
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Klaus Dieter Wolf82 argues that intergovernmental cooperation, traditionally established 
to effectively tackle transborder issues, is more and more lacking control by social ac-
tors and would thus be leading to a process of de-democratization of international gov-
ernance. He therefore calls for a new raison d’état, that understands international gov-
ernance as an inter-cultural regulatory process, legally carried out at inter-governmental 
level, but significantly implying civil society actors in the decision-making so as to 
yield legitimacy. For Wolf, the perspective of at least a partial privatization of world 
politics is realistic - he speaks about the emergence of the cooperative state83. 
 
The tendency to exchange the terms international or world politics more and more 
through international relations marks a great change in the generalized perception on 
the nature of the contemporary international system, stressing out the emerged role of 
supranational agencies, collective governance patterns and civil society actors respec-
tively. Moreover, scholars have started to deeper explore the field in terms of perceiving 
politics as one among other factors constituting what is commonly called international 
relations84, along with other phenomena such as culture and economics.  
 
Intense debates have been carried out since a while on the nature and functional specif-
ics of civil society. Mervyn Frost85, for instance, warns that the ethical significance of 
global civil society should not be misunderstood. Frost refers to two common view-
points. For the first one86, global civil society is “ethically important” but also a “fragile 
layor of non-state actors sandwiched between states and markets”, i.e. a set of voluntary 
associations and organizations, while for the second one, the neo-Marxist school - Frost 
quotes here Justin Rosenberg87 -, global civil society is seen as “a social formation 
which includes the global market”. For the latter view, civil society is “of enormous 
structural power such that even states are subject to it”. But according to Frost, both 
perspectives clearly lack the ethical dimension of global civil society which he finds 
                                                                                                                                               
Constructivism in International Relations: Wendt, Onuf, and Kratochwil – both in: Fierke, Karin M./ 
Jorgensen, Knud Erik (eds.) [2001]: Constructing International Relations – the next generation. 
Armonk, N.Y. and London, and Checkel, Jeffrey T. [1998]: The Constructivist Turn in International 
Relations Theory/ In: World Politics Vol. 50 (January). 
82 Wolf, Klaus Dieter [2002]: Zivilgesellschaftliche Selbstregulierung: ein Ausweg aus dem Dilemma 
des internationalen Regierens?/ In: Jachtenfuchs, Markus/ Knodt, Michèle (eds.) [2002a]. 
83 See op. cit., p. 184. 
84 A contemporary reader containing brilliant articles that deal with the political aspect of IR is Ebata, 
Michi/ Neufeld, Beverly (eds.) [2000]: Confronting the Political in International Relations. Hound-
mills/ London. 
85 Frost, Mervyn [1996]: Global Civil Society: Taking Rights Seriously/ In: Millennium. London. (here 
p. 1-2) 
86 Artcles along this line are contained in Walzer, Michael (ed.) [1995]: Towards a Global Civil Society. 
Oxford. 
87 Rosenberg, Justin [1994]: The Empire of Civil Society. London. 
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“fundamental to our flourishing as ethical beings”. For him, civil society “is the social 
formation within which we constitute one another as rights holders”.88 
 
A more rationalist approach is suggested by Ronnie D. Lipschutz, who explains the 
emergence of global civil society with interacting phenomena both at the structural as 
well as the agency level: while liberalism has achieved universal acceptance as “operat-
ing system” in IR and thus provides space for non-state actors to prompt in, national 
governments are not anymore in a position to provide public welfare goods as they used 
to do, a fact that allows new networks of educated, skilled individuals and associations, 
somewhat like the epistemic community, to take over responsibilities formerly allocated 
to the classic state.89 
 
Other contributions deal with legitimacy of NGO participation in international govern-
ance90, the aspect of democratization of the UN system91 or issues such as distribution 
of power92. The latter states that the end of the Cold War has led to a process of redistri-
bution of power among states, markets, international organizations and non-state actors. 
This process is most reflected in the changing nature of international agencies. Jessica 
T. Mathews argues that, in modernity, those used to be membership based organizations 
of nation-states. Nowadays, they are “building constituencies of their own and, through 
NGOs, establishing direct connections to the peoples of the world”93. 
 
Mathews continues: 
“International organizations are still coming to terms with unprecedented growth 
in the volume of international problem-solving... Treaties, regimes, and inter-
governmental institutions... are multiplying. ‘Soft law’ in the form of guidelines, 
recommended practises, nonbinding resolutions, and the like is also rapidly ex-
panding. Behind each new agreement are scientists and lawyers who worked on it, 
diplomats who negotiated it, and NGOs that back it, most of them committed for 
the long haul.”94 
 
                                                 
88 See Frost, Mervyn [1996], p. 2-3. 
89 Lipschutz, Ronnie D. [1996]: Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society/ 
In: Fawn, Rick/ Larkins, Jeremy (eds.) [1996]: International Society after the Cold War. London/ New 
York, N.Y. (here p. 120-121) 
90 Schweitz, Martha L. [1995]: NGO Participation in International Governance: The question of Legiti-
macy/ In: Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (89th Meeting). 1995. (p. 413-
432) 
91 Otto, Dianne [1996]: Nongovernmental Organizations in the United Nations System: the Emerging 
Role of International Civil Society/ In: Human Rights Quarterly 18 (1996). 
92 Mathews, Jessica T. [1997]: Power Shift/ In: Foreign Affairs (January/February). 
93 Op. cit., p. 58. 
94 Op. cit., p. 59. 
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Contemporary contributions mostly explore international organizations in terms of their 
role as promoter of, forum for, and part of global governance processes and structures. 
Contrary to the old functionalist approach - optimal structures for optimal solutions - 
and traditional rational choice models - effective organizations will be selecetd by force 
of market -, authors such as the Haas brothers95 tackle the phenomenological aspect of 
organizations: these have tremendous staying power, even without function or in ab-
sence of efficiency. The conclusion is: organizations learn. They have a cultural value. 
 
As a movement parallel to the conceptual reconstruction of the phenomenon of global-
ization96, the already introduced term global governance has emerged in IR theory since 
the early Nineties. As a scientific concept, it implies various aspects as have been sum-
marized by Ulrich Menzel: 
 
“Dabei geht es ... um die Bearbeitung der Effektivitäts- und Koordinierungsprob-
leme, die sich aus [der] Vielzahl von Akteuren, Regelungsformen und Handlungs-
ebenen zwangsläufig ergeben. Gemeint ist damit insbesondere die sog. Mehrebe-
nenproblematik, die sich einerseits aus der Koexistenz bzw. Kooperation staatli-
cher und nichtstaatlicher Akteure ergibt."97 
 
In their article Global Governance – Herausforderungen an der Schwelle zum 21. Jahr-
hundert, Dirk Messner and Franz Nuscheler98 co-relate global governance with the im-
                                                 
95 Haas, Peter M./ Haas, Ernst B. [1993]: Learning to Learn. Some Thoughts on Improving Global Gov-
ernance (lecture script). Geneva. 
96 The present book does not aim at dealing with globalization issues as such, although linkages and 
impacts towards the topics examined here are obvious and significant. A well-appreciated articel in-
troducing the phenomenon is Perraton, Jonathan/ Goldblatt, David/ Held, David/ Mc Grew, Anthony 
[1998b]: Globalisation of Economic Activity/ In: Perraton, Jonathan/ Goldblatt, David/ Held, David/ 
Mc Grew, Anthony [1998a]: Global Flows, Global Transformations: Concepts, Evidence and Argu-
ments. Cambridge, Engl. Discussions of the interactions between globalization and the changing na-
ture of statehood are contained in Rittberger, Volker [2000]: Globalisierung und der Wandel der 
Staatenwelt/ In: Menzel, Ulrich (ed.) [2000a], Cable, Vincent (ed.) [2000]: Globalization and Global 
Governance: Rules and Standards for the World Economy. London, and Cerny, Philip G. [1995]: 
Globalization and the changing logic of collective action/ In: International Organization 49 (Autumn). 
The impacts of globalization on state formation, labour and social systems are explored in Altvater, 
Elmar/ Mahnkopf, Birgit [1999]: Grenzen der Globalisierung. Münster, and Altvater, Elmar/ Mah-
nkopf, Birgit [2002]: Globalisierung der Unsicherheit. Münster, while tensions and linkages between 
globalization, participation and the local level are thoroughly explored in the following reader: Berndt, 
Michael/ Sack, Detlef (eds.) [2001]: Glocal Governance? Voraussetzungen und Formen demokrati-
scher Beteiligung im Zeichen der Globalisierung. Wiesbaden. Glocal governance is also subject to 
Altvater, Elmar/ Brunnengräber, Achim [2002]: NGOs im Spannungsfeld von Lobbyarbeit und öffent-
lichem Protest/ In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 6-7. 
97 Menzel, Ulrich [2000b], p. 179. 
98 Messner, Dirk/ Nuscheler, Franz [1997]: Global Governance – Herausforderungen an der Schwelle 
zum 21. Jahrhundert/ In: Senghaas, Dieter (ed.) [1997]: Frieden machen. Frankfurt (Main). Another 
article by one of the co-autors exploring more the linkages between globalization, global governance 
and development is Messner, Dirk [1999]: Globalisierung, Global Governance und Entwicklungspoli-
tik/ In: Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 1. 
 Andreas Rechkemmer 
 
26 
pacts of advanced globalization on the diminishing power potential of the state and 
summarize: 
 
“Global Governance bedeutet ... weder die hierarchische Steuerung der Welt-
Gesellschaft durch eine Weltregierung noch einfach die Summe der Aktivitäten 
von Nationalstaaten. Sie erfordert zwar eine Stärkung der Vereinten Natinen und 
anderer internationaler Organisationen, erschöpft sich aber nicht in einem Mehr 
an Multilateralismus und in einer global orientierten Außenpolitik; sie meint viel-
mehr das Zusammenwirken von staatlichen und nicht-staatlichen Akteuren von 
der lokalen bis zur globalen Ebene.”99 
 
They continue: 
“Global Governance bedeutet erstens die Neudefinition von Souveränität, die – 
verstanden als selbstbestimmte Herrschaftsgewalt nach innen und außen – durch 
die Globalisierungsprozesse unterminiert wird... Global Governance bedeutet 
zweitens die Verdichtung der internationalen Zusammenarbeit durch internationa-
le Regime mit verbindlichen Kooperationsregeln, also eine Verrechtlichung dieser 
Beziehungen... Global Governance meint drittens das Bewußtwerden gemeinsa-
mer Überlebensinteressen und steht für eine Außenpolitik, die sich normativ an 
einem Weltgemeinwohl orientiert... Global Governance meint ... einen ‘breit ange-
legten, dynamischen und komplexen Prozeß interaktiver Entscheidungsfindung’, 
an dem viele Akteure beteiligt sind."100 
 
In conclusion, the authors develop what they call the archticture of global governance, 
a scheme comprising all structures and policy levels that are constitutive for global gov-
ernance. Those are: nation-states, international regimes and organizations, national and 
global civil society, regional integration projects, business/ TNCs and the local level.101 
These action levels interplay on the basis of an ongoing process of international legisla-
tion. Finally, global governance is perceived as a cultural phenomenon of a normative 
nature.  
 
No need to underscore that Messner’s and Nuscheler’s approach is – just as most of the 
contributions dealing with global governance – in itself normative rather than merely 
descriptive102, but it is able to provide us with valuable material so as to grasp the notion 
                                                 
99 Op. cit., p. 342. 
100 Op. cit., p. 342-344. The authors refer to a definition set out by the Commission on Global Govern-
ance. Reference is provided in the article. 
101 Op. cit., p. 346. 
102 In Messner, Dirk [1998a]: Architektur der Weltordnung. Strategien zur Lösung globaler Probleme/ In: 
Internationale Politik Vol. 11, the author further elaborates on his architecture of global governance, 
providing six so-called dimensions of global governance, i.e. normative desiderata towards progress in 
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of global governance as an expression of postmodernity. I therefore deliberatley choose 
their definitory framework for further reference in this study.103 
 
The present chapter aimed at preparing the ground for the core elaborations I am going 
to outline in the following chapters. I wanted to explore the semantic field of the mod-
ernity/postmodernity discourse in international relations theory, providing a broad idea 
on the respective notions and implications of the postmodern or post-Westphalian para-
digm for contemporary international order, in contrast to the premodern and modern 
ones, respectively. Terms such as sovereignty, territoriatlity, balance of power, and the 
functional dimension of international law on one handside, and the concepts of post-
nationalism or denationalization, international institutions and global governance on the 
other, provided the backdrop in front of which the examination of UNCCD will be un-
dertaken.   
 
                                                                                                                                               
this field. An update is provided in Messner, Dirk/ Nuscheler, Franz [2003]: Das Konzept Global Go-
vernance. Stand und Perspektiven. Duisburg. 
103 While Messner and Nuscheler stand for a normative exploration of the field, and Menzel chooses a 
more analytical approach, a huge multitude of scholars have contributed substantially to the debate 
within the past decade, highlighting other aspects such as the institutional and legal dimension, and 
others. For our purpose it is sufficient to have been provided with somewhat like a conceptual frame-
work that allows us to understand the notions, dimensions and analytical impacts of global govern-
ance, and to relate these with the notions and dimensions of postmodernity in international relations. 
For further reference, I would like to mention Brozus, Lars/ Zürn, Michael [2003]: Regieren im 
Weltmaßstab/ In: Globalisierung – Informationen zur politischen Bildung 280 (published by Bundes-
zentrale für politische Bildung), 3. Quartal. Bonn, Finger, Matthias [2003]: Global governance as an 
institutional phenomenon/ In: Lederer, Markus/ Müller, Philipp (eds.) [2003]: Challenging the social 
democratic vision of globalization. Hamburg (forthcoming), Brunnengräber, Achim/ Stock, Christian 
[1999]: Global Governance: Ein neues Jahrhundertprojekt?/ In: PROKLA 116/29 Nr.3, and Risse, 
Thomas [1999]: Democratic Global Governance in the 21st Century/ In: Progressice Governance for 
the XXI Century (Conference Proceedings 20th and 21st November). Florence. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Rio as locus classicus for postmodernity 
 
Global environmental governance 
 
Indeed, much has been said and written on globalization, global governance and, more 
specifically, on global environmental governance within the past decade. Significantly 
enough, the terms globalization and global governance are relatively new: statitics 
show that their use in literature, science and rhethorics has basically started to become 
somewhat trendy only in the early Nineties.104 While it is not my undertaking here to 
write about the effects of globalization, it is evident that there are close links between 
this phenomenon and others commonly referred to as global environmental problems. 
 
Hans-Joachim Schellnhuber and Frank Biermann state in this context: 
“Fest steht aber, daß alle skizzierten Globalisierungsprozesse ganz wesentlich zur 
Veränderung der planetarischen Umwelt beitragen – indem sie ein hochkonsumti-
ves, auf kurzfristiges Denken angelegtes Zivilisationsmuster weltweit etablieren 
helfen und die kommerzielle Ausbeutung der Naturressourcen der Erde grenz-
überschreitend optimieren.”105 
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines globalization as follows: 
”Economic "globalization" is a historical process, the result of human innovation 
and technological progress. It refers to the increasing integration of economies 
around the world, particularly through trade and financial flows. The term some-
times also refers to the movement of people (labour) and knowledge (technology) 
across international borders. There are also broader cultural, political and envi-
ronmental dimensions of globalization.”106 
 
Markets promote efficiency through competition and the division of labour - the spe-
cialization that allows people and economies to focus on what they do best. Global mar-
kets offer greater opportunity for people to tap into more and larger markets around the 
world. It means that they can have access to more capital flows, technology, cheaper 
imports, and larger export markets. But markets do not necessarily ensure that the bene-
fits of increased efficiency are shared by all. Thus the issue of globalization cannot be 
simplified as a phenomenon of ‘free trade’ agreements, or the policies of the World 
                                                 
104 A detailed statistical examination of the issue is contained in Altvater, Elmar/ Mahnkopf, Birgit 
[1999]. (p. 20-21) 
105 Schellnhuber, Hans-Joachim/ Biermann, Frank [2000]: Eine ökologische Weltordnungspolitik. Globa-
les Umweltmanagement statt Untergangskultur/ In: Internationale Politik 12 (Dezember). (here p. 9) 
106 See the website <www.imf.org>. 
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Bank. It needs to be understood more systemically, as being a global process. A thor-
ough reorganization of the world's economic and political activity is underway, with 
takeover tendencies of governance patterns by transnational corporations and the inter-
national trade bureaucracies that they established.   
 
In conformity with a comprehensive classification established by the German Advisory 
Council on Global Change (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Bundesregierung Globale 
Umweltfragen/ WBGU), Udo E. Simonis names global environmental problems  
“changes in the atmosphere, in the oceans, and on land the causes of which can be at-
tributed, directly or indirectly, to human activities; these changes affect the natural 
metabolic cycles, the aquatic and terrestrial ecological systems, as well as economy and 
society...”107. 
 
Environmental problems can be categorized along three levels of appearance. Local 
phenomena are limited to the spatial dimension of states, e.g. emmissions in industrial 
zones, air pollution caused by traffic in urban areas, or the locally limited contamination 
of a river through chemical waste. Regional phenomena are of a transboundary, but re-
gionally limited nature, e.g. intoxication of transborder water basins, or drought periods. 
Global phenomena affect world-wide shared resources and sinks, e.g. climate change 
and global warming, the pollution of the oceans, or loss of genetic diversity. 
Although definitory considerations suggest that, following this classification,  only 
global phenomena are of international concern, emphasis has to be laid on the fact that 
also local or regional problems may, and sometimes do, culminate to an extent of a 
global dimension. To give just one example: a regional drought catastrophe may trigger 
chain reactions such as agriculture production loss, famine and poverty, migration or 
social unrest108.  
 
On the interplay of globalization and environment, it is obvious that not all globally 
known environmental problems are due to or inter-related with globalization effects.109 
However, it is worthwhile to discriminate two different types of interaction: firstly, we 
know of grave environmental problems that are caused or increased by globalization-
related phenomena. These are issues such as land degradation caused by unsustainable 
                                                 
107 Simonis, Udo E. [1999]: Global Environmental Problems – Searching for Adequate Solutions (WZB 
Policy Paper). Berlin (here: p. 3) – referring to German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) 
[1994]: World in Transition: Basic Structure of Global People-Environment Interactions. 1993 Annual 
Report. Bonn. 
108 A detailed examinitaion of the issue along with a number of case analysis is contained in Rechkem-
mer, Andreas [2000]: Environmental refugees and environmental migration. The very special case of 
desertification/ In: Gate 3/2000. 
109 A more detailed outline of this subject is provided in Rechkemmer, Andreas [2003b]: Lösungsansätze 
für globale Umweltprobleme/ In: Globalisierung – Informationen zur politischen Bildung 280 (pub-
lished by Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung), 3. Quartal. Bonn. 
 Andreas Rechkemmer 
 
30 
landuse and production patterns due to world market forces, the climate and energy di-
lemma - CO² emmisions, the greenhouse effect - due to world wide industrialization 
processes and ‘exported’ unsound technologies, or unsustainable energy consumption 
triggered by enhanced global mobilty.  
 
Secondly, we should also mention intermediate consequences such as the erosion of 
environmental safety standards due to competition pressure – reference can be made, for 
example, to the deforestation of rain forests, or textile production patterns in Asian 
countries.110 The interrelatedness of such issues as mentioned above is as obvious as are 
the mutual linkages between the said levels of ocurrance: the local, regional and global 
ones.111   
 
After three decades of intense data collection, research and analysis, there is broad con-
sensus in contemporary natural as well as social science as far as the identification of a 
number of environmental problems that are usually referred to as global is concerned. In 
this context, I would like to recall here: the cluster of climate change phenomena includ-
ing ozone layer depletion and global warming, loss of genetic (or biological) diversity, 
deforestation, soil erosion, land degradation and desertification, the contamination and 
other critical impacts on the world’s oceans and other international waters, scarcity of 
international freshwater resources, problems with waste and chemicals, and the use of 
non-renewable energies.112 
 
                                                 
110 For further reference and empirical case studies, refer to Altvater, Elmar/ Mahnkopf, Birgit [1999], 
and Altvater, Elmar/ Mahnkopf, Birgit [2002]. 
111 Further reommended articles on the interplay of globalization, environment and global public policies 
are Altvater, Elmar [1992]: Der Preis des Wohlstands oder Umweltplünderung und neue 
Welt(un)ordnung. Münster, Hirst, Paul [1997]: The global economy – myth and realities/ In: Interna-
tional Affairs 73, 3, and Esser, Klaus [1998]: Nationalstaatliches Handeln im Übergang von der In-
dustrie- zur Informationsökonomie/ In: Messner, Dirk (ed.) [1998b]: Die Zukunft des Staates und der 
Politik. Bonn. 
112 See also Rechkemmer, Andreas [2003b], p. 72-74. I will not further elaborate on a detailed description 
and exploration of this important matter, apart from the ten points flagged out in the next para, since a 
huge number of scientific contributions is available addressing these major global environmental 
problems. For the purpose of this book, it is sufficient to have named them. For further reference, 
please refer to Simonis, Udo E. [1996]: Globale Umweltpolitik: Ansätze und Perspektiven. Mannheim 
etc., Wöhlke, Manfred [1996]: Sicherheitsrisiken aus Umweltveränderungen (SWP-Arbeitspapier 
2977). Ebenhausen (Isar), Jänicke, Martin/ Weidner, Helmut [1997]: Zum aktuellen Stand der Um-
weltpolitik im internationalen Vergleich – Tendenzen zu einer globalen Konvergenz?/ In: Aus Politik 
und Zeitgeschichte B27/97, Jänicke, Martin [1998]: Umweltpolitik: Global am Ende oder am Ende 
global?/ In: Beck, Ulrich (ed.) [1998]: Perspektiven der Weltgesellschaft. Frankfurt, Graßl, Hartmut 
[2000]: Globale und allgegenwärtige Umweltprobleme: Bestandsaufnahme und qualitative Einschät-
zung, and Jänicke, Martin [2000]: Profile globaler Umweltveränderungen – both in: Kreibich, Rolf/ 
Simonis, Udo E. (eds.) [2000]: Global Change - Globaler Wandel. Berlin,  and Bundesministerium für 
wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) (ed.) [2002]: Von Rio nach Johannesburg. 
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In his article The Global Environmental Agenda:Origins and Prospects, James Gustave 
Speth113 provides his own account for the ten most pressing global environmental issues 
of our time: 
? Loss of crop and grazing land due to desertification, erosion, conversion of land to 
non-farm uses, and other factors; 
? Depletion of the world ’s tropical forests, leading to loss of forest resources, serious 
watershed damage (erosion, flooding, and siltation), and other adverse conse-
quences; 
? Mass extinction of species, principally from the global loss of wildlife habitat, and 
the associated loss of genetic resources; 
? Rapid population growth, burgeoning Third World cities, and ecological refugees; 
? Mismanagement and shortages of freshwater resources; 
? Overfishing, habitat destruction, and pollution in the marine environment; 
? Threats to human health from mismanagement of pesticides and persistent organic 
pollutants; 
? Climate change due to the increase in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere; 
? Acid rain and, more generally, the effects of a complex mix of air pollutants on for-
ests and crops; 
? Depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer by CFCs and other gases. 
 
However, global environmental issues did not really play a significant role on the inter-
national political stage – as far as the UN and other formal negotiation settings are con-
cerned – until the early 1970s. The consciousness of the necessity for a sustainable use 
of the planet’s natural resources was basically, if at all, limited to national initiatives. At 
the time of the United Nations’ inauguration in 1945, environmental issues did not mat-
ter - there is no reference made within the provisions of the UN Charter.114 The Organi-
zation first focused on the issues of peace and security, international cooperation and 
human rights.  
 
In the same context, the Worldwatch Institute states: 
“When the United Nations was created a half-century ago, such events would 
have been difficult to imagine. Environmental degradation was not even consid-
ered much of a national threat at that time, let alone a pressing global problem 
that could provoke international conflict and undermine human health, economic 
well-being, and social stability. Accordingly, the U.N. Charter does not even men-
tion the word ‘environment’. In 1945, as large parts of Europe and Asia lay in ru-
                                                 
113 Speth, James Gustave [2002]: The Global Environmental Agenda: Origins and Prospects/ In: Esty, 
Daniel C./ Ivanova, Maria H. (eds.) [2002]: Global Environmental Governance: Options & Opportuni-
ties. New Haven, Ct. (Quoted items are taken from the executive summary.) 
114 See also Rechkemmer, Andreas [2003b], p. 74-75. 
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ins, ensuring that no world war would ever again break out was viewed as the 
most urgent task before the world community.”115 
 
As a result of the emerging process of de-colonialization and thus of the growing num-
ber of UN member states especially in the 1960s, however, new issues like development 
as well as economic and social affairs made it on the international agenda. Finally, also 
environment was recognized generally as a global issue to be dealt with by the interna-
tional community and in particular by the United Nations and its specialized agencies. 
 
It was in 1968 that the United Nations General Assembly first recognized the need to 
engage into international environmental issues. Resolution GA 23/198 states that greater 
attention should be given to human environment as a basis for sustainable economic and 
social development. Furthermore, the General Assembly expressed the hope that donors 
would assist developing countries through the means of enhanced cooperation to find 
appropriate solutions for their environmental problems. It was the first time that a link 
had been established between environment and development. The same resolution 
called for the organization of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment (UNCHE), the first world conference on environment. 
 
In 1972, the UN organized this conference in Stockholm. Its opening day, 5 June, is still 
celebrated globally as world environment day. Imke Keil calls UNCHE a first pragmatic 
step towards environmental politics.116 Although the 113 participating countries insisted 
on their national prerogatives throughout the conference and seemed unlikely to sacri-
fice those to some extent so as to ensure a common denominator as a platform for sub-
stantial improvements, two remarkable results came out of UNCHE: the main conclud-
ing document, the Declaration on Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration), which 
basically consists of a thorough listing of environmental problems of global concern 
known at the time, and, in accordance with the notable provisions of resolution GA 
23/198, the call for the foundation of the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), headquartered in Nairobi, Kenya, to be confirmed by the following General 
Assembly session.117 
 
UNCHE was a bold step forward, in the sense that for the first time ever, global players 
and stakeholders could refer to an international document addressing the full range of 
known environmental issues of global concern. Also, the declaration addressed all the 
pertaining issues highlighted in resolution GA 23/198, notably the linkage created be-
                                                 
115 Worldwatch Institute [1995]: Partnership for the Planet: An Environmental Agenda for the United 
Nations. Washington DC. 
116 Keil, Imke [1994]: Die Umweltpolitik der Vereinten Nationen/ In: Hüfner, Klaus (ed.) [1994]: Die 
Reform der Vereinten Nationen. Opladen. 
117 A comprehensive review of UNCHE is given in Keil, Imke [1994]. 
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tween environment and development. Furthermore, other important issues such as inter-
national liability and the polluter pays principle, the decision to raise the official devel-
opment assistance (ODA) of OECD countries to 0.7% of their GNP, and the foundation 
of Earthwatch, a global satellite-based monitoring system, were addressed and estab-
lished first through the Stockholm Declaration.  
 
However, since there was neither a legally binding status attached to this document nor 
a clear mechanism for arbitration and enforcement created, the Declaration did not have 
sufficient power, and just reflected a Westphalian symptom: states were ready to ad-
dress global issues globally, but rather dwelled on their national authority in handling 
environmental affairs.118 
 
The second important multilateral achievement concerning global environment was the 
foundation of UNEP, whose onset functions consisted mainly in the collection, systema-
tization and dissemination of state-of-the art knowledge, the coordination of national 
and inter-agency efforts, mainstreaming the most pertaining problems of global envi-
ronment into existing inter-governmental processes and conferences, and the facilitation 
of conferences, meetings and workshops. However, UNEP - obviously exceeding the 
tied nature of its original mandate - soon started to play a more pro-active role in pro-
viding leadership and catalytical support to the invocation of new conventions and re-
gimes such as the Washington Convention on International Trade in Endangered Spe-
cies of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the MARPOL convention restricting inten-
tional discharges by ships (both 1973), the Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), 
the Vienna Convention (1985) respective the Montreal Protocol on Substances that De-
plete the Ozone Layer (1987), and the Basel Convention on controlling transboundary 
movement of hazardous wastes (1989). UNEP also established the International Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) in October 1990.119 But like UNCHE, apart from the pro-
active promotion measures sketched out above, the initial organizational matrix of 
UNEP can be considered as rather weak: no enforcement, no controlling, no initiative 
for international legally binding arrangements.120 Its budget comes from the regular UN 
core budget, fund raising for programming and project design and administration is, as a 
rule, depending on voluntary contibutions by member states, trust funds and even by 
non-governmental entities - a ‘humiliating’ perspective. Despite all this, UNEP in its 
history has proved to be somewhat creative: apart from Earthwatch, the GRID/GPS sat-
ellite imaging project has been set up, input to a multitude of international, regional and 
                                                 
118 See op. cit., p. 82. 
119 Thorough evaluations of most of the named regimes are contained in Gehring, Thomas/ Oberthür, 
Sebastian (eds.) [1997a]: Internationale Umweltregime: Unweltschutz durch Verhandlungen und Ver-
träge. Opladen. 
120 See Keil, Imke [1994], p. 83. 
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national conferences has been provided, HABITAT, and a series of international treaties 
have been promoted and inaugurated by UNEP. 
 
Since resolution GA 23/198 and 1972’s UNCHE, global environmental issues had thus 
been tackled multilaterally at first, but much according to the principle of non-binding 
resolutions and political committments, apart from some of the aforementioned particu-
lar regimes, and without challenging the tradtional sovereignty concept of the states 
involved.  
 
Ultimately, the break-through for global environmental governance came in the Eight-
ies.121 Following an initiative by UNEP, the United Nations General Assembly in 1984 
established the World Commision on Environment and Development (WCED), the so-
called Brundtland Commission122. Its members were independant experts who were 
supposed to come up with substantive proposals for enhanced exploration of the nexus 
environment-development. The commision’s final report Our common future, or 
Brundtland-Report123, became the locus classicus for the term sustainable development, 
its definition became a paradigm: 
 
“Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable – to ensure that it 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future genera-
tions to meet their own needs."124 
 
The Brundtland report further defines sustainable development as “...a process of 
change in which exploitation of resources, the direction of investment, the orientation of 
technological development, and institutional change are made consistent with future as 
well as present needs”125. For Udo E. Simonis, sustainable development thus deals with 
“two fundamental issues, i.e. inter-generational equity and comprehensive structural 
adjustment”126. It has to be recalled that the term sustainable development was pro-
moted and functionalized by the Brundtland Commission, yet not invented. It was first 
introduced in 1980 as part of the World Conservation Strategy published jointly by The 
                                                 
121 The notion of global environmental governance is distinct from the one of global environmental poli-
tics, which is an adequate description for the multilateral efforts of the period before 1984/87. Global 
environmental governance implies the concept of global governance, postmodern in itself, as outlined 
in the previous chapter. Further attention to this matter is provided further down this chapter. 
122 This name followed the commission‘s chairwoman, the former Prime Minister of Norway, Mrs Gro 
Harlem Brundtland. 
123 World Commision on Environment and Development [1987]: Our common future. Oxford. German 
Version: Hauff, Volker (ed.) [1987]: Unsere gemeinsame Zukunft. Weltkommission für Umwelt und 
Entwicklung. Greven. 
124 World Commision on Environment and Development [1987], p. 8-9. 
125 Op. cit. 
126 Simonis, Udo E. [1998a]: How to lead world society towards sustainable development? (WZB Policy 
Paper). Berlin. (here p. 1) 
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World Conservation Union (IUCN), the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and UNEP127. 
The core concept foresees that economic growth is on the long run not possible without 
maintaing functional ecosystems, and that revenue generation by simple exploitation of 
natural resources is possible only for a short while.  
 
Petra Stephan128 says:  
“Keine andere Leitvision für die Gestaltung der Weltgesellschaft hat in den ver-
gangenen zehn Jahren eine auch nur annähernd große Verbreitung gefunden.” 
 
The Brundtland report became influential by creating a strong link between the policy 
fields, or sectors, of environment and development, highlighting that poverty, under-
development and depletion of natural resources are closely linked and mutually interac-
tive. The concept of sustainable development became the new paradigm for global envi-
ronmental governance. The publication and dissemination of the Brundtland Report 
coincided with the ongoing erosion process in the Eastern political hemisphere and the 
end of the Cold War. It thus benefited in its outlook from a newly created historical 
momentum, in which states, all over sudden, were ready and eager to revive the princi-
ple of collective action and yield the establishment of multilateral agreements under the 
aegis of the United Nations.  
 
It was the time of an important series of world conferences, invoking new forms of in-
ternational agreements, in which genuine collective goals were identified and supposed 
to be tackled. Nation-states showed readiness to sacrifice national interests and tradi-
tional sovereignty considerations to a large extent for the desired benefit of global con-
cerns. This phase reached its climax in the early Nineties and was reflected in a number 
of ‘historical’ addresses invoking a new world order129. Being a so-called soft policy 
area, global environmental issues benefited from this momentum, given that heads of 
states and governments obviously perceived it as one of the preferred testing grounds 
for the newly identified approach. Thus, the spirit of postmodernity was given a gener-
ous platform to infiltrate international relations. 
 
In this context, and following the suggestions of the Brundtland Report, the General 
Assembly passed resolution 44/228 on 22 March 1989, which decided on the organiza-
tion of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), to 
                                                 
127 IUCN/UNEP/WWF [1991]: World Conservation Strategy – Living Resource Conservation for Sus-
tainable Development. Gland. 
128 Stephan, Petra [2002]: Nachhaltigkeit: ein semantisches Chamäleon. In: E+Z – Entwicklung und Zu-
sammenarbeit 4/ April. (here p. 112) 
129 This term is usually identified with President George Bush sen.‘s speech to the U.S. Congress. 6 
March 1991. This speech has often been cited as the administration’s principal policy statement on the 
postwar order in the Middle East.  
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be held from 3 to 14 June 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The foreseen mandate for 
UNCED was originally to review and to take stock of the development made on the 
respective sectors of environment and development since the Stockholm Conference of 
1972, and to identify new strategies for enhanced collective action at both global and 
regional levels. It was foreseen to further merge the two sectors into the field of sustain-
able development. 
 
UNCED is regarded as incomparable and the most important event to date in global 
environmental politics. The conference represented a watershed due to comprehensive 
calls for linking environmental and development issues as stated above. Expectations of 
the representatives from the 180 participating countries ran high, and the concept of 
sustainable development, which had become a sort of slogan, introduced a new quality 
in international cooperation. A number of key multilateral resolutions and agreements 
were agreed on at UNCED, above all »Agenda 21«. Expectations were even higher for 
the next decade regarding prevention of environmental catastrophes, a just organization 
of global markets and the fight against poverty and famine. The Nineties were supposed 
to bring about a worldwide change in awareness.130 
 
While the term global environmental politics refers to a specialized thematic target field 
as a sub-category of international politics and implies states as principal actors yielding 
inter-governmental agreements, I would like to raise the question: What defines global 
environmental governance? Enlightening for the understanding of the concept in ques-
tion, Maria Ivanova contributed the following elaborations to the discourse: 
 
„Two traditional forms of governance have dominated world affairs until recently 
- national governance through governmental regulation and international govern-
ance through collective action facilitated by international organizations and in-
ternational regimes. However, governing human relations has become a compli-
cated endeavor that has transcended the national and interstate scale and moved 
to a global level involving multiple actors across national borders and multiple 
levels of regulatory authority - from subnational to supranational. In this context, 
institutional arrangements for cooperation are beginning to take shape more sys-
tematically and have now been recognized as critical to the effective tackling of 
any global problem. Public-private partnerships, multi-stakeholder processes, 
global public policy networks, and issue networks are regarded as important tools 
for global governance.“131 „International organizations are the traditional facili-
                                                 
130 UNCED, its main objectives, contents and outcomes are discussed more thoroughly in the following 
sub-chapter. 
131 Ivanova, Maria H. [2003]: Partnerships, International, Organizations, and Global Environmental Gov-
ernance/ In: Witte, Jan Martin/ Streck, Charlotte/ Benner, Thorsten (eds.) [2003]: Progress or Peril? 
The Post-Johannesburg Agenda. Wahington DC, Berlin, p.9. 
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tators of collective action at the international and global level and provide a par-
ticularly interesting analytical lens for partnership arrangements. International 
organizations may perform a range of roles in a partnership context - enabler, fa-
cilitator, supporter, or active participant - and influence the shape, form, and 
function of the collaborative arrangements.“132 
 
UNCED became the first playground on which these concepts were brought in and 
tested, and subsequently reflected in UNCED’s conference outcomes as well as in the 
entire Rio follow-up process. Charlotte Streck highlights the networking character of 
global environmental governance. She provides her own vision in the article 
Umweltpolitik in globalen Netzen133: 
 
„Netzwerkorientierte Strukturen können an vielen Stellen Lösungen anbieten, an 
denen müde, langsame Bürokratien nicht in der Lage sind, innovativ und flexibel 
zu reagieren. Trisektorale Politiknetzwerke zwischen Vertretern von Nationalstaa-
ten, Unternehmen sowie der Zivilgesellschaft eröffnen eine Möglichkeit, den 
Netzwerken der NROs und der Privatwirtschaft ein politisches Gegenüber anzu-
bieten. Globale Politiknetzwerke bringen in dynamischer, nicht-hierarchischer 
Form die von grenzüberschreitenden Problemen betroffenen Akteure zusammen, 
um auf der Basis von Interessen- und Wissensdifferenzen in einem ergebnisoffenen 
Prozess nach tragfähigen Regelungsformen zu suchen.“ 
 
The author continues stating that such trisectoral networks are poorly formalized struc-
tures. Their tasks are the identification of certain problems that require collective regu-
lation, global agenda setting, the implementation of taken decisions, the generation and 
collecton of knowledge, the discussion and setting of standards, and creative negotiation 
processes.134 I would like to use this definitory phrase to characterize what is commonly 
meant nowadays by global environmental governance, as a first systematic approach, 
and on a rather phenomenological basis. Yet one addition seems necessary: the role of 
international organizations, particularly the organs, programmes and agencies of the UN 
system, and also the system of world conferences, should not be underestimated in their 
significance as platforms as well as mediators.  
 
Multilateral cooperation experiences a re-definition of its genuine connotation: through 
the incorporation of non-state actors, the scientific community and non-hierarchical 
regulatory patterns, the referred to networks surface as truly multilateral in the real 
sense of the word. However, we should not neglect that formal and inter-state negotia-
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tion processes, under UN aegis and yielding classical legal agreements or single re-
gimes135, are still part and parcel of global environmental governance structures, as are 
the states as important, if not principal, actors among many others. Hans-Joachim 
Schellnhuber and Frank Biermann136 add that the regulation of global environmental 
problems cannot be based on decentral mechanics of the market alone, they require ef-
fective and efficient international institutions and global legislation. Since both factors 
are nowadays still founded on the principles of inter-statehood, a fundamental dilemma 
emerges:  
 
„Die Herausforderungen des 21. Jahrhunderts sollen mit etatistischen Strukturen 
bewältigt werden, die bestenfalls dem 19. Jahrhundert entstammen und dem virtu-
ellen Schrumpfen des Planeten in keiner Weise gerecht werden können.“137  
 
An idealtype analogous structure to a globalized world would consist of a global federa-
tive constitutive-executive zone, i.e. a world government, which is out of sight.138 
Therefore, the authors promote the formula ‚global governance instead of global gov-
ernment‘ for the environmental field. Other scholars highlight the role of NGOs and the 
need for a more formalized participatory legitimicy for the same. In their article The 
Role of NGOs and Civil Society in Global Environmental Governance, Barbara Gem-
mill and Bimbola Bamidele-Izu139 state:  
 
„International decisionmaking processes seek legitimacy through the involvement 
of civil society, yet formal mechanisms for NGO participation within the UN sys-
tem remain limited. Ad-hoc civil society participation should be replaced by a 
strengthened,more formalized institutional structure for engagement.“140 
 
The authors identify five major roles that civil society can play, i.e. collecting, dissemi-
nating, and analyzing information, providing input to agenda-setting and policy devel-
                                                 
135 More on regimes, and particular reference to regime theory findings is provided in Gehring, Thomas/ 
Oberthür, Sebastian [1997b]: Internationale Regime als Steuerungsinstrumente der Umweltpolitik/ In: 
Gehring, Thomas/ Oberthür, Sebastian (eds.) [1997a]. The authors refer to classical definitions such as 
the one given by Stephen Krasner, and define regimes as „Zusammenhänge von impliziten oder expli-
ziten Prinzipien, Normen, Regeln und Entscheidungsverfahren, an denen sich die Erwartungen von 
Akteuren in einem gegebenen Problemfeld der internationalen Beziehungen ausrichten“. (see p. 10)  
136 Schellnhuber, Hans-Joachim/ Biermann, Frank [2000], p. 10-11. 
137 Op. cit. 
138 More on the fascinating concept of a world government can be found in Albrecht, Ulrich [1998b]: 
Völkerbundsprojekte der frühen Humanisten – Von Erasmus zu Kant/ In: Albrecht, Ulrich (ed.) 
[1998a]: Die Vereinten Nationen am Scheideweg. Von der Staatenorganisation zur internationalen 
Gemeinschaftswelt? Hamburg, and Beck, Ulrich (ed.) [1998]. 
139 Gemmill, Barbara/ Bamidele-Izu, Bimbola [2002]: The Role of NGOs and Civil Society in Global 
Environmental Governance/ In: Esty, Daniel C./ Ivanova, Maria H. (eds.) [2002]: Global Environ-
mental Governance: Options & Opportunities. New Haven, Ct. 
140 Op. cit., p. 1. 
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opment processes, performing operational functions, assessing environmental condi-
tions and monitoring compliance with environmental agreements, and advocating envi-
ronmental justice. The German Institute for International and European Environmental 
Policy (Ecologic) summarizes, on the same account, the roles that NGOs play in the 
context of global environmental governance, according to their analysis:  
 
? Enhancing the knowledge base; 
? Advocacy and lobbying; 
? Membership in national delegations; 
? Contribution to compliance review and enforcement as well as dispute settlement 
procedures; 
? Ensuring transparency; 
? Supporting international secretariats; 
? Networking, including integrating levels of governance; 
? ‚Globalization‘ of values and preferences.141 
 
Rounding up the definitory framework provided for the term in question, I would like to 
mention, last but not least, Richard Stewart, who writes142: 
 
„The coming decades pose an enormous challenge of governance for the global 
community: preserving the planet’s ecosystems and protecting the world’s com-
mon environment while meeting the aspirations of all peoples for higher personal 
and societal levels of economic welfare. Meeting this challenge will require newly 
developed and developing countries and public/private international partnerships 
for sustainable development; wider adoption of economic instruments for envi-
ronmental and resource protection; improved international mecha-nisms for risk 
assessment and resolution of trade/environment controversies; and more focused 
and effective international environ-mental laws and institutions...“ 
 
All aforementioned aspects and elaboratory contributions may serve as a conceptual 
quilt to grasp the notion of global environmental governance, always keeping in mind 
what has been said on the postmodern paradigm for IR, and, more precisely, on the no-
                                                 
141 Ecologic [w/o year]: Participation of Non-Governmental Organisations in International Environmental 
Governance: Legal Basis and Practical Experience (Report). Berlin, p. 6. Other articles are Buschor 
Graciela [1996]: NGOs advocacy for environmental diplomacy to effect global environmental change/ 
In: Transnational Associations Vol. 2, Willetts, Peter [1996]: From Stockholm to Rio and beyond: the 
impact of the environmental movement on the United Nations consultative arrangements for NGOs/ 
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dernisse in den Beziehungen zwischen UNO und NGOs/ In: Albrecht, Ulrich (ed.) [1998]. 
142 Stewart, Richard [1999]: Global Governance for Sustainable Development/ In: Progressice Govern-
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tions of global governance. In the following sub-chapter, UNCED will be discussed, 
and thus a first empirical approach to this field will be undertaken.143 
 
What is so postmodern about Rio? 
 
Benefiting from a historical momentum, and surfing on the wave of the post-cold-war 
new world order philosophy, the UN Conference on Environment and Development, 
commonly also called the Earth Summit, became the platform for the aforementioned 
notions and implications of postmodernity. UNCED was prepared by four committee 
sessions, so-called PrepComs, taking place mutually shifting between New York and 
Geneva, and involving member states representatives as well as inter-governmental and 
non-governmental organizations. Great expectations and hopes were raised in the fore-
front, and intense scientific preparation and media coverage seconded the deliberations. 
A multitude of NGOs had engaged into promotion measures. Probably the PrepComs’ 
most important activity was the elaboration of the draft Agenda 21, the later major con-
ference output. Understanding had been reached among delegates that general and spe-
cific goals were to be mentioned along with accompanying financial, institutional and 
economic measures. Nevertheless, tension emerged between developed and developing 
countries, the latter insisting not to be instructed on how these countries should solve 
their environmental problems. Developing countries also dwelled on the fact that the by 
far larger share of global pollution is caused by the North. They asked for compensa-
tion, while, probably as a reaction, Northern countries did not agree on broad technol-
ogy transfer.144  
 
During the PrepComs, the impression emerged at times that supranational concepts 
would have a difficult standing versus established traditional sovereignty-based ideas 
about international cooperation. However, hot issues such as balancing out economic 
growth and free trade, but also the question of optimal means for financial transfer 
measures for the sake of environmental improvements still made it into the drafts.  
 
In the following, I am not going to focus on the conference proceedings as such. In-
stead, the focus is laid on the outcomes of Rio. There are official documents and trea-
ties, institutional changes, and an officially agreed upon follow-up process. More inter-
                                                 
143 A recommended article on the tensions between global environmental governance and the globaliza-
tion of economic structures, featuring the case of climate politics, is Flavin, Christopher [2002]: Die 
Erfahrungen der Klimapolitik und die internationalen Governance-Strukturen/ In: Flavin, Christopher/ 
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en Politique Environnementale. Lausanne, and Wapner, Paul [1995]: Politics Beyond the State. Envi-
ronmental Activism and World Civic Politics/ In: World Politics 47 (April). 
144 For broader exploration of UNCED and its preparatory phase, refer to Keil, Imke [1994]. 
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esting are structural and substantive re-orientations within existing or newly founded 
institutional bodies and so-called informal consequences, i.e. shifts in the way multilat-
eral cooperation in the field of sustainable development has been perceived and incorpo-
rated after Rio. We will therefore take a look at the formal as well as informal Rio out-
puts. 
 
UNCED’s well-known outcomes, the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, the three Rio Con-
ventions, the Forest Declaration, the Commission on Sustainable Development and the 
Rio process including the Rio +5 conference and a new system of world conferences, 
will be summarized first as follows. 
 
The Rio Declaration contains 27 basic governance guidelines for environment and de-
velopment policies, and was the result of PrepCom 4 (New York, 2 March to 4 April 
1992). It is legally not binding and „definiert die wesentlichen Grundsätze, die das Ver-
hältnis Staat und Bürger im Themenbereich Umwelt und Entwicklung bestimmen sol-
len“145. It identifies general rights, e.g. for development and democratic participation in 
decision-making processes, and also obligations, e.g. integrating environmental con-
cerns in national policies and strategies, the introduction of a comprehensive legislation, 
public participation, the polluter pace principle, prevention measures, poverty eradica-
tion, moderate population-growth politicies, and the principle of North-South solidarity. 
Industrialized countries are supposed to assume particular responsbility as the world’s 
major polluters. Furthermore, guidelines on how to sustainably steer national economics 
are part of the Declaration.146 
  
The second and most important and influential conference output is Agenda 21, which 
reflects a global consensus and political committment towards environmental and de-
velopment cooperation. In 40 chapters, summing up to some 800 pages, it features and 
spells out the entire repertoire of identified policy fields for sustainable development. 
The Agenda names international conditions for partnership, particularly on trade, tech-
nological cooperation, and financial support for developing countries. It further com-
prises central topics such as poverty eradication and sustainable use of natural resources 
as well as socio-economic issues such as participation of major groups in implementa-
tion processes. Altogether, 115 sustainable development topics for the 21st century are 
addressed.  
 
Imke Keil states: „Es sollte ein Aktionsprogramm sein, das allgemeine und spezielle 
Ziele sowie finanzielle, institutionelle und ökonomische Bedürfnisse und Pläne en-
                                                 
145 Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) (ed.) [2002], (p. 5). 
146 See Keil, Imke [1994], p. 86-88. 
 Andreas Rechkemmer 
 
42 
thält...“147, naming a huge amount of political guidelines of global concern and address-
ing all environmental issues known at the time – just sparing problems of the Antarctic 
circle.148 The Agenda thus provided detailed proposals so as to turn around the overall 
direction, to improve standards and empirical findings valid for the year 1992. Agenda 
21 contains scientific analysis, action plans as well as detailed budgets and cost esti-
mates.149 
 
Martin Jänicke calls the Agenda 21 a strategic steering model as a consequence of gen-
eral reform tendencies in the public sector of developed countries, reflected in the con-
cepts of ‘public management’. The central aspects of this steering model are consensual 
target identification, integration of environmental concerns into the pollution pace sec-
tors, participation, monitoring, and coordinated multi-level implementation from global 
to local.150 
 
„Der durch die Agenda 21 strukturierte „Rio-Prozess“ hat insgesamt eine beacht-
liche Wirkung entfaltet: In den neunziger Jahren haben mehr als 130 Länder der 
Welt Umweltministerien bzw. zentrale Umweltbehörden eingerichtet. Fast alle 
Länder haben einen nationalen Umweltplan oder eine nationale Nachhaltigkeits-
strategie entwickelt... Der Ministerrat der OECD verabschiedete 2001 eine Nach-
haltigkeitsstrategie für die Mitgliedsländer. Rund 6.400 Prozesse einer „lokalen 
Agenda 21“ in 113 Ländern wurden abgeschlossen oder eingeleitet... Eine grosse 
Zahl industrieller Selbstverpflichtungen bzw. freiwilliger Vereinbarungen zum 
Umweltschutz wurde abgeschlossen. Der Rio-Prozess hat weltweit auf allen 
Handlungsebenen und in zentralen Verursachersektoren wichtige Lernprozesse 
ausgelöst.“151 
 
The third outcome of UNCED are the so-called Rio Conventions: firstly, the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which entered into 
force on 21 March 1994 and yields to stabilize the climatic effects of anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emmissions – seconded by the Kyoto Protocol adopted in 1997. Sec-
ondly, the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), which entered into force on 29 Decem-
ber 1993. Both were opened for signature at UNCED. The third Rio Convention, the 
                                                 
147 Op. cit., p. 87. 
148 See Volger, Helmut [1998], p. 301. 
149 The initially foreseen Eath Charter was neither part of the Agenda nor adopted separately at Rio. In 
this context, refer to Unmüssig, Barbara [1992]: Zwischen Hoffnung und Enttäuschung. Die Konfe-
renz der Vereinten Nationen über Umwelt und Entwicklung (UNCED)/ In: Vereinte Nationen 40/4. 
(p. 118) 
150 Jänicke, Martin [2003b]: Reformbedürftig, doch alternativlos - das Steuerungsmodell des „Rio-
Prozesses“/ In: Altner, Günter et al. (eds.) [2003]: Jahrbuch Ökologie 2004. München. (here p. 34) 
151 Op. cit., p. 35. 
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United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) received a negotiation 
mandate in Rio. 
 
At the Third Session of the Conference of the Parties to UNFCCC (COP 3) in Decem-
ber 1993 in Kyoto, Japan, industrial countries committed themselves in the Kyoto Pro-
tocol to reduce or stabilize their greenhouse gas emmissions. No committments are 
foreseen for developing countries. At and after COP 3, further agreements on the im-
plementation mode of Kyoto, the so-called Kyoto mechanisms were agreed upon: em-
mission rights trading through certificates, joint implementation of climate programmes 
between developed countries, and the Clean Development Mechansism (CDM) with 
developing countries.  
 
These mechanisms are market based, involving the private sector and science. They aim 
at creating economic incentives for investment and technological change, so as to render 
the implementation of Kyoto as cheap as possible, also foreseeing indirect investment to 
developing countries. Further provisions are enhanced multilateral assistance for climate 
protection programmes in developing countries through the Global Environment Facil-
ity (GEF) and through bilateral channels, transfer of sound technologies, capacity buld-
ing, and the submission of periodical national communications containing detailed 
overviews on sources and sinks for greenhouse gas emmisions along with national 
strategies for their reduction.152 
The CBD promotes overall protection of biodiversity and sustainable use of biological 
and genetical resources along with a just and balanced distribution of advantages emerg-
ing from this use. It also contains restrictions and guidelines for access to genetical re-
sources and their use, technology transfer, and biosafety. The focus is on national activi-
ties including an obligation for regular reporting. Developed countries function as fi-
nancing entities together with the GEF. Important to name is also the corresponding 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, which addresses dangers deriving from transboundary 
trade of genetically altered organisms.153 
 
Two further important outcomes of Rio were the Declaration on Forests and the related 
Forest Principles, and later the foundation of the United Forum on Forests (UNFF) in 
October 2000, and the establishment of the Commission on Sustainable Development 
(CSD), which was finally confirmed and adopted on 22.12.1992 by the UN General 
Assembly.   
                                                 
152 See Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit (BMZ) (ed.) [2002], p. 
13-17. See also Biermann, Frank [2000a]: Stand und Fortentwicklung der internationalen Klimapoli-
tik/ In: Kreibich, Rolf/ Simonis, Udo E. (eds.) [2000]. 
153 See Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit (BMZ) (ed.) [2002], p. 
13-17. See also Suplie, Jessica [2000]: Stand und Fortentwicklung der internationalen Biodiversi-
tätspolitik/ In: Kreibich, Rolf/ Simonis, Udo E. (eds.) [2000]. 
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The CSD was made responsible for promoting the Rio follow-up process, i.e. the coor-
dination, catalyzation and monitoring of the implementation of UNCED‘s results and 
outcomes, and to elaborate further recommendations and policy guidelines for enhanced 
governance in the field of sustainable development. It was also entrusted with control-
ling payment of 0.7 % of OECD countries’ GDP as Official Development Assistance, 
and thorough collaboration with the Global Environment Facility. 
 
„Sie ist so etwas wie das ‘Gewissen von Rio’ und ein zentrales Forum geworden, 
auf dem Industrie- und Entwicklungsländer auf hoher politischer Ebene Quer-
schnittsfragen der Umwelt- und Entwicklungspolitik sowie Hindernisse bzw. Fort-
schritte zu einem insgesamt nachhaltigen Politikpfad diskutieren und Lösungsvor-
schläge erarbeiten.“154 
 
The CSD organizes its work since 1993 in yearly sessions. It has 53 member countries. 
The CSD is mandated to elaborate proposals for the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) to influence and guide the UN‘s and its member countries‘ policies in the 
fields of environment and development. ECOSOC is the central coordinating body in 
this context within the UN system, also including agencies such as the World Bank. 
 
Until 1997, i.e. the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly known as 
Rio +5, the Commission observed and monitored globally the progess made on the im-
plementation of the Rio documents and treaties, and reported accordingly to the General 
Assembly. After Rio +5, the CSD followed up on thematic topics such as industrial de-
velopment, sound tourism, sustainable agriculture, transport, or energy, and specific 
problems such as transfer of appropriate technologies or capacity building. The CSD 
spells out recommendations, e.g. concerning the internalization of environmental costs, 
the changing of production and consumption patterns, free trade for developing coun-
tries, mainstreaming of sustainable development issues into national policies. It also 
follows up on ODA matters.155 
 
The Rio +5 conference of 1997 concluded in the assessment that the so far implemented 
measures in support of UNCED’s outcomes were not sufficient. It therefore passed 
resolutions stressing the need for the following desired improvements: enhanced in-
vestment into human capital, clean technologies, and the reform of price systems in or-
der to tackle unsustainable production and consumption patterns. Delegates from more 
                                                 
154 Op. cit., p. 17. 
155 See op. cit. 
Global Environmental Governance  
 
45
than 165 countries met in New York to this end. The finally adopted document was 
called Programme for the Implementation of Agenda 21.156  
 
Another important Rio outcome, being part of the so-called Rio process, or Rio follow-
up process, is the system of world conferences such as Conferences of the Parties to the 
three Conventions (COPs), follow-up and governing bodies‘ meetings of other envi-
ronmental regimes, single world conferences yielding a specific thematic goal, and the 
Special Sessions of the General Assembly:  
 
? Rio +5, 1997, New York 
? Kairo +5, 1999, New York, on world population 
? Kopenhagen +5, 2000, Geneva, on social development  
? Beijing +5, 2000, New York, on women’s rights   
? Istanbul +5, 2001, New York, on housing and HABITAT II   
 
As part of the official, or formal, outcomes, Rio also brought up the so-called develop-
ment goals, being summed up in the paper Shaping the 21st Century in 1996 by the de-
velopment co-operation department of OECD, DAC, naming seven global goals for 
sustainable development. They were later, at the UN Millennium Summit, in September 
2000 in New York, further elaborated and adopted as the Millennium Development 
Goals, following consultations among international agencies, including the World 
Bank, the IMF, the OECD, and the specialized agencies of the United Nations.157 For 
each goal one or more targets have been set, most for 2015, using 1990 as a benchmark: 
 
1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger.  
2. Achieve universal primary education. 
3. Promote gender equality and empower women. 
4. Reduce child mortality. 
5. Improve maternal health. 
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. 
7. Ensure environmental sustainability. 
8. Develop a global partnership for development.158 
  
For the formal outcomes, I would like to mention, last but not least, the post-Rio strate-
gies on sustainable development, which were and are supposed to be adopted and im-
plemented by all UN member states: 
 
                                                 
156 See op. cit., p. 17-18, and Merkel, Angela [1997]: Fünf Jahre nach Rio - Ergebnisse der VN-
Sondergeneralversammlung/ In: Umwelt Nr. 9. 
157 See <www.developmentgoals.org>. 
158 Source: UNDP. 
 Andreas Rechkemmer 
 
46 
„Wirtschaftliche Effizienz, soziale Gerechtigkeit und der Erhalt der natürlichen 
Umwelt hängen wechselseitig voneinander ab und ergänzen sich als gleichwerti-
ge, fürs Überleben wichtige Interessen. Dies ist die zentrale Erkenntnis, die hinter 
dem Leitbild der Nachhaltigen Entwicklung steht. Nur strategische Ansätze mit 
langfristiger Perspektive werden diesem Leitbild in der Praxis gerecht. Nachhal-
tigkeitsstrategien erfüllen diesen Anspruch. Sie verknüpfen unterschiedliche Sek-
torpolitiken und richten sie aus auf vorrangige Problemfelder eines Landes. Ihr 
gemeinsames Kennzeichen ist die auf lange Sicht gleichgewichtige Berücksichti-
gung wirtschaftlicher, sozialer und ökologischer Aspekte und die Qualität ihres 
Entstehungsprozesses.“159 
 
As has been stated above, Agenda 21 featured the scientific state of the art and intro-
duced a vast collection of action plans, including detailed cost plans. It consisted of a 
huge environmental respective sustainable development governance compendium für 
governments and non-governmental organizations addressing the national, regional and 
global levels likewise. But due to a certain clash of interest, according to some critics, 
some themes are not at all or only weakly reflected, e.g. biotechnology, the contamina-
tion of the oceans, or export of wastes.160  
 
Imke Keil, for instance, critizes that the calling for obligations was one-sidedly directed 
towards the Third World, while the North not really claimed its adequate responsabili-
ties and thus did not fully define its own necessary obligations. For example, the 0,7% 
of GNP ODA was promised but never generally implemented by OECD countries. The 
North also pushed the enlargement of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) - which 
had been founded in 1990 as a major environmental credit programme, and was admin-
istered jointly by the World Bank, UNEP, and UNDP - while developing countries 
wanted to create a new United Nations environmental fund.161  
 
As far as the Rio Conventions are concerned, Keil laments that UNFCCC is binding but 
only a framework without a clear time plan. CBD is also binding but lacking control 
procedures and sanctions as well as a balance of interests between economic use and 
conservation of genetical diversity, or the participation of the South in matters pertain-
ing to biotechnology. She also critizices that the forests did not receive a convention of 
their own, only a rather general declaration on their sustainable use. Furthermore, de-
spite great public interest, intense research by science, and significant NGO participa-
tion, the clash of interests between North and South, governments, industries, and the 
civil society could not be avoided. For Keil, UNCED provided great findings and good 
                                                 
159 Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) [2002]: Rio Konventionen: Vor einer neuen De-
kade/ In: Akzente Spezial (Sonderausgabe), März, p. 10. 
160 See Keil, Imke [1994] and Unmüßig, Barbara [1992].   
161 See Keil, Imke [1994]. 
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plans but too many declarations and conventions without sharper enforcement mecha-
nisms.162 
 
However, the question of whether or not Rio has been succesful, or, more precisely, has 
truely met all the needs of environment and development concerns, is not the purpose of 
this book. Rather, I would like to follow the traces that give us the impression that the 
Earth Summit has been the locus in recent political history when and where postmodern 
concepts of international relations have had a significantly strong performance and im-
pact on the newly designed and agreed upon treaties, programmes and regimes, and 
ultimately found their probably consequentmost implication within the conceptual de-
sign of the UN Convention to Combat Desertification.  
 
To illustrate the idea of Rio as locus classicus for a postmodern understanding of inter-
national relations, I will identify and name seven phenomena of postmodernity that are 
characteristic for Rio and its outcomes. Explanatory text is provided in the following 
paras. 
 
We recall that the Westphalian system is perceived as locus classicus for modernity in 
international relations, featuring the concepts of sovereignty and territoriality as under-
lying principles for inter-statehood: states aim to preserve both sovereignty as well as 
their territorial identity, reflected in national legislation and enforcement procedures, 
and are the sole dominant actors in the international society. The state, a spatial unit, 
results in the fundamental ordering of international relations through a central reliance 
on dominium-based conceptions according to the notions of Roman law. 
 
Yet, UNCED stands for significant change in conceptualizing international relations, 
i.e. the migration from modernity, or Westphalian order, to postmodernity, or post-
Westphalian order. At this point, it has to be recalled that ‚postmodernity in IR‘ should 
be understood as a conceptualization in itself, and subsequently has to be taken as a 
condensed mental construct drawn from empirical observations of evident changes in 
the way global actors cooperate both in structural as well as in normative terms.  
 
The Earth Summit centralized cooperative activities of environmental and development 
targets, and largely displaced formerly established and notoriously repeated state-
sovereignty-oriented patterns and procedures in environmental politics, i.e. national 
policy and legislation frameworks following internationally agreed upon not binding 
standards, through the community-oriented procedures featured in the legally binding 
Rio Conventions and further conference outcomes. Subsequently, environment and sus-
tainable development became major subjects to international law.  
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In the light of Friedrich Kratochwil’s elaborations on sovereignty as a social institution, 
the conceptual shift to postmodernity, or post-Westphalian order in international rela-
tions can be understood as a process of desired structural, or institutional change due to 
a gradually transformed shared understanding of the underlying normative terms of ref-
erence, institutional rules and/or functional settings of the international society.  
 
Adding the findings of Alexander Wendt – like Kratochwil featured in the previous 
chapter – we may understand Rio as a case of international state formation that does not 
mean formal cession of sovereignty to supranational institutions, but rather relocates 
individual state actors’ de facto sovereignty to transnational authorities, whose result is 
the emergence of a new governing system, which breaks down the spatial coincidence 
between state-as-actor and state-as-structure.163   
 
(1) We therefore may identify the first phenomenon of postmodernity with the enhanced 
political readiness of conference Parties to widely sacrifice the classical prerogative of 
individual, national sovereignty considerations for the sake of collective state formation 
and a multilateral understanding of sovereignty, i.e. the construction of collective regu-
latory regimes supreme to the national policy-making level. This first phenomenon is of 
a political nature and can further be explained within the context of the process of iden-
tity-formation among states.164 In the Rio case, the rather newly emerged awareness of 
global public goods served as a reference point for collective policy formulation in the 
sense of the afore-mentioned.165 
 
If we recall further findings of Chapter Two, namely that, contradictory to a real-
ist/positivist perception, international law is not to be seen as constitutive for political 
order, but rather coincides with socio-historical, extra-legal patterns that reflect and re-
shape the political reality, the step ahead to turn scientific research results and political 
desiderata concerning the global environment into an extensive framework of suprana-
tional treaties and agreements of a binding nature including instruments of monitoring, 
evaluation, and dispute settlement reflects another transformatory quality, more pre-
cisely vis-à-vis classical legal concepts underlying Westphalia. 
 
As has been said by William Coplin, law is a primary tool in the socialization of the 
individual, providing an image of both factual and normative aspects. International law 
                                                 
163 Reference is made to the sub-chapter Elements of a classical debate of Chapter One. 
164 See Wendt, Alexander [1996] as referred to in sub-chapter Elements of a classical debate. 
165 More substance on global public goods and their constructing role for policy formulation and collec-
tive action in international politics can be found in Brunnengräber, Achim (ed.) [2003]: Globale Öf-
fentliche Güter unter Privatisierungsdruck. Münster, and Albin, Cecilia [2003]: Negotiating interna-
tional cooperation: global public goods and fairness/ In: Review of International Studies Vol. 29, No. 
3 (July). 
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functions in such a manner, as an institutional device for communicating to the policy-
makers of states a consensus on the nature of the international system.  
 
(2) We therefore can identify the second phenomenon of postmodernity at Rio with the 
state community’s readiness to sacrifice the concept of a dominium-like understanding 
of territoriality in environmental politics for the sake of yielded supremacy of a supra-
national process of legislation. This second phenomenon is of a truely legal nature, and 
may have been triggered by the insight of the inter-wovenness of global issues.166  
 
Rolf Kreibich states in this context167: 
“Wenn die UN-Konferenz für Umwelt und Entwicklung... etwas verdeutlicht hat, 
dann ist es die unauflösbare ökologische und technologische Interdependenz der 
internationalen Staatengemeinschaft. Dazu gehört in erster Linie die enge Vernet-
zung der 185 Teilnehmerstaaten über den stofflichen Ressourcenverbrauch und 
die Schadstoffströme, die Menge des Energieverbrauchs und die Art der Energie-
nutzung sowie deren direkte und indirekte Folgen, insbesondere auch der Klima-
folgen.” 
 
(3) This leads us to the third phenomenon of postmodernity flagging out at UNCED: the 
constructing role of knowledge in international relations, and its coefficient, the learn-
ing capacity of institutions. Referring back to the conceptual elaborations of Ernst B. 
Haas and Alexander Wendt in the ‘Modernity/Postmodernity debate’ chapter of this 
book, and in analogy to the findings of main stream regime theory, within the world of a 
postmodern understanding of international relations, the factors of knowledge and in-
formation are at times rated higher than genuine political will as a result of national in-
terest of hunger for power. This spirit highly influenced Rio, where, as never before, the 
epistemic community had not only a big say but also significant influence on the sub-
stantive conference outputs.168  
 
(4) The fourth phenomenon of postmodernity is of a conceptual nature, and refers to the 
semantics promoted at Rio. Its most prominent notion is the nexus created between en-
vironment and development – expressed in the concept of sustainable development. 
This term is a typically postmodern cross-over of two formerly autonomous concepts, 
                                                 
166 I recall to perceive the shift to postmodern paradigms as gradual and complementary, i.e. while basic 
elements of modernity remain vaild – e.g. the state as a principal actor in international relations -, oth-
ers are sacrificed for the sake of a new conceptual reality, rating community-oriented values higher.   
167 Kreibich, Rolf [1998]: Nach den Gipfeln von Rio und Berlin – Was taugen die UN zur Bekämpfung 
der weltweiten Umweltschädigung?/ In: Albrecht, Ulrich (ed.) [1998a]. (p. 91) 
168 See Haas, Peter M./ Haas, Ernst B. [1993], Wendt, Alexander [1996], as well as Nielson, Daniel L./ 
Tierney, Michael J. [2003]: Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World 
Bank Environmental Reform/ In: International Organization Vol. 57, No. 2 (Spring). 
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whose merger constructed a whole new field of semantic reference, which influenced 
strategic, structural and scientific re-orientation processes alike, and thus proved to con-
struct new realities:169 
  
„Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration modified an international understanding of 
development that went back to the end of World War II. Essentially, development 
in this context is an international term of art encompassing four basic elements 
that are necessary to ensure and improve human quality of life and opportunity. 
These are 1) peace and security, 2) economic development, 3) social development 
or human rights, and 4) supportive national governance. For more than half a 
century, we have measured human progress in these terms, and there has been a 
great deal of progress. Environmental degradation has been considered a price 
that we necessarily pay for this progress. The concept of sustainable development 
changed this definition of progress by incorporating environmental protection and 
even restoration into the definition of development. Instead of making progress in 
conventional development at the environment’s expense, or protecting only the 
environment, the idea is to work toward both conventional development and envi-
ronmental protection at the same time. That concept is the irreducible core of 
Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration.“170 
 
But there’s more to say. Rio also brought about the so-called sustainability triangle, a 
conceptual matrix in which productive economic growth is linked with social justice 
and ecological sustainability, and thus forms a holistic framework for perceiving devel-
opment cooperation, environmental protection and good governance as a unity. This 
concept resulted in the buzzword ‘combat poverty - promote private economy - preserve 
natural resources’. It refers to developing countries as well as developed countries, and 
rates environment, social and economic affairs as equally valuable components of post-
Rio policy.171 In the aftermath of UNCED, a forth dimension was added to the triangle, 
and this one thus turned into a square: participation and with it explicit reference to 
good governance as a political means rounded up the concept of holistic sustainabil-
ity.172 
 
(5) The strategic and structural downstream consequences of the aforementioned seman-
tics, or conceptual achievements, mark the fifth phenomenon of postmodernity: the 
                                                 
169 Refer to the foregoing sub-chapter on global environmental governance and the elaborations on the 
Brundtland Commission and the concept of sustainable development. 
170 Dernbach, John/ Feldman, Ira [2003]: After Johannesburg: Sustainable Development Begins at Home. 
Washington. <www.sustainabledc.org> 
171 See Stephan, Petra [2002], and Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwick-
lung (BMZ) [2002]. 
172 See Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) [1996]: Indicators of sustainable development: 
Framework and methodologies. New York, NY.   
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process of reshaping and re-structuring policies and strategies as well as institutional 
settings by national governmental bodies and international agencies alike. Rio resulted 
in the formulation of cross-sectoral, integrated policies and strategies, both at national 
and international levels, such as national strategies fo sustainability, or the new interna-
tional development frameworks of the World Bank (Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, 
PRSP) or the European Union (New Cotonou Agreement).  
 
Moreover, institutional reform was an important agenda item. Administration entities 
created according to the notions of functionalism were told to be out. In were new, 
small, smart and highly decentralized secretariats for facilitation management, e.g. the 
Convention Secretariats. Operations were to be carried out in a network manner, i.e. 
while the Rio Secretariats were to manage negotiations and facilitate policy formulation, 
a system of agencies present in the field, i.e. UNEP, UNDP, WMO, UNESCO, IFAD, 
FAO, The World Bank Group and others, were expected to jointly implement the trea-
ties and programmes with state governments. Also, UN institutions adopted their inter-
nal policy guidelines in accordance with the cross-sectoral outcomes of Rio. For in-
stance, UNDP reformed their policy unit, and created the Sustainable Energy & Envi-
ronment Division (SEED), which was designed to reflect the integrated nature of 
Agenda 21 and the Rio Conventions.173 Another example for post-Westphalian institu-
tional design is the already mentioned Global Environment Facility (GEF) – a multi-
agency fund of a truely cross-sectoral nature.174 
 
(6) The sixth phenomenon of postmodernity can be identified with the emergence of the 
concept of global governance, more specifically of global environmental governance, 
that had high season at UNCED, or principally started to become fashionable there. In 
particular, global public policy networks, the involvement of NGOs and other civil so-
ciety actors, transnational as well as local corporations and the scientific community 
were prominent issues in Rio, and subsequently found their way into the newly devel-
oped cooperation frameworks and treaties.175 
  
(7) The seventh phenomenon of postmodernity can be identified with the characteristic 
mix of progressive governance tools that had been elaborated for UNCED and were 
meant to render the implementation process of Agenda 21 and the Conventions more 
effective. Strategy fragments such as the so-called bottom-up-approach, participatory 
                                                 
173 A detailed description of its organigramme and responsabilities is given in United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP) [1997]: Implementing the Rio Agreements. A Guide to UNDP’s Sustain-
able Energy & Environment Division. New York, NY. 
174 More on the GEF, within the given context, can be found in Streck, Charlotte [2001]. 
175 Reference is made to the sub-chapters on global governance and global environmental governance 
contained in this book. For the latest update on global governance research, refer to Messner, Dirk 
[2003]: Herausforderungen für die zukünftige Global Governance-Forschung/ In: Brunnengräber, 
Achim (ed.) [2003]. 
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aspects of policy formulation and implementation, a decentralized logic of intervention, 
or the new ‚partnership agreements‘ - meant to replace traditional development financ-
ing concepts -, but also even more informal tools such as the type II outcomes are to be 
mentioned in this context.176 
 
There may be more such post-Westphalian phenomena that can be traced at UNCED 
and its follow-up process. However, the seven mentioned above are characteristic and 
cover a wide range of policy formulation and state formation aspects, as they relate to 
political, legal, epistemic, semantic, structural, organizational and strategic notions. 
 
In the following two chapters, my focus will be laid mostly on the fifth, sixth and sev-
enth phenomenon as these are persistantly reflected in the conceptual matrix of 
UNCCD, which features an inter-sectoral approach - as an instrument of a socio-
economic, developmental and environmental nature alike -, follows many of the norma-
tive notions commonly connotated with the concept of global governance, and tries to 
construct new implementation avenues providing a whole mix of post-Westphalian 
governance tools. In my view, the desertification convention is, among UNCED‘s out-
comes, the one featuring the farmost reaching post-Westphalian approach, as will be 
outlined in Chapter Three, which deals with its conceptual framework. Chapter Four 
will then provide a number of examples from UNCCD’s implementation practice. 
 
 
                                                 
176 The more participation-related tools are thoroughly discussed in Lazarev, Grigori [1994]: People, 
Power and Ecology. Towards participatory eco-development. London. Altogether, further references 
and explanations on the tools mentioned here are provided in the following chapters. See also Bier-
mann, Frank [1998]: Weltumweltpolitik zwischen Nord und Süd. Die neue Verhandlungsmacht der 
Entwicklungsländer. Baden-Baden. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The conceptual matrix of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertifi-
cation (UNCCD) 
 
Historical milestones and terms of reference 
 
Desertification touches most gravely the life conditions of rural people in the poorest 
developing countries, particularly in Africa. Drought causes severe economic and social 
problems for those whose income and nutrition depends on agricultural gains. Natural, 
reoccuring drought periods are often aggraved by anthropogenic causes and factors such 
as deforestation, overgrazing, unsustainable landuse practises, and result in the loss of 
top soil fertility.177  
 
Udo E. Simonis states that soils are not only “der Degradation ihrer Qualität ausgesetzt, 
sondern zusätzlich noch der Gefahr des irreversiblen Verlustes durch Erosion, die bei 
den fruchtbaren Böden, die als land- und fortwirtschaftliche Produktionsgrundlage die 
Welternährung sicherstellen sollen, besonders gravierend sein kann.”178 
 
Desertification became an issue on the international agenda in the 1970s only. After a 
long and devastating drought period in Sub-Saharan Africa, more precisely in the Sahel, 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s, which caused the death of over 200 million peo-
ple and several millions of animals, the Inter-State Permanent Committee on Drought 
Control in the Sahel (CILSS) was established by nine Sahelian countries in September 
1973 in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, as a first inter-governmental institutional step. 
CILSS seeked, among others, to enhance awareness among governments world-wide.  
 
Subsequently, in August and September 1977, the UN organized the so-called United 
Nations Conference on Desertification (UNCOD) in Nairobi, Kenya. There, desertifica-
tion was addressed as a global problem for the first time. UNCOD resulted in the adop-
tion of the first international agreement on the issue, the Plan of Action to Combat De-
sertification (PACD). Among its provisions was a complete stopping of degradation 
processes of formerly fertile soils until the turn of the century, and, if possible, the re-
version of desertified areas into fertile land.  
 
The Sahel drought period of the 1970s is mostly connotated with famine and humanitar-
ian desaster. However, it is the corresponding ecological desaster that is, strictly speak-
ing, identified with desertification. This term does not refer to the spreading of natural, 
existing deserts. It rather points to the conversion of previously ‚normal‘ land into de-
                                                 
177 See United Nations [1977]: Desertification: Its Causes and Consequences. Oxford etc. 
178 Simonis, Udo E. [1996], p. 61. 
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sertified areas. The concept ‚desertification‘ reverts back to the works of the French 
researcher Aubreville, who, in 1949, introduced it for the process of loss of vegetation 
cover.  
 
Although quite some research on the ecology and economy of dryland zones had been 
undertaken by UNESCO, WMO and FAO in the 1960s, the term desertification was 
first applied politically during the Sahel crisis in the 70s, and mentioned as a terminus 
technicus in 1974 as part of the UN General Assembly‘s resolution 29/337, initiated by 
Burkina Faso, which called for the convocation of UNCOD.179  
 
The General Assembly mandated UNEP to collect exisiting knowledge and consult with 
other UN bodies, so as to come up with proposals for solutions to be tabled at UNCOD. 
During the preparatory phase for the conference, thorough scientific research on the 
phenomenon of desertification was undertaken. Distinguished from the natural pulsa-
tions of the Sahara and other deserts, and from some popular ideas, profound findings 
on the causes and effects of drought, land degradation and desertification were col-
lected, and UNCOD was expected to, on the basis of these findings, elaborate solutions. 
 
UNCOD comprised 94 states and 65 NGOs, and was held from 29 August to 9 Septem-
ber 1977. The expected outcome was the elaboration and adoption of  the PACD. Ex-
tensive background documentation was provided to this end: listings of existing scien-
tific findings, mostly on the impact of climate, as well as on ecological and social 
change and technology, elaborated by an inter-disciplinary group of international ex-
perts. Furthermore, a collection of case studies and a world map on desertification were 
provided. UNEP tabled some feasibility studies to explore possible intervention means 
and measures of a transnational nature. UNCOD took place upon high scientific input 
and great contributions from of the epistemic comunity: it seemed that by far sufficient 
knowledge was available for succesful political deliberations. UNCOD was a case of 
consensual knowledge, and no major political dispute emerged during the conference.180 
 
The documents state: 
„Deserts themselves are not the sources from which desertification springs... De-
sertification breaks out, usually at times of drought stress, in areas of naturally 
vulnerable land subject to pressures of land use.“181  
                                                 
179 See Ehlers, Maximilian [1996]: Die Rolle von Wissen in der internationalen Politik. Magisterarbeit. 
München, p. 27, Odingo, Richard S. [1990]: The definition of desertification: Its programmatic con-
sequences for UNEP and the international community/ In: Desertification Control Bulletin Vol. 18, 
and Spooner, Brian [1989]: Desertification: The Historical Significance/ In: Huss-Ashmore, Rebecca/ 
Katz, Salomon H. (eds.) [1989]: African Food Systems in Crisis. New York. 
180 See Ehlers, Maximilian [1996], p. 30-31. 
181 United Nations [1977], p. 15. 
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Officially, desertification was defined as follows: 
„Desertification is the diminution or destruction of the biological potential of the 
land, and can lead ultimately to desert-like conditions. It is an aspect of the wide-
spread deterioration of ecosystems, and has diminished or destroyed the biologi-
cal potential, i.e. plant and animal production, for multiple use purposes at a time 
when increased productivity is needed to support growing populations in quest of 
development...“182 
 
Yet, no reference to the climatic zones in which desertification occurs was provided. 
Implicitely, however, the definition referred to desert margins and dryland ecosystems. 
Desertification was thus officially defined as a loss of biological productivity with 
socio-economic consequences. The international community‘s goal was set as to pre-
serve food supply of growing populations and their economic development. In 1977, 
more than a third of the world‘s surface was recognized as desertic or semi-arid, while 
some 9,115,000 sq kilometers were called as desertified due to man-made causes. Some 
30 million sq kilometres, or 19 percent of the surface, were said to be at risk - distrib-
uted among two thirds of the world‘s countries. For the first time ever, desertification 
was thus acknowledged as a global problem.183 
 
The PACD defined as its goal:  
„The immediate goal of the Plan of Action to Combat Desertification is to prevent 
and to arrest the advance of desertification and, where possible, to reclaim deser-
tified land for productivity use. The ultimate objective is to sustain and promote, 
within ecological limits, the productivity of arid, semi-arid, sub-humid and other 
areas vulnerable to desertification in order to improve the quality of life of their 
inhabitants.“184 
 
Immediate measures were decided upon to be implemented until 1984, while the overall 
goals were set to be achieved until 2000. All these measures were not legally binding, 
and no clear consensus on regulatory means was defined. The treaty’s 28 recommenda-
tions, mostly calling on national measures, included issues such as knowledge bases, 
capacity building, and national action plans. Little emphasis was laid on the need for 
international cooperation - only financial and technical support was promised to be pro-
vided to affected countries. To this end, a special account at the UN was created, and 
                                                 
182 United Nations Conference to Combat Desertification (UNCOD) [1978]: Round-up, plan of action 
and resolutions. New York, NY. (here: PACD, Part II, Para 7). 
183 See Op cit: Part A/ Round-up of the Conference. 
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reference to a desired new international economic order was given in Article 100. Yet 
no additional means or resources for development cooperation were created.  
 
The PACD was a purely declarative paper not only without any legally binding status, 
but also without benchmarks, indicators or monitoring and evaluation scenarios. It 
proved to be least effective and finally failed. UNEP, which was mandated to imple-
ment the PACD, provided detailed reports on the progess made since UNCOD in 1984 
and 1992 respectively, unveiling that desertification and land degradation had worsened 
rapidly by then – made impressively evident through GPS monitoring systems. More-
over, few countries had ever shown deeper interest to commit themselves to support the 
implementation process of the PACD.185 
 
By the time the convocation of UNCED was decided upon, the PACD was already 
commonly regarded as an insufficient instrument, and subsequently de facto abandoned. 
Yet, the issue of desertification, and with it related phenomena such as drought and 
various forms of land degradation, were still on the top of a number of national gov-
ernments’ agendas, particularly on those of African and other developing countries.  
 
During UNCED’s PrepComs, the desertification portfolio was supposed to be dedicated 
a chapter in Agenda 21, while negotations among G 77 countries started aiming at mak-
ing it even a convention issue. So, UNCCD has its origins in UNCED and, more spe-
cifically, in Chapter 12 of Agenda 21 – as the result of tough bargaining efforts of the 
group of African countries and the G 77. 
 
Edith Kürzinger and Hans-Peter Schipulle name some of the main provisions contained 
in Chapter 12 of UNCCD: 
 
“Eine breite Palette von Aktivitäten wird darin vorgeschlagen: Sie reichen von 
der Verbesserung der Daten- und Informationsbasis durch nationale Umweltin-
formationssysteme über Maßnahmen zur Sicherung der Bodenfruchtbarkeit und 
des Wasserhaushalts (durch Erhaltung und Wiederherstellung einer schützenden 
Vegetationsdecke), die Einführung nachhaltiger Landnutzungssysteme, die Er-
schließung zusätzlicher Einkommensmöglichkeiten außerhalb der Land-, Forst- 
und Viehwirtschaft ... bis hin zur Schaffung wirksamer Planungs- und Koordinati-
onsstrukturen für die institutionalisierte Beteiligung aller gesellschaftlicher Kräfte 
an nationalen Aktionsprogrammen.”186 
                                                 
185 See Ehlers, Maximilian [1996], p. 4. 
186 Kürzinger, Edith/ Schipulle, Hans-Peter [1996]: Desertifikationskonvention – Ein Lehrstück für den 
Rio-Folgeprozeß?/ In: E+Z Jg. 37 (1). (here p. 8) Another interesting articles that highlights the nego-
tiations and the overall background of UNCCD is Lührs, Georg [1995]: Leben und Überleben in 
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On the bargaining about UNCCD, Maximilian Ehlers writes: 
„Eher überraschend konnten sich ... Entwicklungsländer mit ihrer Forderung 
nach einer Desertifikationskonvention gegen den Widerstand der Industrieländer 
durchsetzen. Die Konvention scheint ein diplomatischer Erfolg der ärmsten und 
schwächsten Staaten der Welt zu sein. Mit ihr wird ein vor allem für die Sahel-
staaten Afrikas wichtiges Problem der Schädigung natürlicher Ressourcen inter-
nationalisiert, das für sie bedrohlicher und unmittelbarer wirkt als andere, neuere 
Umweltprobleme wie der anthropogene Klimawandel und die Ausdünnung der 
Ozonschicht, die von den Industrieländern als internationale Umweltprobleme ge-
sehen werden.“187 
 
He continues: 
„Die Desertifikationskonvention wirft für die Theorie der internationalen Bezie-
hungen interessante Fragen auf: Wie kommt es, daß sich ausgerechnet die poli-
tisch und wirtschaftlich schwachen afrikanischen Entwicklungsländer mit ihrem 
Anliegen international durchsetzen konnten?... Für die dominanten Theorien der 
internationalen Politik, die Macht und nationales Interesse als zentrale Analyse-
einheit betrachten, ist die Ausweitung des Völkerrechts auf Initiative schwacher 
Staaten ... schwer zu erklären.“188 
 
The Earth Summit, in Chapter 12 of Agenda 21, called on the UN General Assembly to 
set up an inter-governmental committee to prepare for a legally binding instrument that 
addresses the problem of desertification, which was confirmed by the 47th Session of the 
General Assembly in December 1992 in New York through resolution 47/188. The 
drafting process of UNCCD was thus part and parcel of UNCED’s official follow up 
process, and was charged to an inter-governmental panel (INCD).  
 
Udo E. Simonis writes in this context:  
“Im Dezember 1992 war ein Verhandlungskomitee (International Negotiating 
Committee for the Elaboration of an International Convention to Combat Deserti-
fication, INCD) eingesetzt worden, zu dem neben Vertretern der beteiligten Staa-
ten auch zahlreiche Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NROs) als Beobachter zuge-
lassen wurden.”189 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Trockengebieten. Das Übereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen zur Bekämpfung der Wüstenbildung/ 
In: Vereinte Nationen 43/2 (April). 
187 Op. cit., p. 4-5. 
188 Op. cit., p. 5. 
189 Simonis, Udo E. [1996], p. 69-70. 
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The INCD convened ten times altogether. At session one (INCD-1, 24 May to 3 June 
1993, Nairobi) the delegates exchanged existing information and background knowl-
edge on major problems to be tackled by the convention. They also discussed the prin-
cipal goals of UNCCD, highlighting the particular emphasis on Africa for the first time. 
The following three sessions were dedicated to the elaboration of a draft convention and 
regional implementation annexes. An important issue was the partnership between 
North and South and South and South. At INCD-5, taking place from 6 to 17 June 1994 
in Paris, the final draft of UNCCD including four regional implementation annexes 
passed. Five further INCD sessions were organized to prepare for the first session of the 
Conference of the Parties (COP).190 
 
The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experi-
encing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa (UNCCD) was 
adopted on 17 June 1994 and openend for signature at UNESCO Headquarters in Paris, 
France from October 1994 to October 1995, during which period it received 115 signa-
tures. The signature ceremony took place from 14 to 15 October 1994 in Paris, and 85 
states signed UNCCD at this occasion, and became the first Parties to the Convention. 
June 17 became the world day to combat desertification.  
 
The UN General Assembly welcomed this new convention and its signatory process 
through resolution 49/234, adopted on 23 December 1994. UNCCD entered into force 
on 26 December 1996, 90 days after the 50th instrument of ratification was deposited. 
For a party acceding the Convention after this date the Convention enters into force 90 
days after this party has deposited its instrument of ratification, accession or acceptance. 
To date, it has been signed and ratified by more than 190 states. Developing countries as 
well as developed countries, including such countries not affected by drought or deserti-
fication are Parties to the Convention. This mode follows the principle of international 
partnership. 
 
In October 1997, the first session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 1) was organ-
ized in Rome, Italy. Rules governing the COP and its subsidiary bodies were estab-
lished, the functions of the Global Mechanism, the financial mechanism of UNCCD, 
was set forth, and the permanent secretariat of the Convention (UNCCD Secretariat) 
was designated. COP 2, taking place in December 1998 in Senegal, Dakar, concentrated 
on medium-term strategies of the secretariat. A declaration on the convocation of the 
first round table of Members of Parliaments on desertification was decided upon. In 
January 1999, the Permanent Secretariat of the UNCCD was established in Bonn, Ger-
many – after having served as an interim secretariat based in Geneva. COP 3, which 
convened in November 1999 in Recife, Brazil, brought forth a first review of policies, 
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operational modalities and activities of the Global Mechanism as finance broking insti-
tution. Consultations took place on the "Recife Initiative" to enhance the implementa-
tion of the obligations of the Parties to UNCCD.  
 
In December 2000, COP 4 in Bonn, Germany established a fifth implementation annex 
for Central and Eastern Europe (Annex V), and adopted the "Recife Initiative".191 An 
inter-governmental ad-hoc working group (AHWG) started an in-depth review of coun-
try reports on the implementation of the Convention in March and April 2001 at an in-
tersessional meeting in Bonn, Germany. A comprehensive report, including conclusions 
and recommendations on further steps in the implementation of the Convention, was 
adopted and submitted to COP 5 in October 2001 in Geneva, Switzerland. 
 
At COP 5, a Committee for the Review of the Implementation of the Convention 
(CRIC) was established as a second subsidiary body of the COP. Furthermore, Parties 
agreed on the reform of the Committee on Science and Technology (CST), the scientific 
and first subsidiary body of the COP, and a Group of Experts was established. In Au-
gust and September 2002, at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) 
taking place in Johannesburg, South Africa, governments called on the Global Envi-
ronment Facility (GEF) to become a financial mechanism of the UNCCD. Subse-
quently, in October 2002 the Second Assembly of the GEF convened in Beijing, China, 
and adopted a decision to designate land degradation as its fifth focal area, and to estab-
lish the GEF as a financial mechanism of the UNCCD.  
 
In November 2002, the first meeting of the Group of Experts to the UNCCD took place 
in Hamburg, Germany. Also in November 2002, the first session of the newly estab-
lished CRIC (CRIC 1) was organized in Rome, Italy. Innovative solutions to combat 
desertification were identified and shared by country Parties and inter-governmental 
bodies, based on update reports on UNCCD implementation received by countries. A 
report was adopted and submitted to COP 6, which was organized in September 2003 in 
Havana, Cuba. 
 
On the first session of the Committe to Review the Implementation of the Convention 
(CRIC), the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB) writes: 
 
„The first meeting of the CRIC was held at the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion (FAO) headquarters in Rome, Italy, from 11-22 November 2002. The CRIC 
was established in accordance with decision 1/COP.5 to regularly review the im-
plementation of the CCD, draw conclusions, and propose concrete recommenda-
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tions to the COP on further implementation steps. CRIC-1 considered presenta-
tions from the five CCD regions, addressing the seven thematic issues under re-
view: participatory processes involving civil society, NGOs and community-based 
organizations; legislative and institutional frameworks or arrangements; linkages 
and synergies with other environmental conventions and, as appropriate, with na-
tional development strategies; measures for the rehabilitation of degraded land, 
drought and desertification monitoring and assessment; early warning systems for 
mitigating the effects of drought; access by affected country Parties, particularly 
affected developing country Parties, to appropriate technology, knowledge and 
know-how; and resource mobilization and coordination, both domestic and inter-
national, including conclusions of partnership agreements. The meeting also con-
sidered information on financial mechanisms in support of the CCD’s implemen-
tation, advice provided by the CST and the GM, and the Secretariat’s report on 
actions aimed at strengthening the relationships with other relevant conventions 
and organizations.“192 
 
On the sixth session of the COP, held in September 2003 in Havana, Cuba, the follow-
ing valuable assessment has been provided by the ENB: 
 
„The sixth Conference of the Parties (COP-6) marked the transition from aware-
ness raising to implementation... There certainly was scope to scale a critical 
threshold by finally taking important and overdue steps. These included designat-
ing the GEF as a financial mechanism for the CCD and identifying CRIC criteria 
for the COP-7 review. Two factors served as an additional impetus to making sig-
nificant progress: the presence of Cuban President Fidel Castro, known for his 
ability to do “much with very little,” and the first anniversary of the WSSD, which 
identified combating desertification as a tool for eradicating poverty. The Havana 
Declaration, which resulted from the two days’ discussions among the 13 Heads 
of State and Government and was appended to the more substantial COP deci-
sions, while falling short of addressing the specific objectives of COP-6, reaffirms 
a strong political commitment to combating desertification. Looking at the two 
weeks of negotiations, several items merit particular attention. Clearly, the most 
controversial issue was the programme and budget, and little headway was made 
on the regional coordination units (RCUs). In contrast, the designation of the 
GEF as the CCD’s financial mechanism was the biggest success of COP-6. Pro-
gress was also made with regard to synergies with other conventions. With con-
cern being voiced in the corridors, over the lack of transparency, the Secretariat’s 
role must also be examined. Finally, it is important to gauge the impact of the 
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high-level segment on the future operation of the CCD, and the role of emerging 
regional groups.  
 
Agreement on the GEF’s new role was clearly a high point of COP-6, marking the 
beginning of a new era for the CCD. Although the GEF will make available 
US$500 million over three years to land degradation and desertification pro-
grammes, much less than for its other four focal areas (climate change, biodiver-
sity, international waters and ozone depletion), this resource will nonetheless 
make a long-awaited difference for developing country Parties in implementing 
the CCD... 
 
Several agenda items were of direct relevance to speeding up the transition to the 
implementation phase, including synergies between conventions, the CST’s Group 
of Experts, benchmarks and indicators, the CRIC’s new programme of work, and 
RCUs. With the linkages between climate change, desertification and biodiversity, 
Parties to the three Rio conventions have been working on developing synergies 
and drawing on experiences gained in each other’s processes, while trying to 
avoid duplication of work... Discussions on the Group of Experts, benchmarks and 
indicators, and on the new CRIC programme of work illustrated the negotiators’ 
awareness of inadequacies in institution-building, and their willingness to address 
them. On the Group of Experts, progress was made towards prioritizing its work 
to maximize its scientific impact. The CST also made headway in developing 
benchmarks and indicators, which will lead to translating the abundant existing 
scientific information into policy-relevant advice...   
 
COP-6 was also noted by the emergence of several regional interest groups that 
made themselves heard and can be expected to play a growing role in future nego-
tiations. The Annex V (Central and Eastern European) countries are expected to 
have an impact on CCD implementation but are presently going through a diffi-
cult period of adjustment, tinged by a conflict of interests. Several EU- acceding 
members are driven by divided group loyalties, adding confusion to the process: 
some countries are donors, some are affected countries, yet others are undecided 
about their final status. Their current goal is to set common priorities and elabo-
rate a regional coordination agenda. They are unlikely to compete with the other 
annexes for funds, requiring some seed money for developing NAPs. They may 
open new avenues of capacity building and technology transfer, especially on ad-
vanced space monitoring... 
 
Apart from the high-level segment, COP-6 will most likely be remembered for fi-
nalizing the decision that opened the GEF to funding desertification programmes. 
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This achievement, along with bringing order to the CCD structures can be ex-
pected to bring the CCD closer to breaching the implementation gap. On the other 
hand, the CCD Secretariat faces new challenges, such as a down-sized budget and 
the need to build credibility. The new focus on implementation, rather than on 
awareness raising, places a great responsibility on the Secretariat... Despite the 
COPs’ repeated decisions, less than a third of the Parties have submitted their 
NAPs. If the CCD does not address the new challenges it faces, in particular the 
reality of reduced financial contributions and wavering political commitment from 
some donor Parties, the future of the only developing countries’ Convention may 
be bleak indeed.“193  
 
On the socio-economic aspects of desertification: environmental migration and  
environmental refugees194 
 
So far, environmental refugees do not belong to the well-defined "refugees" as of the 
1951 Geneva Convention. They are a dramatically growing group, mostly migrating 
from rural areas to cities, which has not been mentioned in UNHCR's statistics so far as 
they do not belong to the criteria of the convention. Also in the annual World Refugee 
Survey (USCR) they are not mentioned. They are not officially counted, therefore, only 
approximate figures are available. But they already have numberwise surpassed all other 
kinds of refugees and will most probably become the largest group of refugees.   
 
There have always been people migrating from natural changes or catastrophes. But yet 
the group of environmental refugees is a completely new phenomenon. It is hardly older 
than 20 years, since degradation of natural resources has dramatically increased. During 
the last decades, overexploitation of natural resources like land and fresh waters has 
exponentially shifted to a severe problem in a totally unknown rate of expansion. These 
circumstances created a new kind of migration: the environmentally induced migration. 
The causes for this kind of migration are mostly anthropogenic: transformations like 
degradation of soil or vegetation, fresh waters and fresh air.  
 
As far as land degradation and desertification are concerned, there are about four groups 
of different kinds of countries where we experience different causes but similar results: 
the very heterogene group of the developing countries with their fast overexploitation of 
land because of growing populations and international trade patterns without chances 
for coping mechanisms; the group of industrializing countries in Asia and South Amer-
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ica with their strong extension of food production and population growth, foremost in 
urban areas; the group of fuel exporting countries like OPEC with there own kind of 
overexploitation and desertification phenomena; and east-european countries with their 
chemically and agriculturally induced land degradation. They all have to face similar 
results as loss of ground, desertification and its impacts. 
 
Environmental migration is, however, happening chiefly in developing countries. In 
northern countries, it is analytically not separated from "normal" movements to cities 
and industrial complexes (although there have been cases like the Dust Bowl in the US 
in the 80s when people had to move because of desertification). But surely it becomes a 
problem also of developed countries as migrating poor people from the South are push-
ing toward the North, and there mostly to the cities. The reasons that force human be-
ings to leave their land are diverse; mostly there is a combination of interacting factors 
which lead to migration. But, in many cases, desertification plays a strong role: rapid 
population growth rates stress traditional land use and coping mechanisms and lead to 
overexploitation and land degradation in dryland areas; modern ways of land use in-
cluding new technologies to exploit the land often lead to a rapid exploitation. It leaves 
back a totally exhausted land, which is expected to desertify within a short time. The 
people who have lost not only their traditional occupations as farmers but also the land 
itself are now forced to move, mostly to more or less industrialized cities; increasing use 
of fresh water supplies does the rest... Depletion of vegetal cover, water and erosion of 
farm- and grazing-land is today in fact creating the majoruty of the environmental refu-
gees. 
  
In extreme situations, land degradation can remove the economic foundation of a com-
munity or society. To survive, they must move. Others move before the situation gives 
them no other choice. Refugees are often treated without respect, have often to face a 
hopeless situation and do not have the chance to prepare themselves much for a new 
life. For refugees and migrants alike, often, cultural alienation follows.   
 
Experience from recent decades has been interpreted as showing that land degradation 
and desertification have been a major driving force behind the displacement of people. 
In this century, Africa has witnessed a whole set of drought-driven migrations to 
neighboring countries. As shown in a recent study in Niger, land degradation due to 
population-driven reduction of fallow periods, not compensated by additional nutrient 
input to the soil, tends to be one clear component of such migration. In a long term per-
spective, the intercontinental migration, that has already started from North Africa to 
Europe, can be expected to escalate dramatically as a result of rapidly growing water 
scarcity. 
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Reinhard Lohrmann established a typology of international migration and mentioned 
pull factors as well as push factors that cause migration. The pull factors are permanent 
settler movement, temporary worker migration, professional transient movements, refu-
gee migration including asylum-seeking, student migration and cultural exchanges and 
irregular or clandestine migration. This kind of classification looks on migration from 
the receiving end. But migration today is more and more caused by the push factors as 
there are: survival migrants, mobility migrants, refugees including asylum seekers and 
environmental migrants. 
 
Desertification appears most severely in the Sub-Saharan Africa, the Sahel and the Horn 
of Africa, where already we have to face by far the largest number of environmental 
refugees. It has already triggered some of the most broadscale migrations in recent dec-
ades. The author Norman Myers mentions the number of at least 10 million people who 
had become environmental refugees in semi-arid lands and expects a by far greater 
number for the time ahead as regarding the one billion people at risk and their popula-
tion growing rate of sometimes about three percent per year. A special problem of de-
sertification or land degradation is increasing landlessness in overpopulated areas, 
where the productive value of scarce land resources is diminished because of the often 
enormous population pressure. Therefore, people are increasingly forced to abandon 
their homelands. 
 
Another cause for desertification is deforestation in combination with soil erosion, 
which caused already largescale involuntary migrations. But also soil erosion itself - 
500 billion tons of topsoil have been eroded away during the past 20 years -, saliniza-
tion and water deficits are accelerating desertification patterns and do their own to cre-
ate mass migration.   
 
Desertification reduces the land's resilience to natural climatic variations and thus un-
dermines food production, contributes to famine and affects obviously the local socio-
economic conditions. It thereby triggers a vicious circle of poverty, ecological degrada-
tion, migration and conflict. Desertification-induced migration and urbanization may 
worsen foreign living conditions by overcrowding, unemployment, environmental pol-
lution and overstressing of natural and infrastructural resources, and by social tension, 
conflicts and vices such as crime and prostitution in the destination centres. These ad-
verse effects are increasing owing, in no small measure, to environmental degradation. 
One of the tragedies of desertification is that it affects mainly those who can least afford 
it: people living in low-income developing countries, particularly in areas that are al-
ready climatically and economically disadvantaged. Because agriculture in these coun-
tries is the main source of jobs, income and GNP, the effects of desertification are often 
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disastrous, leading to famine and political turmoil. As result of the early 1970's drought, 
governments fell in the affected Sahel countries. 
 
Those affected are mainly the rural poor. With small income, little or no land and scant 
political power, survival depends on the success of a few crops or the sale of a few ani-
mals. As desertification increases, productivity falls: crops fail, domestic animals die, 
water sources dry up and fuelwood becomes difficult to obtain: the prospects for sur-
vival dwindle. At least, drought and land degradation finally trigger a crisis that has 
already occurred in areas suffering from poverty, starvation, civil unrest or war. Then 
the first steps of migration start: farmers are forced to move first to areas previously 
considered too infertile for cultivation. They soon become infertile, too: this is the way 
the wasteland spreads. Normally, dryland's people are used to hardship: they have 
evolved traditional coping mechanisms. But when overcultivation and overgrazing lead 
to permanent and increasing losses in yield, the traditional means of dealing with crisis 
fail. Then, the typical chain starts: crop yields fall rapidly and animals die from lack of 
fodder. Industries based on crop and animal products fail, unemployment rises and peo-
ple get poorer or even reach the state of severe famine. When food production falls, 
food imports often rise, and economic chaos ensues so that governments even may fall. 
For those people affected, there is in the end only one choice: to move. 
 
The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) stressed in its 
preamble the significant affectation of sustainable development through desertification-
induced displacement and migration. At the "International Symposium on environmen-
tally induced population displacements and environmental impacts resulting from mass 
migration", organized by IOM, RPG and UNHCR from April 22-24 1996 in Switzer-
land, it was estimated that more than 135 million people are at risk of being displaced 
mostly as a consequence of severe desertification. Migration to cities and other coun-
tries is a common result of desertification. The number of those who have already had 
to leave runs into millions and continues to increase by about 3 million each year. In 
total, the livelihoods of more than a billion people now risk to be degraded because of 
desertification. For example, one-sixth of the population of Mali and Burkina Faso has 
already been uprooted. This makes urban slums swelling. 
 
From Habitat II we know that urbanization will be one of the most severe challenges for 
sustainable development in the new millennium. Desertification populates the cities. For 
example, there is a long-term flow from Sahelian regions to coastal cities, as we now 
learn from several studies. Urban population would there reach 271 million people in 
2020, which is 3.5 times the present numbers. Also it is estimated that about 60 million 
people from desertified areas will push into North African countries and to European 
shores. As another example, the victims of desertification in Central America fill the 
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cities of the United States; in India, they swell the already teeming cities of the Punjab; 
and in Brazil, where in the north-east of the country desertification threatens an area the 
size of Western Europe, they flock to already overcrowded cities such as Rio de Janeiro 
and Sao Paulo. Between 1965 and 1988, the proportion of Mauritania's people living in 
Nouakchott, the capital, rose from 9 percent to 41 percent, while the proportion of no-
mads fell from 73 to 7 percent. 
 
Areas and countries far distant are affected by migrating people from desertified areas. 
For example, desertification is at least one of the factors pushing Mexican immigrants 
over the border into the US; about 40 percent of the people of the upper and middle re-
gions of the Senegal Valley have already emigrated: there are more people from the 
Bakel region now living in France than there are in the villages they left behind. Thus, 
the poverty of developing countries can impact the social stability of developed coun-
tries, chiefly by shifting into their cities. 
 
Desertification exacerbates political instability. As it contributes to internal displace-
ment, migration and social breakdown, it is a recipe for political instability, for tensions 
between neighbouring countries, and even for armed conflict. Studies presented at the 
Almeria Symposium on Desertification and Migrations, organized by the Government 
of Spain and the CCD Secretariat in 1994, found dryland-environmental causal factors 
in almost half of the about 50 armed conflicts at that time. Specially in African coun-
tries, marginalized arid areas are highly prone to conflict and develop severe security 
challenges for the central governments.195 
 
Another impact of desertification is food insecurity. As Jacques Diouf, secretary general 
of FAO says, "world food production will have to increase by more than 75 percent 
over the next 30 years to keep pace with population growth. We must prepare now to 
feed about 9 billion people by 2030”. In a recent study on population change-
environment linkages in the Arab States region, FAO considers population growth to 
play an unquestionable role in land degradation's impact on food insecurity: "land deg-
radation ... has much to do with accelerated agricultural intensification and the pressure 
of an increasing population combined with the scarcity of cultivable land, leading farm-
ers to ask more of the land than it can yield. And the pressure increases all the more 
rapidly as the spatial growth of human settlements, especially cities, takes a direct toll 
on the surrounding land resources."   
 
                                                 
195 See also Oberthür, Sebastian [1998]: Prävention umweltinduzierter Konflikte durch Entwicklungspo-
litik und internationale Umweltpolitik/ In: Carius, Alexander/ Lietzmann, Kurt M. (eds.) [1998]: Um-
welt und Sicherheit. Herausforderungen für die internationale Politik. Berlin. 
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UNCCD as a tool for sustainable development 
 
Sustainable development is about improving the quality of life for all of the Earth's citi-
zens without increasing the use of natural resources and sinks beyond the capacity of the 
environment to supply them indefinitely. It underlies an understanding that action has 
consequences and that humanity must find innovative ways to change institutional 
structures and influence individual behaviour. It is about taking action, changing policy 
and practice at all levels, from the individual to the general or collective. Sustainable 
development is not a new idea. Many cultures over the course of human history have 
recognized the need for harmony between the environment, society and economy. What 
is new is an articulation of these ideas in the context of a global industrial and informa-
tion society. The Brundtland definition also implies a very important shift from an idea 
of sustainability, as primarily ecological, to a framework that also emphasizes the eco-
nomic and social context of development. 
 
In this regard, since UNCED, more responsibilities have been placed on states and civil 
society to protect local, national, subregional, regional and global environment, espe-
cially those shared by whole communities such as climate change, loss of biodiversity, 
land degradation, desertification and deforestation. In other words, there was conceptu-
alization of a need for more effective implementation of conventions on environment 
and development,   through an integration with domestic law and policy. A number of 
examples clearly point out the human concerns and need for meaningful incentives for 
communities and individuals to achieve sustainable development, including in the 
framework of UNCCD, sustainable land use. 
  
It is commonly recognized that global environmental threats such as climate change and 
global warming are mainly produced in developed countries, and are thus part of the 
epiphenomena of globalization, but have significant and often disastrous impact on de-
veloping countries. Loss of biodiversity, deforestation and desertification are among the 
most prominent ones, since rainfall patterns change significantly in arid, semi-arid and 
dry subhumid areas. But this is not yet the end of the story. Desertification itself is a 
driving force for further downstream problems of severe magnitude, such as marginali-
zation of rural areas, economic disaster and poverty, migration, urbanization, and social 
conflict, just to name some. 
 
There is, as has been mentioned above, a clear link between sustainable development, 
and more particular, environmental issues, and globalization. It has thus been important 
to study and understand the multiple effects of economic globalization in relation with 
global development, environment and questions of participation of people. The term 
‘sustainable development’ itself implies an explicit normative call to balance the effects 
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of globalization in a way that environmental and socio-economic disasters in developing 
countries are addressed, managed and sustainably mitigated and prevented by the global 
community. The UNCCD aims to play a significant role in this context. It further aims 
to contribute concepts and activities which are expected to revitalize local economies 
and communities, and ensure long term ecological stability. The items were foreseen by 
the INCD deliberations. 
 
The UNCCD logic of intervention thus contains typical elements of sustainable devel-
opment principles: enhanced productivity of the agricultural sector instead of one-sided 
industrialization, resolution of injust land tenure structures, the role of education of rural 
people and appropriate technology- traditional as well as modern-, selected moderate 
measures of subvention and protection, enhanced participation of grassroot people.196 
 
Desertification has its greatest impact in Africa because two thirds of the continent are 
deserts or drylands, which are concentrated in the Sahelian region, the Horn of Africa 
and the Kalahari in the south. Not only is the region afflicted by frequent and severe 
droughts, but many African countries are land-locked, have widespread poverty and 
depend heavily on natural resources for subsistence. Their difficult socio-economic 
conditions, insufficient institutional and legal frameworks, incomplete infrastructure 
and weak scientific, technical, and educational capacities have bred the conditions for 
deforestation and overexploitation of land that lead to land degradation, loss of fertile 
soil and desertification as a result. When people live in poverty they have little choice 
but to overexploit the land. There is a high correlation between poverty and environ-
mental degradation as a result of poor people’s dependence on exploitation of the envi-
ronment for survival.197 
  
For example, in Mali, as in other countries in the Sahel such as Niger and Chad that 
suffer from persistent severe droughts, not only are unfavourable climatic conditions 
propelling the process of desertification, but the heavy dependence on land for their 
subsistence. 80% of the 9 million people in Mali, one of the poorest countries in the 
world, are agro-pastoralists. They produce 40% of the GNP and three quarters of the 
country’s exports, inducing farmers to overexploit the land, accelerating land degrada-
tion and desertification. In Zambia, where the percentage households living below the 
poverty line rose from 68% in 1991 to 78% in 1996, 72% of energy sources come from 
wood fuel. In 1998, it was reported that households consumed 88% of firewood and 
96% of charcoal, with 85% of urban households using charcoal for cooking and heating. 
Consequently, 250,000 to 300,000 ha of land per annum are deforested on the average 
                                                 
196 See Senghaas, Dieter [2001]: Wider den entwicklungstheoretischen Gedächtnischwund/ In: Thiel, 
Reinhold E. (ed.) [2001]: Neue Ansätze zur Entwicklungstheorie. 2. Auflage. Bonn. 
197 According to UNDP’s Zambia Human Development Report, 1998. 
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and cultivable land dropped by 30% from 1,004,300 ha in 1989-90 to 701,500 in 
1997/98. The demographic and livestock stress on the land have ruptured the environ-
mental equilibrium. 
 
This is true not only of the drylands in the Sahel and Kalahari, but of the greener coun-
tries such as Ghana, Cameroon, Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda, 
which are as threatened by desertification. Overgrazing and deforestation, which exac-
erbate land degradation and soil erosion, plague these countries. In Uganda, for in-
stance, where 90% of the population lives in rural areas and directly depends on land for 
cultivation and grazing, forestland shrank from 45% of the country’s surface area to 
21% between 1890 and 2000. As a result of overgrazing in its drylands known as the 
“cattle corridor,” soil compaction, erosion and the emergence of low-value grass species 
and vegetation have subdued the land’s productive capacity, leading to desertification. 
Inappropriate farming systems further aggravate the process.   
 
The majority of farmers are not knowledgeable or exposed to improved farming meth-
ods such as crop rotation. In Ghana, where the population density has reached 77 per-
sons per km², 70% of the firewood and charcoal needed for domestic purposes comes 
from the savannah zones, destroying 20,000 ha of woodland per annum. About 40% of 
Ghana’s land mass is subject to desertification, which further exacerbates poverty. 
Many African countries are afflicted by a vicious cycle between poverty and desertifica-
tion.198  
 
It was of utmost importance at UNCED to understand what are the linkages, underlying 
forces, causes and effects between globalization and natural disasters, or, in other 
words, to find an answer to the question: how can sustainable development (and in this 
context: combating desertification and mitigating the effects of drought) be obtained in 
the age of globalization? And how can the structures, trends and effects of a globalizing 
world be utilized to serve the needs of those affected by environmental and socio-
economic disaster such as desertification? The answer identified in Rio lies in the prin-
ciple of collective action. 
                                                 
198 Information taken from national reports submitted to the UNCCD Secretariat. They are featured at the 
Secretariat’s webiste <www.unccd.int>. An interesting country study on desertification and CCD im-
plementation, highlighting its difficulties, in Namibia is Böhm, Nicole [2002]: Desertifikation: Zu den 
Schwierigkeiten der Implementation der UN-Konvention. Fallstudie Namibia. WZB Studie. Berlin. 
Another study on Namibia, focusing on the bottom-up approach and the role of CBOs is Brandt, 
Hartmut [2001]: Role and potential of community based organisations in the implementation of the 
national programme to combat desertification in Namibia. Berlin. A similar study for Kenya, focusing 
on NGO participation, is Kamps, Ortrud [2000]: Die Rolle von NGOs in der Entwicklungspolitik. Am 
Beispiel der Desertifikationsbekämpfung in Kenia. Münster. On geographic studies see also Babaev, 
Agadžan G. (ed.) [1999]: Desert problems and desertification in Central Asia. Berlin. More in Toul-
min, Camilla [2001]: La Convention sur la lutte contre la désertification. Un code de bonnes 
pratiques/ In: Développement et coopération (mars-avril). 
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The bottom-up approach as UNCCD’s post-Westphalian threshold  
 
The Convention defines desertification as „land degradation in arid, semi-arid and dry 
sub-humid areas resulting from various factors, including climatic 
variations and human activities“. It states that combating desertification includes activi-
ties aimed at the prevention and/or reduction of land degradation, the rehabilitation of 
partly degraded land, and the reclamation of desertified land. Drought in terms of 
UNCCD means the „naturally occurring phenomenon that exists when precipitation has 
been significantly below normal recorded levels, causing serious hydrological imbal-
ances that adversely affect land resource production systems“.199 
 
In particular, Article 2, UNCCD, states: 
„1. The objective of this Convention is to combat desertification and mitigate the 
effects of drought in countries experiencing serious drought and/or desertification, 
particularly in Africa, through effective action at all levels, supported by interna-
tional cooperation and partnership arrangements, in the framework of an inte-
grated approach which is consistent with Agenda 21, with a view to contributing 
to the achievement of sustainable development in affected areas. 
 
2. Achieving this objective will involve long-term integrated strategies that focus 
simultaneously, in affected areas, on improved productivity of land, and the reha-
bilitation, conservation and sustainable management of land and water resources, 
leading to improved living conditions, in particular at the community level.“200 
 
The socio-economic aspects of desertification201 have found a strong base within the 
provisional outlines of UNCCD, together with its ecological implications. For a number 
of reasons, UNCCD is thus often regarded more as a developmental treaty than an envi-
ronmental one. But such a kind of distinction would not exatly reflect the nature of this 
Convention, since its origins are truely cross-sectoral and within the framework of sus-
tainable development policies. Yet, while the Climate Change Convention and the Bio-
diversity Convention mostly aim to protect the natural environment from economic im-
pacts, UNCCD aims at addressing the socio-economic conditions of rural developing 
                                                 
199 Definitions taken from the Convention, Art.1 (UN Doc. A/AC.241/27). See further details in Lean, 
Geoffrey [1998]: Down to earth. A simplified guide to the Convention to Combat Desertification. 
Bonn. 
200 Op. cit. 
201 The aforementioned phenomena of migration, urbanization and conflict may serve as examples in this 
context. Further socio-economic aspects of desertification are poverty, income generation loss or 
heath issues. In this context refer also to Katyal, Jagdish/ Vlek, Paul [2000]:  Desertification - causes 
and amelioration. Bonn, Reynolds, James F. (ed.) [2002]: Global desertification. Do humans cause de-
serts? Report of the 88th Dahlem Workshop, 2001. Berlin, and Mainguet, Monique [1991]: Desertifi-
cation. Natural background and human mismanagement. Berlin. 
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country people. However, desertification has to be seen as both cause as well as result 
of socio-economic disorder. 
 
We have learnt further above that the Convention is a case of postmodern conceptuali-
zation of IR. UNCCD fits indeed the first two phenomena of postmodernity seen at Rio 
and described in the previous chapter: it can easily be identified as a process of regime 
building, and its legally binding nature matches with the legal criteria provided.202  
 
Also the third phenomenon, the role of knowledge, can be traced and made evident eas-
ily since the political aspirations for this new agreement as well as the drafting process 
thoroughly took into consideration the history of the PACD, and subsequently sub-
scribed to an approach of ‘lessons learnt’. Following the example of the IPCC, UNCCD 
has furthermore as its first subsidiary body, the Committee on Science and Technology 
(CST), whose experts provided a substantive and knowledge-reflecting base for the con-
tent-driven interventions under this Convention. 
 
One of the chief drafters of UNCCD, Ambassador Robert Ryan, on the scientific con-
text of UNCCD, but also reveiling other crucial aspects, stated: 
 
„Ambassador Bo Kjellén well describes the important role that the international 
scientific community played in the negotiation of the Convention to Combat De-
sertification (CCD). In this connection, two points bear repeating here as back-
ground to discussing scientific challenges in CCD implementation. At its first sub-
stantive session in 1993, the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for Deser-
tification (INCD) spent a week exchanging scientific information. This was crucial 
to developing a broad consensus on the integrated, bottom-up approach that the 
CCD would take to sustainable development in drylands. The International Panel 
of Experts on Desertification (IPED), which had broad geographic and discipli-
nary representation, directly assisted the Secretariat and potential parties in flesh-
ing out this overall approach throughout the CCD and its regional implementa-
tion annexes. The IPED's imprint is particularly evident in the definitions in arti-
cle 1 and in the articles on information collection, analysis and exchange; on re-
search and development; on transfer, acquisition, adaptation and development of 
technology; and on capacity building.  
 
The CCD's integrated, bottom-up approach has two basic facets: It clearly recog-
nizes that economic and social factors cause desertification as much as physical 
factors. One condition for combating land degradation ... is, therefore, reversing 
the vicious circle of poverty in which most dryland communities of developing na-
                                                 
202 Refer to the historical milestones and terms of reference sub-chapter. 
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tions, particularly those in Africa, find themselves. It centers attention on partici-
patory, community action as the basis for combating desertification and mitigat-
ing the effects of drought. Merely consulting local people is not enough. Real par-
ticipation means empowering them to decide for themselves how to use their re-
sources and how to protect the fragile environment in which they live. The same 
overall approach pervades the scientific provisions of the CCD. In essence, the 
Convention challenges the scientific community — social scientists as much as 
physical scientists — to put itself at the service of dryland communities.  
 
“Demand-driven” science is a daunting challenge requiring a change in mindset. 
A new philosophy of technology cooperation needs to replace the traditional top-
down paradigm of technology transfer, which is increasingly seen as the main 
reason why past efforts at desertification control did not get the job done. The sci-
entific provisions of the CCD are broad and detailed. The following, in no par-
ticular order, are just some of the key tasks in crafting a truly demand-driven sci-
entific agenda...: 
 
? To develop benchmarks and indicators of progress in combating desertification 
that encompass both traditional physical variables and measures of success at 
the community level; 
? To encourage information-exchange networks that include not only governments 
and intergovernmental organizations but also non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), local communities and scientific institutions; 
? To inventory and disseminate local technology, knowledge and know-how and 
integrate them with modern technology; 
? To ensure that collection and analysis of scientific information address the needs 
of local communities with a view to resolving specific problems and that local 
communities are involved in those activities; 
? To support research activities that respond to well defined objectives, meet the 
needs of local populations and lead to improved living standards for people in 
affected areas; 
? To develop and strengthen local, national, subregional and regional research 
capacities in developing countries affected by desertification; 
? To extend technology cooperation among affected developing countries, particu-
larly in sectors that foster alternative livelihoods for dryland communities; and 
? To reorient extension services in affected developing countries toward participa-
tory approaches for the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources at 
the community level. 
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Structuring and carrying out a sound scientific agenda will make a major contri-
bution to the success of ... action programs that are the centerpieces of CCD im-
plementation. It is important to recognize, however, as the CCD makes clear, that 
these action programs should be closely linked to other efforts aimed at sustain-
able development, particularly to implementation of related environmental con-
ventions. Article 8 of the CCD specifically encourages joint programs with related 
conventions, notably the Climate Change and Biodiversity Conventions, in the 
fields of research, training and systematic observation, as well as information col-
lection and exchange. The Conference of the Parties and the Permanent Secre-
tariat have already moved strongly to develop such coordination. 
 
One of the main prerequisites for successful coordination with sister conventions 
is a deeper understanding of the scientific factors that link desertification and 
drought to climate change and loss of biodiversity. Special working groups of the 
IPED concentrated on refining knowledge of these linkages. The World Bank, the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF), the International Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) and other organizations have also done considerable work on the subject. 
Given the importance of the linkages, there is room for more extensive and more 
systematic research about them, particularly regarding the positive effects of de-
sertification control on the mitigation of climate change and on the conservation 
of biodiversity. 
 
On the climate side, among other things, desertification control involves reduction 
of slash-and-burn agriculture and of the use of wood for fuel, both of which con-
tribute significantly to greenhouse gas emissions. Also dryland soils may be sig-
nificant carbon sinks and dryland reforestation, if widespread enough, can in-
crease carbon sequestration. Reducing land degradation, by definition, conserves 
important dryland habitats for large mammals, migratory birds, key races of do-
mestic crops and plant sources of commercial and industrial products. Land deg-
radation is also associated with pollution of fresh water ecosystems and with land-
based pollution of the oceans. Greater understanding of such phenomena will 
have an important side effect in building public and political support for the CCD, 
which currently receives less attention than its sister conventions. Science can 
thus play both a direct and indirect role in the Convention's successful implemen-
tation.“203 
 
                                                 
203 Ambassador Robert J. Ryan is an international consultant based in Rome. After his retirement from 
the Foreign Service, he served from 1993 to 1997 as Special Adviser in the Interim Secretariat of the 
Convention to Combat Desertification and concurrently as Chairman of the International Panel of Ex-
perts on Desertification. His full statement can be found at <www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu>. 
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The fourth phenomenon, the semantics of sustainability, and further semantic epiphe-
nomena such as the sustainability triangle/square and other concepts, have, according to 
the above-mentioned notions of UNCCD as a technical means of sustainable dvelop-
ment policy, strongly influenced its outlines, and are replicated in its holistic, integrated 
approach as a cross-sctoral, multi-level framework of comprehension. Furthermore, the 
Convention’s conceptual matrix contains the fifth, sixth and seventh postmodern phe-
nomena, i.e. those of cross-sectoral strategic/ structural reform, global governance ori-
entation and post-Westphalian tools. Yet, UNCCD’s very threshold lies in the so-called 
bottom-up approach, which combines all of these three phenomena in itself. 
 
The Convention foresees that affected countries, i.e. developing countries, some devel-
oped countries, Central and Eastern Europe, some Central Asian countries, give a com-
mittment to prioritize combatting desertfication as a national policy and as a part of their 
national strategies for sustainable development. This process is called mainstreaming, 
and corresponds with the postmodern principle of cross-sectoral strategy orentation. 
Developed countries through their signature bind themselves to support these measures 
through substantial financial resources within existing cooperation frameworks of a bi-
lateral as well as multilateral nature. At the outset, UNCCD achieved no multilateral 
financial mecanism, but the Global Mechanism (GM), which is understood as a broker 
or clearing house body, and also acts as consultancy and training providing entity. 
 
UNCCD’s main target area are the African drylands with some 40 priority countries. 
The Convention’s main policy instrument are National Action Programmes (NAPs), 
delivering frameworks for all activities undertaken in affected countries for its imple-
mentation, such as measures for improving the economic circumstances, of poverty 
eliviation, protection of natural resources, capacity building, empowerment of locals 
and women, or on awareness raising. NAPs work according to a cross- or inter-sectoral 
scheme. These NAPs are, as the prime product of mainstreaming efforts, supposed to 
integrate all previously sectoral target efforts. 
 
A key mechanism of the Convention’s implementation process are the partnership 
agreemens. Bilateral and multilateral donors present in affected developing countries 
are, according to this approach, supposed to bundle themselves and their engagements, 
and thus become integral part in the implementation of NAPs through their consultative, 
technical and financial assistance, always corresponding to a country-driven process. 
 
However, achieving sustainable development without seriously involving the civil soci-
ety at all stages and levels, particularly at national and local levels, is impossible and 
probably doomed to fail. The drafters of UNCCD took this insight into account and 
tried to declinate it through the Convention’s text to a maximum. They had recognized 
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that development is made sustainable through the participation of those concerned. It is 
exactly at this level, where globalization and its epiphenomena need to be met. Creating 
a global village cannot be only left with corporations and shareholders nor with politi-
cians. It is the primordial role of the global civil society to counterbalance and comple-
ment, through their voice and effort, the trends and tendencies currently underway. This 
normative understanding of global governance has underpinned the drafting process of 
the Convention. 
 
However, one should not forget that there is also a process of globalization of NGOs 
going on, with a tendency to strengthen those of the North, and weakening their ‘sister’ 
organizations in developing countries. In other words: Is it really fair to equate the 
emergence of an international civil society with the advancement of democracy? The 
emergence of an international civil society does not really modify the global balance of 
power - it merely expresses it differently. The influential "civil societies" and thus 
NGOs are almost necessarily those of the most powerful countries. Thus, it is the civil 
societies and the NGOs from the rich, media-driven countries that usually exercise in-
fluence in the world. They are the ones with the means to communicate - and thus the 
power to impose their views. It is developed countries influence, not that of Niger, Bo-
livia, or Bangladesh. It is not Nigerian NGOs that are going to intervene in Northern 
Ireland or demonstrate in Seattle, it is European and American NGOs most likely.  
 
The former French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hubert Vétrine, said: 
"Democracy is not like instant coffee, where you can just add water and stir. It 
doesn't result from a conversion, but from a process. The development of civil so-
ciety is a fact. We should make it more responsible and support its most useful as-
pects, but for states to abdicate their roles would mean progress neither for de-
mocracy nor for what we in French call the management of globalization."204 
 
When speaking about partnership, we must as well refer to partnership within the net-
work of NGOs, and examine, if it is the civil society of developing countries whose 
voice is heard, and whose efforts are meaningful. Exactly this normative goal was im-
plied by the drafters of UNCCD. Probably the most interesting point acoording to the 
notions of post-Westphalian governance are UNCCD‘s guiding principles and norma-
tive provisions on particiption, making it a piece of inscribed global governance, since 
the Convention is legally binding and thus international law: UNCCD foresees through-
out participation of concerned populations at all levels in the planning, implementation 
and evaluation of the Convention. The latter is also understood as mobilizing subsidiar-
                                                 
204 Internet source, unknown. 
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ity, utilizing existing knowledge and technology including traditional knowledge where 
appropriate, local experience and best practises.  
 
This concept is called the bottom-up approach, and follows the idea of participatory 
eco-development as a process of decentral decison making. It finds its complement in 
the above-described partnership principle: developing as well developed countries, af-
fected and non-affected countries are supposed to jointly implement UNCCD, including 
all intra-state levels of administration and decision making, and also including various 
actors of civil society: NGOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), associations, 
rural people, especially women, business, and the scientific community.205 
 
„Die Untersuchung der Desertifikationskonvention zeigt..., daß Desertifikations-
bekämpfung in ihr anders als im Rahmen des Bemühungen der 70er Jahre als Ziel 
in der Hintergrund tritt. Vielmehr dient die Konvention in erster Linie dazu, die 
Bedingungen erfolgreicher nationaler und internationaler Entwicklungsbemühun-
gen für alle Parteien verbindlich festzuschreiben: Die Konvention soll zur nach-
haltigen Bodennutzung in Trockengebieten beitragen, indem betroffene Staaten 
ebenso wie Geberländer auf einen neuartigen „Bottom-up“-Ansatz verpflichtet 
werden, der der lokalen Bevölkerung und Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NGOs) 
eine zentrale Rolle bei der Desertifikationsbekämpfung zuweist.“206   
 
In 2002, the Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung 
(BMZ) states: 
 
„Bei der Desertifikationsbekämpfung geht es dabei auf der lokalen Ebene um die 
partizipative Entwicklung und Anwendung von Methoden zur Stabilisierung, Wie-
derherstellung und Verbesserung der Bodenqualität, z. B. durch Erosionsschutz 
und Aufforstung... Im Politikdialog mit den Partnerländern setzt sich die deutsche 
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit für eine Verbesserung der nationalen Rahmenbe-
dingungen für einen wirksamen Bodenschutz ein. Im internationalen Raum unter-
stützt sie die Umsetzung der internationalen Konvention zur Bekämpfung der De-
sertifikation (CCD). Dabei spielt die Politik- und Prozessberatung eine immer 
größere Rolle. Neben der Unterstützung zahlreicher Länder bei der Erstellung so-
genannter Nationaler Aktionsprogramme zur Desertifikationsbekämpfung (NAP) 
werden Länder, die von grenzüberschreitenden Desertifikationsproblemen betrof-
                                                 
205 The concept of participatory eco-development is thoroughly developed and described in Lazarev, 
Grigori [1994]. More on NGO influence of the outline of UNCCD is found in Carr, Susan/ Mpande, 
Roger [1996]: Does the definition of the issue matter? NGO influence and the International Conven-
tion to Combat Desertification in Africa/ In: The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 
34/ 1. 
206 Ehlers, Maximilian [1996], p. 7. 
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fen sind, bei der Erarbeitung und Umsetzung subregionaler und regionaler Akti-
onsprogramme zur Desertifikationsbekämpfung beraten.“207 
  
The bottom-up approach is a new concept of policy implementation, which reverses the 
traditional logic of intervention, the declination of hierarchically generated policy for-
mulation and decision making results to the ‘lower levels’ of intra-state societal order, 
i.e. the so-called top-down approach. This conceptual change, brought up as a discus-
sion base by the United Nations themwelves, and transformed into international law by 
state delegates during the INCD sessions, may have been motivated and triggered by the 
impression of growing erosion tendencies of nation-state capabilities, particularly in the 
fields of environment and development politics in developing countries. I doubt that the 
bottom-up approach is truely of an abstract normative nature, i.e. yielding the empow-
erment of people just for the sake of democracy. 
 
I think that this new and radically altered methodology was expected to render the im-
plementation process of the Convention way more effective than any other previous 
attempt. As such, we can speak of a case of learning institutions: the failure of the 
PACD certainly inluenced the drafting process of UNCCD. Enhanced effectivity of the 
new instrument was thus supposed to be provided by meaningful participation of non-
state actors, of local and regional structures, by a more holistic perception of interna-
tional relations as a complex of global governance, and enhanced synergies between 
existing conventions, regimes and national policies. The bottom-up approach is one of 
the most radical conceptual results of post-Westphalian politics and as such a phenome-
non of the postmodern paradigm. 
 
UNCCD features the strongest focus on postmodern governance concepts among the 
Rio treaties, since bottom-up is, conceptually, nowhere else so strongly implied. The 
bottom-up approach is linked with the epiphenomens or sub-concepts of participatory 
eco-development and partnership agreements within given multi-actor-networks, as 
described above. 
  
One of the key questions that the drafting fathers of the Convention undertook to reflect 
upon was: How can UN agencies link up with civil society? The background for this 
both conceptual and strategic scenario was evident, i.e. the ongoing crisis of multilateral 
organizations backed from the functionalist matrix of post-World War II politics. Look-
ing at the major significance of development issues for the desired success of UNCCD, 
it had seemed before Rio that the new generation of OECD representatives was not any 
more interested in North-South solidarity, as a consequence of which lack of political 
will, interest and funding had to be admitted.  
                                                 
207 Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) [2002], p. 43. 
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In the light of the aforementioned, the designers of UNCCD, encouraged through the 
wave of new world order and global governance concepts emerging by the time of Rio, 
and the strong focus on civil sector engagement during UNCED, chose a participatory 
approach for their conceptual framework, linking the logic of intervention directly with 
the local level and civil society.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Examples from the implementation process of UNCCD 
 
Introduction 
 
In this Chapter a number of empirical examples from the Convention’s implementation 
process shall be presented. They relate to the following topics: 
 
? Cross-sectoral strategies 
? Bottom-up approach 
? (National) Policy formulation 
? (National) Policy evaluation 
? Partnership agreements: North-South Cooperation, South-South Cooperation, Multi-
lateral Assistance 
 
The selection of  examples comprises strategic blueprints elaborated by the UNCCD 
Secretariat as well as reports and/or proceedings from conferences. The blueprints aim 
at putting the Convention’s provisions, along with other concepts of sustainable devel-
opment, into practice. These are a concept to facilitate the elaboration of national re-
ports on implementation of UNCCD, a blueprint for the organization of national forums 
on synergetic implementation of environmental conventions, one for the organization of 
consultative forums for the sake of partnership agreements, the design of an African 
thematic network as a means of South-South cooperation, and a concept for an interna-
tional conference preparatory to the Johannesburg Summit in 2002. 
 
This chapter also contains summaries and assessments of crucial meetings  targetting 
the evaluation of national reports, a national synergy forum in Uganda, a workshop on 
the EU Cotonou Agreement, the launching meeting of the said regional network, and 
the UNCCD WSSD PrepCom. Furthermore, a country case study is provided, featuring 
Uganda’s NAP elaboration process, and also, a GEF initiated cross-sectoral funding 
programme is introduced. The selection featured here aims to represent a broad empiri-
cal spectrum. 
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Item 1: Cross-sectoral strategies/ National policy formulation  
1.1 Elaboration of a National Action Programme (NAP): Uganda  
 
A brief history of Uganda208 
Some time before the 15th century, Nilotic and Nilo-Hamitic tribes had already been 
migrating southward into the geographical area of Lake Victoria, where they more and 
more merged with the locally settled Bantu tribes. Later, during the 15th century, fair-
skinned cattle keepers moved into what is now Western Uganda and became the ‘over-
lords’ of that area. This migratory movement was soon followed by another one, this 
time of Nilotes from around the Al-Ghazal River in Sudan. This latter wave, as it 
crossed the Nile, pushed the earlier invaders before it. Their advance guard settled in 
Western Uganda and established the state of Bunyoro-Kitara.    
 
In the southeast of Bunyoro-Kitara, the smaller state of Buganda grew up as an off-
spring of its larger neighbour. By the end of the 18th century, the boundaries of Buny-
oro-Kitara had been stretched so far that the authority of the ruler began to crumble, 
when the smaller, more compact state of Buganda enjoyed a succession of effective 
Kabakas, or rulers, and began to expand at the expense of Bunyoro-Kitara. It was during 
this period of Buganda's rise that the first Arab traders reached the country in the 1840s. 
Mutesa I, who took office around 1856, admitted the first European explorer, Captain 
John Hanning Speke, who entered into the Kabaka's territory in 1862. Later, the Impe-
rial British East Africa Company was instructed to administer the region on behalf of 
the British government, and, for strategic reasons, the British government itself declared 
a protectorate over Buganda in 1894.  
 
A so-called agreement between the British authorities and the Kabaka, known as the 
Buganda Agreement of 1900, formed the basis of British rule in Buganda for more than 
50 years. Under its terms the Kabaka was recognized as ruler of Buganda as long as he 
remained faithful to the protecting authority. His council of chiefs, the Lukiko, was 
given statutory recognition.  
 
Early in the 20th century the British authorities laid the foundations of a peasant econ-
omy by encouraging the cultivation of cotton, which had been introduced into the coun-
try as an economic crop in 1904. It was mainly owing to the wealth derived from cotton 
that Uganda became independent of a grant-in-aid from the British Treasury in 1914. 
The part played by Europeans as well as Asians was mainly on the commercial and 
processing side of the protectorate's agricultural industry. When an additional crop was 
                                                 
208 Compiled from The World Factbook 2001, published as public domain by the U.S. Government. 
Washington DC, and <www.newafrica.com>. 
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sought in order to widen the basis of the economy, it was African-grown coffee that the 
agricultural department encouraged. In 1921 a Legislative Council was instituted, but its 
membership was so small that it made little impact.  
 
In 1961, at the first countrywide election to the legislative council, the Democratic Party 
(DP) won a majority of seats. Benedicto Kiwanuka was appointed chief minister, but he 
proved to be unacceptable to the ruling elite of Buganda. At pre-independence elections 
to the national assembly, held in April 1962, the opposing UPC (Uganda’s People Con-
gress) won a majority of seats and formed a government, led by Milton Obote. Uganda 
was granted self-government in 1962, with Obote as Prime Minister. The new constitu-
tion provided for a federation of four regions -Buganda, Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro-
each with considerable autonomy. In October 1962, Uganda became independent with 
Mutesa II, the Kabaka (king) of Buganda, as non-executive president.  
 
In February 1966 Obote led a coup against his opponents. The constitution was sus-
pended, the president was deposed and all executive powers were transferred to Obote. 
In April an interim constitution was introduced, withdrawing regional autonomy and 
introducing an executive presidency. Obote became head of state. In May, when the 
Lukiiko demanded the restoration of Buganda's autonomy, government troops, com-
manded by Col. Idi Amin, seized the palace of the Kabaka, and a state of emergency 
was imposed in Buganda. A new constitution was adopted in September 1967, estab-
lishing a unitary republic and abolishing traditional rulers and legislatures.   
 
In January 1971, Amin seized power and declared himself head of state promising a 
return to civilian rule within five years. Soon after taking power Amin suspended politi-
cal activity and most civil rights. The national assembly was dissolved, and Amin ruled 
by decree. The jurisdiction of military tribunals was extended to cover the entire popula-
tion, and several agencies were established to enforce state security. In August 1972 
Amin announced the expulsion of all non-citizen Asians. Most went to the United 
Kingdom, which severed diplomatic relations and imposed a trade embargo against 
Uganda and by the end of 1972 virtually all Western aid had ceased. No coherent eco-
nomic development policy existed, and the country’s infrastructure was allowed to dete-
riorate.   
 
Political exiles in Tanzania and elsewhere, including Obote, were encouraged by Presi-
dent Nyerere of Tanzania to form a united political front to remove Amin. In January 
1979 the Tanzanian armed forces invaded Uganda, assisted by the Uganda National 
Liberation Army (UNLA). They captured Kampala in April. Amin fled the country, 
eventually taking refuge in Saudi Arabia. A provisional government was established in 
April 1979. The elections held in December 1980 were contested by four parties and 
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Obote was proclaimed president for the second time. But the election did not bring mili-
tary or political stability to Uganda.  
 
In July 1985 Obote was overthrown in a military coup, led by Brig. Tito Okello. By the 
end of August 1985, however, the Okello government was facing serious difficulties. 
The National Resistance Army (NRA) under Museveni took control in January 1986. 
Yoweri Museveni was sworn in as president and formed a National Resistance Council 
(NRC), with both civilian and military members. Museveni announced a policy of na-
tional reconciliation,  established a commission to investigate breaches of human rights 
during the regimes of Amin, Obote and Okello, under whom, up to 800,000 Ugandans 
had been killed. In February 1989 the first national election since 1980 was held. 
 
In May 1991 president Museveni formally invited all Ugandan Asians, who had been 
expelled during the Amin regime, to return. This gesture was intended to attract both 
international approval and investment in the Ugandan economy by expelled Asians who 
had prospered since leaving Uganda. Elections to the 288-member constituent assembly 
took place in March 1994, and were accepted by a majority of Ugandans to have been 
conducted fairly. Museveni and the NRM won overwhelming support. The first presi-
dential election in Uganda was held on 9 May 1996, Museveni won with 74.2% of the 
votes. Nation-wide local elections took place in November 1997. Direct presidential and 
parliamentary elections were held in March (presidential) and June 2001 (parliamen-
tary) respectively. 
 
Relief and Aspects of Drainage209 
The relief features of Uganda fall under four categories as outlined below. Generally, 
the altitude ranges from 620 – 5,110 meters above sea level.   
 
Plateau:  Most of Uganda forms part of an interior high plateau of Africa. It is charac-
terized by several stages of truncation, resulting from long continued sub-aerial denuda-
tion. This plateau is lower in the north and center of the country and higher in the south 
and south-west. The relative relief of the lower elevations seldom rises more than 2.1-
3.0 meters. The landscape is of open plains except where inselbergs rise to punctuate the 
plains, especially around Soroti, Nakasongola, and Labwor hills. South-wards from the 
northern plains, which range between 750-1,110 meters, the plateau rise towards the 
Lake Victoria water-shed. The flat-topped hills rise too much the same height along the 
water-shed generally at 1,260-1,320 meters. In Ankole, however, the hill-top level con-
                                                 
209 Compiled from Uganda’s national report submitted to the Conference of the Parties to the United 
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) in 1999, Uganda’s National Action Pro-
gramme to Combat Desertification (NAP), submitted to the UNCCD Secretariat in 2000 – both to be 
found at the UNCCD website <www.unccd.int>. 
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tinues to rise to over 1,800 meters. The arena levels in Ankole are generally at 1,140 
meters. The plateau reaches its highest elevation to the south-west of the country, with 
summits rising to above 2,100 meters in Kigezi. Other highest points are found in 
Karamoja and west Nile. 
 
Mountains: The prominent mountain features of Uganda are found along the interna-
tional border. These include: the Bufumbira volcanic mountains and Rwenzori moun-
tains in the west and south-west; volcanic centers of the Karamoja region which include 
Moroto, Kadam, Napak, Toror, Morungole mountains; and Mount Elgon and Tororo 
plug in eastern Uganda. The biggest point of the country is Mount Stanley, which is at 
5,109 meters above sea level, while the lowest point is at Nimule close to the Sudan 
border, where the valley of Albert Nile drops at about 600 meters above sea level. The 
major volcanoes of the west in Kigezi consist of conical hills rising to a maximum of 
over 4,050 meters above sea level. Permanent ice and snow is found on Rwenzori and 
Elgon mountain peaks; while the summits of Napak, Moroto and Kadam have been 
scoured by erosion. The peaks, which have almost been destroyed by denudation proc-
esses, include that of Tororo plug, Toror Hills and Napak mountain. 
 
Rivers: The pattern exhibited by the flow of rivers in the general direction of Lake Vic-
toria (drainage into this Lake), represents a recent geological re-adjustments that in-
clude, as earlier mentioned, up-warping and faulting along the western rift. This resulted 
in the reversal of the direction of flow of the existing rivers and ponding-up of waters in 
relatively down-ward zone to the east, which now forms the Lake Victoria basin. The 
Kagera, Katonga, and Kafu rivers allrise at present in swamp-filled gaps in the upward 
rift rim and flow sluggishly east to the lake. To the west of the present head-waters of 
these major rivers, steep stream course descend abruptly to the floor of the rift. The 
shatter zone parallel to Aswa zone influenced the breaching of the basin rim in the 
north. Associated with this zone an aggressive rift scrap, which captures escaping wa-
ters, which drain into Lake Albert; through a narrow cleft under 6 meters. Overall, due 
to the influence of warping process, many of the perennial streams of the country, many 
of the water-courses are only seasonal, and some carry water for only a few hours after 
rain. 
 
Lakes:  Lake Victoria (the second largest in the world) has an intricate submerged 
northern coastline and elevated western plains of sand-bar and lagoon. Similar to this is 
the back-tilted Lake Kyoga system and Koki lakes of Ankole. The smaller lake of 
Kigezi resulted from volcanic damming by lava flows or craters. The crater lakes of the 
Western Rift Valley and the tarns on Rwenzori mountains are of different origin; the 
former resulting from gaseous explosions, and the latter from glacial erosion. 
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Climate210 
There are at least five major climatic zones in Uganda, based mainly on similarities of 
rainfall distribution rather than volume, namely: (i) Lake Victoria Zone; (ii) Karamoja 
(iii) Western Uganda; (iv) Acholi-Kyoga; and (v) Ankole-soutern Uganda. The mean 
annual rainfall for the country ranges from less than 500mm in parts of the north and 
north-east, to over 2000mm over Lake Victoria, the Rwenzori and Elgon mountains.  
Most parts of the country receive mean annual rainfall totals varying from 1000-
1500mm.  Generally, the southern half experiences two distinct rainy seasons.  The 
northern half experiences two rainy periods, which coalesce into a single rainy season, 
with a single long and dry season. The central part of the country, however, receives 
rainfall virtually every month, but the peaks are poorly defined. 
 
How desertification and land degradation threaten natural landscapes and sustainable 
development in Uganda211 
Land is by far the most important natural resource in the country supporting about 90% 
of the country's population that lives in rural areas and directly depends on it for cultiva-
tion and grazing. The country is also endowed with a great diversity of animals and 
plant species due to its geographical location in the zone that overlaps community char-
acteristics of the dry east African savannah and those of West African rain forests. 
About 70% of the livestock in the country is owned by cattle keepers with only 30% of 
the cattle found on commercial ranches and modern farms while 94% of all the crops 
output comes from about 2.5 million small holders each cultivating less than 2 ha p.a. 
 
Food security is a serious problem in the country with 5 to12% of the human population 
consuming less than the national daily. The districts of Moroto, Kotido, Moyo, Bun-
dibugyo, Nakasongola and Luwero are chronically deficient in all staple and major food 
stuffs while the Districts of Soroti, Kumi, Tororo, Nebbi, Kabarole, Kasese, Bushenyi, 
Masaka, Mpigi and Mubende are said to be in transitory food security. All these dis-
tricts experience persistent droughts and some of them have started showing desert-like 
conditions which, if not checked, will result into serious land degradation. 
 
According to the UNCCD, desertification is defined as land degradation in arid, semi-
arid and dry sub-humid areas resulting from various factors including climatic variation 
and human activities; while drought is described as the naturally occurring phenomenon 
that exists when precipitation has been significantly below normal recorded levels, caus-
ing serious hydrological imbalances that adversely affect the land resource production 
systems. 
                                                 
210 See ops. cit. 
211 See ops. cit. 
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Uganda’s dry lands occupy what is referred to as the “cattle corridor”, an area stretching 
from the North–East through Central to the South–West of the country. The areas 
mainly rangelands cover approximately 84,000 sq.km of the total land area. In these 
areas semi arid and dry sub humid conditions prevail. They also experience erratic rain-
fall patterns, receive rainfall ranging between 500-800mm/ annum where drought is a 
common recurrent phenomenon. Some other parts in the country particularly the North-
ern region experience similar conditions. In Uganda drought conditions are mainly ex-
perienced in the North- Eastern districts, where serious crop failure has been noted to 
occur in every 5 years.  
 
The main factors contributing to desertification in the country include drought, soil ero-
sion, over grazing, deforestation, and inappropriate farming practices. Poverty as well as 
the increasing population pressure on the land exacerbate these factors. This scenario 
has intensified land and environmental degradation leading to loss of the productive 
potential of the land, famines, low household incomes and increased social unrest in the 
affected areas, particularly in the North East of the country. 
 
Drought - Widespread reliance on rain fed agriculture, subsistence farming and pastor-
alism, poor crop and animal husbandry practices, water scarcity and population pressure 
contributes to vulnerability to drought. Drought affects Uganda, mainly in or near the 
Karamoja region. This region experiences serious crop failure every five years. For ex-
ample, drought occurred in 1979-80, and 1984-85 in Karamoja, and in 1988-89 affect-
ing West Nile, Lira, Kitgum, Gulu and Apac. The 1993-94 drought was the most exten-
sive and affected 16 districts. In 1999, drought seriously hit the districts of Mbarara, 
Ntungamo, Rakai and Bushenyi. Areas characterised by low rainfall and high tempera-
tures, heavy land use and lack of conservation measures are vulnerable to desertifica-
tion. Some areas in the districts of Kotido, Nakasongola and Rakai already exhibit de-
sert-like conditions. 
 
Soil erosion - Is the single most important form of land degradation and a large part of 
the country has been affected in one way or another. While the steep slopes of Kabale, 
Kisoro, Bundibugyo, Mbale, and Kapchorwa districts are the most seriously affected, 
even in the relatively flat areas such as Iganga, Kamuli, Tororo and Kumi, soil erosion 
has occurred at an alarming rate largely through rill and sheet erosion and thus leading 
to gradual but steadily increasing loss in soil productivity. Many of the drier areas, par-
ticularly rangelands have also been seriously affected. Apart from the rapid decline in 
fertility and productivity of the original land, soil erosion has also led to the saltation of 
lakes, rivers and streams. 
 
 Andreas Rechkemmer 
 
86 
Overgrazing - Overgrazing is a serious problem in the rangelands. Particular areas af-
fected are the pastoral counties of Ruhaama, Nyabushozi, Kazo of Mbarara District, and 
the whole of Nakasongola district and Karamoja region. The resulting effects of over-
grazing include soil compaction, erosion (particularly gully erosion) and the emergence 
of low-value grass species and vegetation with subsequent declines in carrying capacity 
of the land and 
therefore low productivity. 
 
Deforestation - At the beginning of the 20 th century, 45% of the country’s surface area 
(108,450sq.km) was under forest cover. The present level of forestland is only 21% of 
its value in 1890 as a result of deforestation. The major causes of deforestation are pro-
vision of wood fuel and clearing of land for agricultural activities. Ninety percent of the 
total population who live in rural areas directly depend on firewood for their energy 
needs, and a big fraction of the urban dwellers depend on charcoal. All in all, 92 percent 
of Uganda’s source of energy is wood fuel, while only 7 percent are supplied by petro-
leum and 1 percent by electricity. The 1986 World Bank Report estimates production of 
wood fuel as 15.6 million cubic meters per annum while consumption is about 18.3 mil-
lion cubic meters which puts demand in excess of the supply by 2.7 million cubic me-
tres. 
 
Inappropriate farming practices - There are at least seven different farming systems in 
the country each with its own soil degradation problems. The actual magnitude of deg-
radation in each system depends largely on population pressure, vulnerability of the soil 
to erosion, rainfall amounts and the general relief of the area. The most critical problem, 
however, is that the majority of farmers have inadequate knowledge of or few opportu-
nities to learn about improved farming methods. For example, crop rotation is often not 
practised; with most farmers growing the same crop types on the same piece of land 
year after year, a situation which leads to serious soil degradation. Improved agro-
forestry systems, capable of renewing and regenerating the soil, are also lacking in most 
farming systems. 
 
UNCCD as an integrated tool to restoring landscapes and achieving sustainability – 
Uganda’s National Action Programme to Combat Desertification212 
Taking recognition of the above issues, the Government of Uganda actively participated 
in negotiations of the Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) and demon-
strated its commitment to implementation of the Convention by signing and ratifying it 
in 1994 and 1997, respectively.    
 
                                                 
212 See ops. cit. 
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The Convention emphasises and gives particular attention to preventive measures for 
areas whose lands are not yet or are just slightly degraded; development of national ca-
pacity to provide early warning against drought; irrigation programmes; sustainable 
agricultural practices; increase in availability of the water resource and integrated plans 
for sustainable management of all the natural resources. The Convention also recognises 
the need to integrate strategies for combating desertification with measures designed to 
eradicate poverty. Under this Convention, parties are called upon to elaborate, adopt and 
implement action programmes, develop and strengthen institutional frameworks, estab-
lish and strengthen food security systems and establish appropriate financial mecha-
nisms.  
 
The UNCCD calls upon parties to formulate and implement National Action Pro-
grammes (NAPs) as the central element in a strategy to combat desertification and miti-
gate the effects of drought. Thus, NAPs should be designed through a participatory lo-
cally driven process involving all key stakeholders at all levels and give particular atten-
tion to local communities in the affected areas. In Uganda, the NAP was elaborated 
within the broad framework of the country’s National Environment Action Plan 
(NEAP) which aims at integrating concerns into the overall socio-economic develop-
ment strategy of the country.  
 
In 1995, a National Awareness Workshop on the UNCCD and the NAP process for 
high-level Government policy and decision makers and NGOs recommended that funds 
be sought to create awareness of the UNCCD and carry out broader consultations on the 
NAP involving NGOs, donors, local communities in more districts. It was also appreci-
ated that addressing issues of desertification and drought will not be an easy undertak-
ing if financial resources to support local community actions are not in place. Thus the 
need to establish a Uganda National Fund to Combat Desertification was emphasised.  
 
The overall strategy in implementing the first phase of the NAP process was to encour-
age the participation of all stakeholders at all levels in awareness and consultation ac-
tivities of the NAP process. Emphasis was put at district and lower levels focussing 
mainly on strengthening the capacity of local authorities and NGOs to ensure their ac-
tive involvement in awareness raising, training and consultation of local communities. 
The NAP consultation process involved mainly local communities, civil leaders at all 
levels, NGOs, government departments, local authorities, and legislators, among others. 
Participatition of the private sector and donor agiencies was rather limited.  
 
The main output of the first phase of the NAP process was the First National Forum 
aimed at bringing together stake holders at all levels to establish a national consensus on 
the objectives, scope and priority programme areas for the NAP the contributions, roles 
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and responsibilities of the various stakeholders in the implementation of the NAP proc-
ess and necessary measures, needed for co-ordination, financing and technical support 
to the NAP process. The First National Forum took place in 1998 and was attended by a 
total of 160 participants. These were mainly stakeholders from the national level, the 
“cattle corridor districts” and other districts affected by desertification and drought. The 
other participants included heads or representatives of key government departments and 
institutions, academic and research institutions, international and national NGOs, pri-
vate sector organizations, donor representatives, legislators and the press. It laid the 
foundation for the elaboration of Uganda’s National Action Programme to Combat De-
sertification, which was finally validated at a Second National Forum and subsequently 
adopted by the government in 2000. 
 
In its NAP, Uganda has decided to focus on the following key projects so as to combat 
desertification and land degradation and thus contribute to sustainable development and 
protection of it’s natural landscapes and the livelihoods of people living therein: 
 
? Promote awareness raising on desertification; 
? Support to local level community initiatives;  
? Development  of appropriate technologies for combating desrtification; 
? Water development and management; 
? Improve soil management by training farmers and pastoral communities in soil fer-
tility conservation and range management; 
? Promote afforestation programmes; 
? Development of  alternative  energy sources; 
? Harmonize the National Action Programme to Combat Desertification with other 
existing national programmes and policies for environment and sustainable devel-
opment; 
? Organize a national conference that will define, in a spirit of partnership, the mo-
dalities for financing important activities under the NAP;   
? Work towards more synergetic implementation of the conventions on desertifica-
tion, climate change, biodiversity and wetlands, fully realizing their interdepend-
ence. 
 
Uganda has put poverty alleviation at the forefront of its development objectives. The 
Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) has guided the formulation of government 
policy since its inception in 1997. Under this plan, Uganda is being transformed into a 
modern economy in which agents in all sectors can participate in economic growth. The 
poor are also to be enabled to participate in this process, both by expanding smallholder 
agriculture and employment in industry and services.  
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Agriculture being the main engine of growth, food security as well as improved in-
comes for the poor makes it the lead sector for modernizing the economy. In this regard, 
a Plan for the Modernization of Agriculture (PMA) has been elaborated. The PMA is a 
sector wide strategic plan whose overall goal is to improve the quality of life of the 
people of Uganda through increased household incomes, food security and nutrition, 
gainful employment and sustainable use of the natural resource base. The NAP is ex-
pected to re-enforce the implementation of the PEAP and PMA as it seeks to address 
issues of land degradation and drought, which have direct effect on agricultural produc-
tion and poverty. 213 
 
 
Item 2: Cross-sectoral strategies/ National policy evaluation 
2.1 Elaboration of national reports: Institutional support to African countries to  
facilitate submission of their reports at COP 3 
 
Activities 
By its decisions 5/COP.2 and 11/COP.1 on procedures for the communication of infor-
mation regarding measures taken for implementation of the Convention and provisions 
for the review of the status of implementation, the Conference of the Parties requested 
the UNCCD Secretariat to report to it during the third session on activities undertaken 
in assisting developing country Parties in the preparation of reports on the implementa-
tion of the Convention. The UNCCD Secretariat received requests from various African 
countries for assistance to enable them to meet their obligations with respect to report-
ing to the COP at its third session on the status of implementation of the Convention. 
Similar requests were received from the Permanent Inter-State Committee for Drought 
Control in the Sahel (CILSS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Arab 
Maghreb Union (AMU), seeking technical and financial support for the preparation of 
reports on implementation of the Convention by their respective member States. 
 
The Secretariat consequently convened a consultative planning meeting with representa-
tives of these subregional organizations in Geneva on 25-26 January 1999, aiming at 
articulating the needs, be they financial, technical or otherwise, of the African countries 
in assessing the progress of implementation of the Convention since its adoption. An 
added advantage of this analytical process of evaluating the progress of CCD imple-
mentation was that it helped to strengthen the capacity of the national coordinating bod-
                                                 
213 The Uganda case study may be complemented by an examination of Zimbabwian policies on drought 
shocks: Owens, Trudy/ Hoddinott, John/ Kinsey, Bill [2003]: Ex-Ante Actions and Ex-Pot Public Re-
sponses to Drought Shocks: Evidence and Simulations from Zimbabwe/ In: World Development Vol. 
31, No. 7. 
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ies so as to enable them to fulfil their respective mandates. The overall goal was to pre-
pare comprehensive reports from the African countries affected by drought and deserti-
fication, and to provide the COP with sufficient information for them to make concrete 
recommendations as appropriate. It was also expected that the process set in motion 
would contribute to the establishment of mechanisms for participatory assessment of the 
implementation of the Convention within the national action programme process. 
 
The Secretariat sought the collaboration of the United Nations Institute for Training and 
Research (UNITAR), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Observatory of the Sahara and Sahel 
(OSS), and experts from the African subregional organizations, in preparing a help 
guide to be used by the affected countries in compiling their national reports 
(ICCD/COP(3)/INF.3). The purpose of this help guide was to assist the Parties to the 
Convention in preparing their first national reports on implementation of the Conven-
tion. The help guide was designed to provide the UNCCD national focal points who 
would coordinate the preparation of the national reports, as well as others involved in 
the process, with useful information to assist them in the collection, compilation, analy-
sis and presentation of data and information, in line with decision 11/COP.1. 
 
The help guide contained background information and explained the procedures for the 
communication of information and review of implementation of the Convention, a pro-
posed methodology and possible process to follow which would be adapted to suit the 
particular needs of each country Party, as well as an outline and explanation of the spe-
cific guidelines provided by decision 11/COP.1. The help guide was therefore expected 
to be adapted by the national coordinating bodies to the particularities and requirements 
of each national context. It could also serve as a tool for monitoring and evaluating pro-
gress made in combating land degradation within the broad context of achieving sus-
tainable development.    
 
To reinforce this process, the Secretariat in collaboration with the United Nations Envi-
ronment Programme supported the convening of a consultative meeting of the subre-
gional organization representatives in Nairobi on 22-23 February 1999, with the objec-
tive of charting out the ways and means to provide technical and catalytic financial sup-
port to the affected countries in preparing their national reports on implementation of 
the Convention.  On this occasion, moreover, the experts from the subregional organiza-
tions also reviewed and refined the help guide. 
 
The subregional organizations embarked on coordination of the preparation of national 
reports of their respective member States. They requested the Secretariat to facilitate the 
organization of planning workshops where the national focal points would be involved 
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in designing the process of elaboration of the national reports. Consequently, the Secre-
tariat, in collaboration with UNITAR, UNEP, UNDP, OSS, CILSS and ECOWAS, 
IGAD, SADC and AMU, organized a series of planning and briefing workshops on the 
formulation of the national reports.  These consultative brainstorming sessions were 
held with the various UNCCD national focal points, the subregional organization repre-
sentatives and the consultants who had been selected to assist with the preparation of 
reports, with the following schedule: on 15-16 March 1999, for the southern Africa 
subregion; on 18-19 March 1999 for the eastern Africa subregion; on 18-19 March for 
the northern Africa subregion, and on 22-23 March 1999 for the western Africa subre-
gion. The aim of these planning and briefing consultations was to help broaden the con-
stituency of actors in this process, and to sharpen the focus of a cadre of officials who 
were to be directly involved in report preparation, while at the same time strengthening 
the capacity of the national coordinating bodies to respond to the issues pertaining to the 
requirements of the Conference of the Parties in this respect.   
 
Upon request from the countries, the organization of national workshops was supported. 
In these workshops, draft national reports were presented to the members of the national 
coordinating body, to be enlarged if needed by officials of the government and other 
interested actors. Similar support was also extended to countries that are not members 
of the subregional organizations but that requested assistance from the secretariat, in-
cluding Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Rwanda, and Sao Tome and Principe. Con-
sultants were also engaged to assist the national coordinating bodies in these country 
Parties to draft their national reports. 
The approach used, to prepare a help guide and work with the subregional organizations 
and the national focal points, has proven to be well adapted to the African context and 
has resulted in the preparation and submission of 41 national reports from affected Afri-
can country Parties within a short period of time. 
From 27 September to 1 October 1999, a Regional Conference was held in Nairobi and 
hosted by UNEP. At this meeting, the African country Parties, among others, discussed 
and exchanged views concerning experiences and lessons learnt from the national report 
elaboration exercise. 
 
Assessment 
Out of 52 African country parties to the Convention, 41 submitted their National Re-
ports on CCD implementation before COP 3, as required by relevant decisions of COP 
1 and 2. This represents over 80%, which can be as far more than expected and a great 
success. The question remains as to why 11 African country parties did not submit their 
reports. The sub-region representatives during COP 3 stated in this context that in 
nearly all of these 11 cases, severe problems or national disasters like civil war or natu-
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ral catastrophes have prevented governments from preparing their CCD reports. In no 
case there was a problem with funding since this had been adequately ensured and or-
ganized by the Secretariat and the sub-regional organizations, making use of the gener-
ous contributions mentioned above, amongst which is also a significant amount granted 
by UNEP.   
 
Furthermore, all African country parties have ratified the Convention and established 
their National Coordination Bodies (NCBs). The legal framework to ensure CCD im-
plementation, and its embeddedness within the countries’ overall policies for environ-
ment and sustainable development is also reported as sufficiently done in all countries. 
On the other hand, many country Parties lamented that funding from bilateral and multi-
lateral donors has been far away from sufficient, and that this severely hampers a rapid 
and efficient launching of even the first substantial measures to implement the Conven-
tion in the field. Moreover, it was said that participation, especially that of rural women 
in the national CCD process, is still much behind the expectations and needs to be 
strengthened significantly. Decentralization seems to be a difficult task in many African 
countries, but that exactly this would be needed to ensure effective implementation of 
the CCD. Moreover, the role of NGOs and the civil society, even the private sector, 
needs to be further enhanced. 
 
2.2 Evaluation of national reports - Ad Hoc Working Group (AHWG) session to  
review national reports, March/April 2001 - Wrap up session for Africa 
 
After a full 4 days session, and the detailed presentation and discussion of 32 African 
National Reports (29 + 3), a wrap up session was organized comprising delegates from 
African and other country Parties, inter-governmental agencies and further observers. 
Referring to paragraphs 3 and 4 of decision 3/ COP.4, the Ad Hoc Working Group 
“should fulfil its mandate in accordance with paragraph 4 of decision 1/COP.4 and 
should draw up conclusions and propose concrete recommendations for further steps in 
the implementation of the Convention”. In doing this the format given for the elabora-
tion of National Reports was followed. Discussion emerged along the following key 
issues: 
 
1. Strategies and priorities established within the framework of sustainable develop-
ment plans and/or policies 
2. Institutional measures taken to implement the Convention 
3. Participatory process in support of the preparation and implementation of the NAP 
4. Consultative process in support of the preparation and implementation of national 
action programme and partnership agreement with developed country parties and 
other interested entities 
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5. Measures taken or planned within the framework of the NAP, including measures to 
improve the economic environment, to conserve national resources, to improve in-
stitutional organisation, to improve knowledge of desertification and monitor and 
assess the effect of drought 
6. Financial allocation from national budgets in support of implementation as well as 
financial assistance and technical cooperation received and needed, identifying and 
prioritizing requirements 
7. Review of benchmarks and indicators utilized to measure progress, and an assess-
ment thereof 
 
The following recommendations were made on a draft basis after the deliberations of 
the delegates: 
1. Parties should pay attention to the implication the AHWG proceedings have for the 
work of the CST, such as the issues of indicators and early warning systems.  
2. The lack of capacity building in terms of establishing adequate funds and financing 
channels at national level has to be solved. Particular attention is given to the possi-
ble funding thru the Global Environment Facility (GEF). 
3. More attention has to be paid to the variety of existing programmes, strategies, in-
struments and funding mechanisms (such as poverty reduction strategies), and work 
is to be undertaken towards achievement of simplification, integration, streamlining 
and harmonization of such strategies and instruments. 
4. The donor community should pay attention to the fact that economic cooperation 
needs to be environmentally sound. 
5. Donors wish to orient their assistance to the specific priorities of the clients in eco-
nomic cooperation, i.e. poverty reduction frameworks. However, the problem is that 
only few of those strategies are highlighting the environmental area. So, there is an 
urgent need for bridging the gap between implementation of sustainable develop-
ment and environment conventions like the CCD and de facto priorities mentioned 
by developing country governments towards donors which do not refer to those 
conventions. 
6. Synergies between Rio conventions are to be reflected in the NAPs, so that the 
NAPs can become part and parcel of the NEAPs and their main components. 
7. Mobilisation of resources needs to be intensified and channelled thru field activities 
foremostly. 
8. Harmonization and streamlining of national institutional entities involved in the co-
operation business is yielded. 
9. Alternative funds need to be identified (private sector for instance). 
10. The Rio+10 proceedings may provide an important stage for enhancing those efforts 
with regard to synergious implementation of all Rio conventions. 
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11. Strengthening subregional and regional bodies to effectively participate in the CCD 
implementation, in particular in fund raising, I crucial.   
12. Effective NAP implementation goes hand in hand with efficient implication of a 
Chef de file in the national process. Donor embassies are all to be implied as actors 
present, and they should be coordinated, which should be done by the Chef de file. 
It is also a PR measure for the latter. 
13. NGOs’ impact needs to be strengthened.  
14. Developed countries are expected to bring across their experiences in development 
cooperation to inspire developing countries’ approach towards enhanced implemen-
tation. 
15. A number of NAPs have been adopted, but little feedback about their implementa-
tion is available. Has the strategic approach to be revised? 
16. Solid indicators for successful implementation are needed. 
17. Enhanced cooperation between the southern and the northern Mediterranean is 
called for. 
18. The Secretariat should watch out for correct adherence to the Convention’s provi-
sions.  
19. Attention is to be paid to the importance of the filed level to learn about best prac-
tises, develop indicators and inspire the work of the CST. 
20. Benchmarks and indicators: little information is available in most of the country 
reports. Indicators must be cost effective and easy to monitor 
 
 
Item 3: Cross-sectoral strategies / Synergetic implementation of multilateral 
agreements on environmental and sustainable development issues 
3.1 Synergies among the Rio Conventions – Blueprint by the UNCCD Secretariat to 
hold National Coordination Forums in selected countries 
 
Context 
The challenge posed by the intricate relationships of climate change, biological diver-
sity, drought and desertification on the social, economic and environmental fronts in 
many countries has been exemplified in recent times. It has also been amply demon-
strated that there is a clear convergence of objectives among the three Rio Conventions 
as well as the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, and that there is need for a reorientation 
of the strategic approaches that have hitherto been pursued by the various interested 
parties, particularly at the individual country level. This emerging significance of inter-
actions and inter-linkages of the issue areas covered by these four Conventions point at 
a high potential for synergies in the development and implementation of activities that 
would help to meet the broad objectives of these treaties. 
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In particular, to address poverty reduction and achieve environmental security for this 
millennium, the international community needs to tackle land degradation in the dryland 
areas with a renewed determination and within a broader framework that includes refer-
ence to a complex set of elements - land management, biological diversity, climate, as 
well as economic and social development, population dynamics, among others. Fur-
thermore, success in the process necessarily depends upon, and requires, the full partici-
pation and awareness of the populations involved. Article 8 of the UNCCD outlines the 
relationship with other conventions, and in particular with the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and other related environmental treaties. Article 8.1 states: "The Parties 
shall encourage the co-ordination of activities carried out under this Convention and, if 
they are Parties to them, under other relevant international agreements, particularly the 
CBD, UNFCCC in order to derive maximum benefit from activities under each agree-
ment while avoiding duplication of effort. The Parties shall encourage the conduct of 
joint programmes, particularly in the fields of research, training, systematic observation 
and information collection and exchange, to the extent that such activities may contrib-
ute to achieving the objectives of the agreements concerned". Furthermore, this princi-
ple is affirmed by Article 22, paragraph 2(i), on the promotion and strengthening of re-
lationships with other relevant conventions, as well as Article 23, paragraph 2(d) requir-
ing the UNCCD Secretariat to co-ordinate its activities with the secretariats of other 
relevant international bodies and conventions. 
 
The named Conventions share a common concern for many environmental and devel-
opmental issues, and stress the need for participation of populations. They also operate 
in the same ecosystems. However, they also contain numerous overlaps. In particular, 
they overlap in terms of standard obligations required by their Parties such as require-
ments for research, reporting, training and public education and awareness, as well as of 
the actions suggested, including the elaboration of national and regional programmes, 
scientific data collection, involvement of the same actors in the participatory process. 
 
Although the specific fields of reference do not coincide, the fact that they are closely 
interrelated is reflected also in the similarities of obligations and prescriptions. Similari-
ties appear, for example, in articles 4 and 5 of the UNCCD, article 3 of the UNFCCC 
and article 6 and many others of the CBD, related to the main obligations of Parties; or 
in articles 16 and 17 of the UNCCD, 5 of the UNFCCC and 12 of the CBD, on research 
and information collection; or in articles 19 of the UNCCD, 6 of the UNFCCC and 12 
and 13 of the CBD on education, training and public awareness, among several others 
that serve to illustrate the inter-linkages. Such similarities are not surprising, since given 
the close interrelation among the phenomena that the Conventions address, and that 
their principles are also inevitably linked both at the level of analysis and elaboration, as 
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well as de facto at the implementation level, when actions taken towards one issue nor-
mally have implications on others. 
 
Main Objective of the Forums on Developing Synergies at Country Level 
Each of the named Conventions could stand on its own, with its own defined objectives 
and commitments, but it has been clearly demonstrated that there are linkages and in-
herent relationships among all of them. More often than not, countries are Parties to the 
three Conventions, and they have to struggle to adhere to requirements for implementa-
tion, reporting, achieving synergies at the field level, etc. This calls for joint approaches 
within one given country, in order to not only rationalise the use of available resources, 
but to also minimise duplication and to take advantage of the complementarity that the 
three treaties can offer. If they are implemented collaboratively, progress can be made 
on all fronts and results can be obtained that are greater that the sum of the three.  
 
This proposal was developed within this background and realisation that time and again, 
country Parties to the four Conventions have called for support to enable them to iden-
tify possible strategic approaches in the development and implementation of joint activi-
ties that interface the key issue areas that are covered by the Conventions. This would 
help to avoid duplication of effort, and it is also seen as a step towards ensuring that the 
implementation of these Conventions can be efficient and cost-effective. The principal 
goal was to generate a country driven process by which policy makers and the other 
actors will in the intermediate term achieve synergy at the field level.   
 
The Rationale and Possible Targeted Actions to Enhance Synergy at Local Level 
In the foregoing, there was an identified need expressed to engage the key national 
functionaries involved in the implementation of the four Conventions, in the identifica-
tion of further steps that could be taken to enhance co-operation among the various ac-
tors at the local level, and to encourage the formulation of specific actions at the na-
tional level, to further develop synergy processes that would contribute to a more effec-
tive implementation of the Conventions. There was a need identified to organise at the 
country level custom-tailored information exchange forums with the key decision mak-
ers and actors, that can facilitate a clearer understanding of the requirements set by these 
Conventions, with a view to catalysing synergistic approaches and programming actions 
that properly address local situations. 
 
Decision makers need tools for understanding, and tools for action, towards the imple-
mentation of appropriate programmes. The launching of a joint programme of informa-
tion exchange and awareness raising in this particular area, in the affected countries 
aimed at national and local decision makers would therefore enable them to approach 
the issues of common concern to the Conventions more effectively. It would also facili-
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tate the understanding of the mechanisms that link drought and desertification, loss of 
biodiversity and climate change, and hopefully lead to better identification of joint ac-
tivities for possible solutions at the local level.  
 
According to the initiators of the UNCCD Secretariat, moreover, the workshops would 
also help clarify procedures related to the implementation mechanisms and reporting 
requirements set by the Conventions, and assist in launching or enhancing a broad par-
ticipatory process and local consultations among the national focal points, national co-
ordinating bodies and the other key actors.  
 
The custom-tailored workshops represented a suitable and flexible response to the al-
ready identified needs. They offered a possibility for decision makers and stake-holders 
to share views and questions, solutions and alternatives that relate to different aspects of 
the same problem: the effective local level implementation of the Conventions. They 
would also aim at enhancing action at the local level, and in particular at highlighting 
those elements in the decision making process which are common to the four Conven-
tions, such as emphasis on participatory development, integrated programming and 
partnership arrangements, consultative aspects of a country-driven implementation 
process.  
 
The UNCCD Secretariat jointly with the CDB, UNFCCC and Ramsar Secretariats pro-
posed to support these country level actors to enable them to brainstorm on the nature 
and scope of possible actions that may be taken at the national level among the various 
interested parties, with a view to enhancing synergy. It was envisaged that the National 
Focal Points and National Co-ordinating Bodies of the four Conventions would come 
together to identify these specific actions that bring out the synergy and best practices 
for joint implementation of the four Conventions. The key collaborators in this under-
taking were expected to be the four Secretariats of UNCCD, CBD, UNFCCC, the Ram-
sar Convention as well as GEF Secretariat, UNITAR and UNDP. 
 
Main Objectives and Expected Outputs   
The UNCCD Secretariat identified the following objectives: 
? To review the progress made in implementation of the (CCD, CBD, UNFCCC and 
Ramsar) Conventions at national level; 
? To identify areas of synergy and linkages between the implementation processes of 
the Conventions at national level; 
? To seek views of a wide cross section of actors on the methodology for integrating 
issues of the key environment conventions into the national planning processes; 
? To elaborate concepts for future field projects and activities reflecting synergies 
between Conventions. 
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The following expected outputs were identified: 
? Participants sensitized on the four Conventions and the need for a common method-
ology for integrating issues of the key environment conventions into the national 
planning processes;  
? Areas of synergy between the four Conventions and measures (policy and institu-
tional) needed to strengthen the inter -linkages between their national implementa-
tion processes identified; 
? Views/ input of participants on the common methodology for  integrating issues of 
the key environment conventions into the national planning processes obtained;  
? Concepts for future project and activities reflecting synergies between the Conven-
tions elaborated. 
 
 
3.2 Synergies among the Rio Conventions – Report of the National Consultative  
Forum Uganda, September 2001   
 
Introduction 
The Government of Uganda has signed and ratified a number of multilateral environ-
mental agreements which include, among others, the United Nations Convention to 
Combat Desertification (UNCCD), the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (UNFCCC), the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Con-
vention on Wetlands (Ramsar). The implementation of these agreements at national 
level is spearheaded by different lead agencies. The focal point for UNCCD is in the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries, while the focal points for CBD, 
UNFCCC and RAMSAR convention are in the Ministry of Water, Lands and Environ-
ment. However, the Government recognized the interdependence of these Conventions, 
and the need to efficiently utilize resources at its disposal to fulfill its obligations under 
these conventions. To that end, the Government initiated a multi-stakeholder consulta-
tive process for more effectively integrating issues of the four conventions into National 
planning processes. Taking into consideration the above background, Uganda’s Gov-
ernment hosted a wide multi-stakeholder forum to elaborate the synergies among the 4 
conventions as a basis for effective implementation of the conventions at national and 
local levels.  
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Objectives of the forum  
The specific objectives of the National Forum were: 
? To review the progress made at national level in the implementation of the conven-
tions; 
? To identify areas of synergy and linkages in the implementation of the conventions 
at national level; 
? To seek views of a wide cross section of actors on the proposed approach for inte-
grating issues of the 4 conventions into national planning processes; 
? To elaborate concepts for future field projects and activities reflecting on synergies 
between the conventions. 
 
The perceived justification of holding the forum 
? Mobilisation of various stakeholders on the conventions and acclimatising them 
with their roles. These stakeholders include Development Agencies, politicians at all 
levels, implementing Ministries and Agencies and Departments. 
? Creation of awareness on the conventions including obligations of the various part-
ners. 
? Development of a network of stakeholders upon which participants can rely on for 
synergy in implementation of the convention. 
? Development of a common vision of the required interventions to address environ-
mental and convention issues in the country 
 
Opportunities identified for building synergies between conventions 
? Existence of Conducive National development planning and legal frameworks such 
as the Poverty eradication action Plan, The plan for the Modernisation of Agricul-
ture, the Decentralisation policy, National Environment Statute and District Devel-
opment Plans. 
? With an on-going shift from a project to sector-wide approach to planning process 
and resource allocation the mainstreaming or integrating of activities of the conven-
tions in a synergised manner is most appropriate in order to reflect their multi-
sectoral and cross-cutting nature. 
? The interests of all the 4 conventions converge at field level.. Therefore, joint envi-
ronment management programs that demonstrate synergy in the implementation of 
conventions particularly at local and community level could easily be developed, 
implemented, documented and disseminated or shared. 
? Existence of a Multi-stakeholder task-force for integrating Conventions into the Na-
tional Planning process can be used as a starting point in promoting synergies be-
tween conventions. 
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Main weaknesses identified 
? Lack of an Environment Sector Programme at national level, which should serve as 
a basis for mainstreaming of environmental issues including concerns of the conven-
tion into the PEAP and Poverty Action fund (PAF). 
? Lack of a well co-ordinated approach for environment and development planning at 
national level and the Capacity for integrated environment and development plan-
ning and implementation particularly at local government and community levels. 
? Lobby, advocacy and enforcement mechanisms for environment and global conven-
tions concerns are weak and should be strengthened at national and local levels. 
? There are few examples of programs where synergies in the design and subsequent 
implementation have been attempted. Therefore, opportunities and benefits of syn-
ergy have not been maximised.   
? Multi-media awareness programs on the conventions are very limited. 
? Lack of a national multi-stakeholder forum on the environment (including conven-
tions). Need for its establishment and  institutionalisation. 
? Weak Co-ordination in the implementation of the conventions. The Multi-
stakeholder task force that is already in place under the National Environment Man-
agement Authority needs to be strengthened and institutionalised. 
? Weakness of the regulatory framework to enhance the implementation of the con-
ventions, particularly at local Government levels.  The Local Governments Capacity 
to develop and enforce bye-laws, undertake surveillance on the environment should 
be developed. 
? Failure by Government to meet its obligations with regard to annual subscriptions to 
the conventions, among others. 
? The capacity of relevant institutions in the country to enable them access resources 
particularly from GEF and its initiatives is very weak. 
 
Lesson Learnt 
? The issues covered by conventions are critical for effective delivery of the Govern-
ment’s Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP).  However, environmental issues 
and the related concerns of the conventions need to be well articulated in the PEAP. 
? The Opportunity to effectively integrate and consider conventions concerns in the 
Poverty Alleviation Fund would be enhances if a National Environment Sector Plan 
and more District Environment Action Plans are prepared. 
? While there are clear benefits and opportunities for synergy in the implementation of 
the conventions, there is little effort made to co-ordinate these interventions at na-
tional and local level. 
? At local Government and Community levels, the issues of the conventions are in-
separable with livelihood needs of the people. Therefore, harmonization and synergy 
in implementation of these conventions is inevitable at this level. 
Global Environmental Governance  
 
101
? The level of awareness on the conventions is very limited. The conventions have 
limited circulation at national and local level. Besides, the language of the conven-
tions is not easily understandable to the various stakeholders. This will negatively 
affect the development and implementation of synergies. 
 
The priority interventions for synergies as agreed at the forum  
? Capacity building particularly at local government level. This covers environment 
awareness, information exchange, infrastructure development, and training in envi-
ronmental planning and issues of convention. 
? Joint action planning and implementation of programs focuses on community needs 
and demonstrating community benefits that address issues of synergy among the 
conventions based on an ecosystem approach.  This includes availing of appropriate 
resource management and adaptation technologies. 
? Coordination, networking and information exchange, including a mechanism for 
regular consultation. 
? Harmonization and improved enforcement of policies and other regulatory frame-
works. 
 
 
Item 4: Cross-sectoral strategies/ Multilateral assistance 
4.1 Global Environment Facility (GEF) Africa Land and Water Initiative 
 
Introduction 
Recognizing the continued degradation of Africa’s environment and natural resources 
and its resulting poverty and human suffering, the heads of the GEF and its implement-
ing agencies (IAs) – UNDP, UNEP, and the World Bank - launched the Africa Land 
and Water Initiative in March 1999. The objective of the Initiative is to develop a coor-
dinated action program to address land and water management issues in Africa in an 
integrated manner.   
 
The Initiative has two dimensions – (a) the IAs would develop their own activities with 
their own resources; and (b) GEF activities would be developed and implemented by the 
IAs. It is expected that the coordinated actions of (a) and (b) will help African countries 
to accelerate efforts to reverse land and water degradation, with tangible results on the 
ground. 
 
An inter-agency working group, chaired by the Africa Region of the World Bank, was 
established in July 1999 to coordinate the development and implementation of the ac-
tion program. Organizations represented on the working group are the World Bank, 
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UNDP, UNEP, GEFSEC, FAO, IFAD, and the Global Mechanism of the Convention to 
Combat Desertification. 
 
Land and Water Management Challenges in Africa 
A number of activities have been supported by governments, in collaboration with in-
ternational development agencies, to address land and water management issues in Af-
rica. Although there are a few dotted successes, a majority of them have not been able to 
reverse land and water degradation trends largely because they were characterized by 
sectoral approaches, long gestation period, lack of in-country capacity to implement 
projects, lack of coordination among related activities, and inadequate results on the 
ground. 
 
Land and water management challenges that Africa continues to face include:  
(a) deforestation of watersheds with negative impacts on, for example, water flow 
and water quality, biodiversity, and on the lives and livelihood of people living 
on marginal lands who are becoming more prone to floods, landslide, etc.;  
(b) pollution of waterbodies by domestic wastes, industrial effluent, and agricul-
tural runoffs, leading to poor water quality;  
(c) salinization in poorly managed irrigation areas, leading to the loss of produc-
tive farmlands; and  
(d) growing conflicts in–country and among riparian countries over water rights 
and allocation as demand from a rapidly growing population increases. 
 
Integrated Ecosystem Management Approach 
The Initiative provides African countries opportunities, through the GEF’s Operational 
Program on Integrated Ecosystem Management (OP#12), to address land and water 
management issues in a more comprehensive way. The integrated ecosystem manage-
ment approach represents a paradigm shift from a single-sector approach to a more inte-
grated and cross-sectoral approach to achieve both sustainable development goals and 
global environment benefits.  
 
The integrated approach provides a framework to address economic, social, and envi-
ronmental dimensions of land and water management issues within the context of sus-
tainable development.  For example, when issues related to agriculture, energy, public 
health, water sanitation, environment quality, etc. are addressed within a single frame-
work, land and water degradation issues would no longer be seen only as an environ-
mental issue, but rather as central to the sustainable development agenda of a country. 
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The shift to an integrated approach is necessary because the single sector approach  fo-
cuses largely on technical and engineering solutions without addressing policy and insti-
tutional factors such as water pricing and tenure security that are necessary to achieve 
effective and sustainable management.   
 
Unique Features of a Basin/Sub-basin Management Program 
Each basin/sub-basin management program supported under the Initiative would com-
prise a package of interventions based on the IAs’ own regular programs and a GEF 
element. The main program elements would include, where applicable, the following:    
 
(a) Policy and Regulatory Reforms to support measures to clarify property rights, 
pricing structure, allocation and use of land and water resources, demand man-
agement, conflict resolution mechanisms, environmental protection, adminis-
trative structures and procedures, etc.; 
(b) Use of Economic Instruments such as pricing water to reflect its economic 
value and to promote efficiency in water use; targeted subsidies to make water  
more accessible to poorer segments of the population; and adopting the “pol-
luter pays” principle to minimize land and water pollution;   
(c) Capacity building to provide land and water resource managers the skills and 
tools for integrated ecosystem management.  This would include strengthening 
and harmonizing  administrative structures and procedures; strengthening the 
management planning process; improving resource assessment; information 
management and dissemination; and human resource development; and 
(d) Develop innovative financing packages for policy and regulatory reforms, and 
investments.  These packages may comprising grants, loans, contingent financ-
ing, etc. from the IAs, GEF, governments, donors, private sectors, etc. 
 
Complementarity with programs of the GEF Implementing Agencies 
The Initiative would utilize the financial resources and comparative advantage of the 
GEF and its partners (World Bank, UNDP, UNEP, Global Mechanism of the CCD, 
FAO, etc.), in a coordinated way, to assist African countries to achieve optimum posi-
tive results from integrated management of land and water resources.  Participation in 
the Initiative would also help the IAs to mainstream integrated land and water manage-
ment approaches in their regular programs. The following are some of the complemen-
tary activities that the IAs would  develop, using their own resources, to support the 
Initiative: 
 
(a) Work Bank:  (i) Analysis of the policy and the regulatory framework and of 
the potential use of economic incentives for integrated land and water man-
agement; (ii)  policy dialogue with countries on needed reforms, for example, 
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through the Country Assistance Strategy process; and (iii) convening donors’ 
meetings to mobilize funds for program activities. 
(b) UNDP: assessing the capacity building needs of a country in integrated land 
and water management as part of its Country Cooperative Framework. 
(c) UNEP: mobilize scientific and technical institutions and expertise in Africa.   
 
Accelerating Results on the Ground 
An accelerated and incremental process would be adopted to develop and implement a 
program of integrated land and water management interventions, emphasizing timely 
results on the ground (see Figure 1 and 2 for details on the process). Limited hands-on 
capacity building activities in integrated ecosystem management for key in-country 
technical staff would be built into the program development phase. This phase would be 
funded with GEF, PDF resources, funds from the IAs, and leveraged co-financing. This 
phase should take 9-12 months to complete. As part of program development, a frame-
work outlining broad strategic directions and an incremental approach to the manage-
ment of a selected sub-basin/basin would be developed.  Guided by this framework, the 
program would initially focus on selected “hotspots” (demonstration phase), followed 
by expansion to other sites (expansion phase).  
 
The IAs’ own resources, GEF funds, and co-financing would be used to finance the 
demonstration phase. However, consistent with its role as a catalyst and having demon-
strated the effectiveness of integrated land and water management approaches at the 
“hotspot”, the GEF would not necessarily be involved in financing the expansion phase 
of the program.  It will, however, assist countries to mobilize funds from donors, private 
sector, etc. for this phase of the program towards the end of the demonstration phase. 
The Initiative would help to optimize financial and technical support from the IAs, GEF 
and, other donors at all the phases by facilitating better coordination, thereby avoiding 
duplication or fragmented implementation. 
 
Country Selection Criteria 
Because of the urgent need to demonstrate the effectiveness and benefits of integrated 
land and water management approaches, the first set of countries to be selected for the 
Initiative (3-5 countries) must be in a position to achieve early successes.  Based on this 
expectation, the following criteria would guide the selection of countries: 
 
(i) countries that provide opportunities to build on existing work on sub-
basin/basin management. For example, the country/countries in the basin 
should have already began on their own preliminary diagnostic analysis of 
land and water management  issues;   
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(ii) countries should have relatively good policy and regulatory framework that 
needs only modest incremental strengthening to support effective integrated 
land and water management; and 
(iii)in the case of transboundary waterbodies, there should exist a strong commit-
ment by the riparian countries to work together to address land and water 
management issues.  e.g. they should have a treaty on the use and management 
of a waterbody and/or a commission (or a similar body) established as a 
mechanism for making collective decisions about resource allocation and 
management.  
 
Networking 
To provide additional technical support and create opportunities for information ex-
change, the project actors, with assistance from STAP, would be linked to existing sci-
entific and technical networks of African institutions, government agencies, NGOs, etc. 
on integrated land and water management. Exchange visits, electronic newsletter, work-
shops, etc. would also facilitate the exchange of information among the participants of  
the Initiative as well as with other organizations working on similar issues.   
 
 
Item 5: Partnership agreements/ North-South cooperation 
5.1 Blueprint by the UNCCD Secretariat to hold Consultative Forums in affected  
African countries 
Each African country Party to the CCD is required to adopt an integrated approach ad-
dressing the physical, biological and socio-economic aspects of the processes of deserti-
fication and drought in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 2(a) of the UNCCD. A 
National Action Programme to Combat Desertification (NAP) is referred to as a useful 
policy instrument to achieve such objectives of the CCD as provided by its Article 10 
and Article 4 of its Regional Annex I for Africa.  
 
The progress made in NAP formulation and implementation has been reported through 
national reports submitted to the Conference of the Parties to the CCD since its third 
session in 1999 in Recife. These were reviewed individually at various occasions. In 
COP decision 8/COP.4, affected developing countries that had not yet adopted their 
NAPs, were invited to accelerate the process of elaboration and adoption of their Na-
tional Action Programmes with a view to finalizing them no later than at the end of 
2005. 
 
In this context, the UNCCD Secretariat and the Regional Bureau for Africa of UNDP, 
taking into account the decision of the Executive Board of UNDP on the role and activi-
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ties of UNDP in support of the UNCCD, signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 
April 2001 with the objective to strengthen cooperation in the context of support to Af-
rican affected country Parties to the UNCCD, particularly as regards the implementation 
of already existing NAPs. The main objective of this exercise was to foster the imple-
mentation process of the UNCCD in Africa at national level through the facilitation of 
the organization of national consultative forums aiming to create partnership agreements 
in selected countries which were already disposing of a finalized and adopted National 
Action Programme.  
 
The UNCCD Secretariat elaborated a blueprint for the organization of consultative fo-
rums. Such consultations are supposed to aim at: 
? Creating an enabling environment for a gathering of all significantly involved part-
ners for CCD implementation at national level; i.e. government authorities, national 
focal point and national coordination body (NCB), NGOs and civil society represen-
tatives, bilateral and multilateral partners; 
? Analyzing the extent to which the NAP has been integrated in the various national 
sustainable development frameworks and the resource gaps that need to be funded if 
the NAP objectives have to be achieved; 
? Facilitating the identification and the launching of priority activities under the NAP 
and other relevant programmes already adopted; 
? Convening at a common understanding of nature and structure of NAP implementa-
tion in each selected country through the establishment of partnership agreements 
and resource mobilization as requested by the CCD (Annex I, Art. 18). 
 
Furthermore, the forums are expected to contribute to: 
? Support the implementation of NAPs at the local level to pursue socio-economic 
and environmental benefits through combating desertification; 
? Mobilize the public support for the NAP process and strengthen the networks of 
stakeholders for this purpose thereby enhancing a broad ownership of the CCD 
process at all levels; 
? Assist in main-streaming desertification control in national policy agenda, particu-
larly in areas of the environment and sustainable development encompassing associ-
ated socio-economic and other related environmental matters in an interdisciplinary 
approach. 
 
It was the idea that assistance shall be given to support the UNCCD National Focal 
Points (NFPs) and/or National Coordinating Bodies (NCBs) in affected countries in 
strengthening and improving their capacities and structures to implement the Conven-
tion, particularly through communication with development partners and participation 
in the organization of consultative forums. In particular, the project foresees the: 
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Hire of consultants to carry out the following: 
 
? Establish the extent to which the NAP objectives and priority programme areas have 
been integrated in other national programmes and donor-funded projects with simi-
lar aims and objectives; 
? Following from (i) above, establish resource gaps that remain and the likely partner-
ships that could enhance their closure; 
? Develop project profiles for priority programme areas to address the identified gaps. 
 
Furthermore is foreseen the: 
? Undertaking of discussions with stakeholders on ways and means of implementing 
NAPs; 
? Supporting of the formulation of a framework document that identifies priority ac-
tivities and supporting field project proposals for possible funding by various 
sources; 
? Organizing of consultative forums with donor countries and international agencies 
for the implementation of the NAP. 
   
The Secretariat offered its facilitation service to affected countries governments. Con-
sultative meetings would be convened by the respective governments with a view to 
discuss and reach a common understanding on the prospects and modalities for partner-
ship building and resource mobilisation for the implementation of the NAP. It would 
bring together participants from potential bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, rele-
vant international organizations, interested inter-governmental and non-governmental 
organisations, and all other stakeholders that might be able to contribute financially or 
technically to the NAP implementation. 
 
The support would focus on the preparation of a framework document on the interface 
between the NAP and other relevant national frameworks, and on the approach to main-
stream the NAP into the strategies and programmes of development partners. Assistance 
would also be given to sensitize the donor community on the objectives of the meeting 
and the organisation of the meeting itself. 
  
The main expected results of the workshops would thus be: 
? Contribution to Mainstreaming of the UNCCD process into national development 
strategies;  
? Contribution to Linking of the UNCCD process with other existing national plans, 
programmes and strategies such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers; 
? Improved coordination of all actors involved in the process on the national level; 
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? Identification of priority activities for CCD/NAP implementation, preparation of a 
framework document, with a particular view to create synergies among environ-
mental conventions at national level and avoid duplication; 
? Conclusion of concrete partnership arrangements to foster the implementation of 
priority activities under the NAPs;  
? Consideration of follow up activities such as project formulation and fund raising, 
NAP implementation as a standing item in bilateral negotiations. 
 
 
5.2 Workshop on the Integration of Priority Activities Related to Combating Deserti-
fication into the Country Support Strategies under the ACP-EU Cotonou Partner-
ship Agreement, Cotonou, Benin, 2001 
 
Background 
Country Parties to the UNCCD as well as institutional representatives from Western and 
Central Africa gathered for a workshop in Cotonou, Benin, on 2 and 3 May 2001, tar-
geting the integration of priority activities elaborated under UNCCD National Action 
Programmes (NAPs) into the implementation procedure mechanism of the ACP-EU 
Cotonou Agreement, the so-called Country Support Strategies (CSSs) that were sup-
posed to be finalised by June 2001. For this purpose, the workshop brought together 
UNCCD National Focal Points and National Authorising Officers responsible for the 
European Development Funds in the respective countries concerned, along with repre-
sentatives from non-governmental, inter-governmental and scientific institutions. The 
major objective was to review the progress made by UNCCD country Parties as regards 
the integration of priority programmes elaborated for the implementation of the 
UNCCD into the Country Support Strategies.  
 
In this respect, the UNCCD Secretariat, mandated at COP 4, pursued various consulta-
tions with the ACP-EU Secretariat, recognising the complementarity between the 
UNCCD process and the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement signed in Cotonou in June 
2000. The two institutions resolved to co-operate for the benefit of ACP countries af-
fected by the phenomena of desertification. 
 
The main objective of the co-operation was to identify the best approaches to facilitate 
access to existing financial mechanisms within the framework of co-operation between 
affected ACP countries and the European Community. This emanated from the under-
standing that the “Cotonou Partnership Agreement” and the UNCCD are both commit-
ted to addressing the issues of poverty and sustainable development. 
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In view of the linkages between the UNCCD and the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, 
it is ideal to integrate the priority activities of the UNCCD into the Country Support 
Strategies and the National Indicative Programmes elaborated through the ACP-EU 
Partnership Agreement.  
 
Opening Proceedings 
The speakers, while paying tribute to Benin as host country and for its role in the CCD 
process, welcomed the initiative of associating the UNCCD with the Cotonou Agree-
ment. Many statements stressed that fighting poverty in Africa equates to combating 
desertification and aiming for sustainable development. Before declaring the workshop 
open, the Minister of Foreign Affairs identified that there is no conflict between envi-
ronment and development. Therefore efforts to sustainable development require sensible 
sustainable use of the natural resources.   
 
Workshop Objectives 
The workshop was held under the following objectives: 
1. Bringing together the UNCCD National Focal Points and the EDF National Author-
ising Officers of West and Central Africa; 
2. Introducing the UNCCD and the ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement; 
3. Highlighting the linkages between the UNCCD and the Cotonou Partnership Agree-
ment; 
4. Identifying synergies through related articles of the UNCCD and the Cotonou Part-
nership Agreement; 
5. Discussing ways and means for possible integration of priority projects of the Na-
tional Action Programmes into the Country Support Strategies and eventually into 
the National Indicative Programs of these countries; 
6. Identifying financial needs in the context of UNCCD national and sub-regional ac-
tion programmes as well as the best approach to facilitate access to the existing 
European Development Fund (EDF) resources within the framework of the Cotonou 
Agreement. 
 
Salient Points of the ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement 
The innovative aspects of the new Cotonou Partnership Agreement were examined: 
- The political dimension; 
- Poverty reduction; 
- Participatory approach; 
- Financial co-operation in the long and short term; 
- Operational programming. 
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As regards operational programming, the innovations of the Cotonou Agreement indi-
cate that the framework for designing, managing and reviewing EC development co-
operation with individual ACP partners will be the Country Support Strategies, which 
are supposed to be done in consultation with a wide range of national stake-holders and 
must contain the following key essential elements: 
 
1. An outline and assessment of the country’s own development strategies, includ-
ing the National Development Strategy as a country agenda in poverty reduction 
related to the medium-term development objectives; 
2. The analysis of the country situation including political, economic, social and 
physical indicators, examining how to realise the goals set and their benefit to 
the poor; 
3. The compilation of the country’s environmental profile that supports and 
strengthens environmental integration in the country as defined (Art. 20 par 2 
and Art. 32 of Cotonou Agreement); 
4. The EU response, which should concentrate on a limited number of sectors and 
take into account the role and activities of other donors.    
 
Participants were advised that the integration of the UNCCD NAPs into the CSSs and 
subsequently into the NIPs would be the cornerstone of securing resources from the 
ACP-EU development co-operation for the implementation of the UNCCD.   
 
Presentation of Focal Areas of the UNCCD National Action Programmes (NAP) 
The participants were informed that the objectives of the UNCCD demand an integrated 
approach that renders effective actions at all levels of social and economic endeavours 
in combating desertification and mitigating the effects of drought, with a view to con-
tributing to the achievement of sustainable development. It is in this aspect that the Na-
tional Action Programmes (NAP) are designed by affected countries. The workshop 
examined how the following NAP focal relate to the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. 
 
- Poverty Eradication through sustainability objectives of economic growth, ecologi-
cal balance and social development; 
- Popular Participation stressing the full involvement of local people, local communi-
ties, women, youth, NGOs at all levels; 
- Integrated Approach that takes into account, where relevant, the relationship be-
tween the land tenure, food security and the traditional knowledge; 
- Partnership Arrangements, which advocate that the parties should develop, in the 
spirit of partnership, co-operation among all levels of government, communities, 
non-governmental organisations and landholders. 
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It was understood that the NAP is an essential implementation tool of the UNCCD as it 
includes measures to prepare for and mitigate the effects of drought in any particular 
country. Its approach, production, elaboration and implementation were identified to 
share linkages with the objectives and goals of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement.  
 
Identification of Synergies between the Cotonou Agreement, the UNCCD and NAP  
activities that could be integrated into the Country Support Strategies (CSSs) and  
National Indicative Programs (NIPs) 
The Cotonou Agreement and the UNCCD are both based on building partnership 
through the bottom-up approach, involving grass-root communities concerned, and the 
objective to alleviate poverty by targeting the utilisation of natural resources with the 
goal of contributing to the achievement of sustainable development in the ACP Coun-
tries concerned. The main articles that highlight the similarities and interrelation be-
tween the UNCCD and the new Cotonou Partnership Agreement were deliberated upon. 
Synergies could be integrated into the Country Support Strategies (CSSs) and the Na-
tional Indicative Programs (NIPs) were identified and elaborated upon.  
 
It was recorded that National Action Programmes designed under the UNCCD are to 
contain strategies (like the poverty reduction strategy paper), policies and programmes 
in social and economic areas, to address the many problems associated with desertifica-
tion and drought. So do the CSSs and the NIPs under the Cotonou Agreement. In sev-
eral African countries most of these plans or strategies have been developed or are at 
various stages thereof, and they in one way or another represent avenues for achieving 
sustainable development. 
 
It was concluded that the bottom-up approach used in the elaboration of the NAPs   
goes well with the mechanism of implementing the Cotonou Agreement that advocates 
the fundamental principle of equality of the partners and ownership of their develop-
ment strategies. The objectives, principles and goals of development strategies in both 
the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification 
are identical, for instance in the area of poverty alleviation or as for thematic and cross-
cutting issues such as social and human development and economic development, 
among others.  
 
Procedures of drawing up the National Indicative Programs (NIPs) and the integration 
of the UNCCD Process 
The implementation of the new Cotonou Partnership Agreement demands more public 
dialogue and consultation among all stakeholders, be they government, non-government 
organisations, private sector, or non-state actors, to come up with the Country Support 
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Strategy. This is intended to promote the bottom-up approach, a process that has been 
undertaken in developing the NAPs. 
 
Since drawing up the Country Support Strategy is a joint venture between the European 
Union Delegate and the National Authorising Officer in the country concerned, and 
since this is supposed to be done after consultation with a wide range of actors involved 
in the development process and in dialogue with other donors, in particular Member 
States of the EU, it should be based on the country’s own development agenda and 
should constitute an analysis of its economic and social situation and policies.  
 
It will function as a pool from which the National Indicative Programme will be fished. 
Thus it introduces the system of operational programming which involves a process of 
continuously updated programming forecasts based on a five year perspective that is 
extended or rolled over every year after the annual country review. An important ele-
ment in the programming cycle is that it begins at the same time that the CSS prepara-
tions start. The programming cycle is a system of reviews to examine the progress of 
programmes and projects and to identify early where corrective action should be taken 
or when and where new resources will be required. 
 
This will require an annual operational review, a mid-term review and an end of term 
review. The reviews will be conducted locally and jointly facilitating more objective 
assessment. Consequently, the National Action Programme should influence the Coun-
try Support Strategy and the operational programming because desertification is 
strongly linked to poverty and food security (article 10 of the UNCCD).   
 
Combating Desertification through the Sequestration of Carbon out of the Atmosphere 
At the invitation of the Secretariat of the United Nations Convention to Combat Deserti-
fication (UNCCD), the Near East Foundation’s Executive Director, Mr. John Lewis, 
deliberated on combating desertification and mitigating global warming through the 
sequestration of carbon content out of the atmosphere, while protecting biodiversity at 
the same time. He explained how the mechanism can be used in land reclamation, by 
restoring soil fertility, planting trees and bushes, and improving rangelands across the 
desertifying (degraded) landscape. This land reclamation work requires, in addition to 
appropriate technology and local organisations, some rain and the sun. 
 
However, he recognised the increasing pressure on the demand side of this growing 
global market for carbon sequestration offsets. Such carbon credits are already being 
sold internationally, mostly between North American energy concerns and Latin Amer-
ica. He noted that there is need to review the steps that UNCCD may have to oversee in 
order to ensure that its desertifying countries can meet this demand with a competitive 
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supply of carbon.  He outlined the roles surrounding the seller, the host country, and 
four more roles including the ultimate buyer, the GHG-emitting industry.   
 
He concluded by saying that the first step towards making this carbon trading work for 
semi-arid Africa is to engage in some demonstration pilot projects. These pilots will test 
the agronomic and institutional feasibility of adding several tons of carbon per hectare 
to the existing land use system. The Near East Foundation is looking forward to promot-
ing this land use development possibility.  
 
Procedures of Drawing up Regional Support Strategies (RSSs) and Regional Indicative 
Programs (RIPs) 
Under the Cotonou Agreement the participation in regional co-operation will include 
two or more ACP countries. The ACP States concerned can decide on the definition of 
their geographical regions. So regional integration programmes should correspond to 
programmes of existing regional organisations with a mandate for economic integration. 
Regional programming shall take place at the level of each region.  The programming 
shall be a result of an exchange of views between the European Commission, the duly 
mandated regional organisation(s), and the ACP States in the region concerned. 
 
Programming for this purpose shall mean: 
(a) preparation and development of a Regional Support Strategy (RSS) based on the 
region’s own medium-term development objectives and strategies; 
(b) a clear indication from the Community of the indicative resource allocation from 
which the region may benefit during the five year period; 
(c) preparation and adoption of a Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) for implement-
ing the RSS; 
(d) review process covering the RSS, the RIP and the volume of resources allocated to 
each region. 
 
The RSS shall include the following elements: 
(a) an analysis of the political, economic and social context of the region; 
(b) an assessment of the process and prospects of regional economic integration into the 
world economy; 
(c) an outline of the regional strategies and priorities pursued and the expected financ-
ing requirements; 
(d) an outline of relevant activities of other external partners in regional co-operation;  
(e) an outline of the specific EU contribution towards achievement of the goals for re-
gional co-operation and integration. 
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It is foreseen that the Regional Support Strategy process will begin in September 2001 
and should be developed through the appropriate consultative processes involving the 
relevant stakeholders.  
 
Lessons learnt by Sub-Regional Institutions in Integrating the SRAPs into the ACP-EU 
Regional Support Strategies (RSS) 
Under the UNCCD, the SRAPs are designed to address areas of concern to more than 
one country Party. The SRAPs are therefore geared to transboundary and shared natural 
resources, and they harmonise and add value to solving problems from a sub-regional 
perspective. Country Parties that come together to develop a SRAP are expected to enter 
into co-operation that may include agreed joint programmes for the sustainable man-
agement of transboundary natural resources, scientific and technical co-operation, and 
strengthening of relevant institutions.  
 
In the case of Western Africa, all the three sub-regional organisations, namely 
ECOWAS, CILSS and WAEMU had met in Lomé to harmonise the regionalisation 
effort among themselves in the preparation of a RSS. In their common presentation, 
they identified the areas of activities they recommended to the regional authorising offi-
cers for reaction. They include: investment promotion, capacity building, increase in 
agricultural production, trade development, technical and scientific cooperation, and 
democratization of the region, with an objective of regional integration of the member 
states and achieving the goal of human and sustainable development.   
 
For central Africa, CEMAC had been identified by the UNCCD National Focal Points 
of Central African States and the Great Lakes, as a sub-regional organisation to run the 
UNCCD sub-regional activities. But the representative from CEMAC informed the par-
ticipants that problems prevailing in the region still interfere with the implementation of 
any UNCCD process. However there is good will to promote areas like capacity build-
ing and human development within the sub-region. 
 
Country Presentations on Drawing up the CSSs and the NIPs, thereby integrating 
UNCCD Priority Activities 
Various participants presented their country situations on the various stages of the im-
plementation of the National Action Programmes and their integration into the imple-
mentation procedure of the  ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement: Benin, Burkina 
Faso, The Gambia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal detailed their country positions 
while the rest of the countries gave a brief overview of their activities in this regard. It 
came to light that some of the countries had completed or were at the verge of complet-
ing their CSS, except in the case of Senegal, which was about to conclude its Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper. In many cases where the CSS had been concluded, the NAOs 
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had not consulted the UNCCD national focal points or the civil society at large. And 
focal sectors had been identified without public knowledge. However, participants were 
informed that environmental elements and CCD components are generally reflected in 
the development efforts and programmes of Sahel countries. It was also recorded that 
some countries had not yet drawn up their NAPs, so they wondered as to what they 
could include in the CSS and NIP.   
 
Countries admitted that integrating the NAPs into the CSS as a stand-alone focal area 
was difficult. However, specific areas where synergies could be developed resulting in 
the integration of the NAPs into the CSS were identified: 
 
• Poverty reduction 
• Capacity building 
• Provision of alternative livelihoods 
• Food security 
• Gender equity 
• Rural development 
• Infrastructure development   
 
Otherwise, countries conceded that combating desertification is a poverty reduction 
strategy as poverty is both a cause and a result of environmental degradation. Therefore 
programmes elaborated in the NAPs should aim to achieve goals that include desertifi-
cation and land management, drought mitigation and poverty reduction. Integrating 
poverty reduction and environmental protection programmes could result in sustainable 
development. It was concluded that achieving the integration of the priority actitivities 
of the UNCCD into the CSS would ensure complementarity and sustainability of the 
development programmes. Forging partnership between the UNCCD and the Cotonou 
Partnership Agreement at country level was discussed as another strategy of integrating 
the NAPs into the CSSs and NIPs.  
 
The Central African countries requested that the CEMAC Secretariat may play a cata-
lytic role in bringing the implementation of the CCD into action, particularly in devel-
oping partnership through integrated capacity building programmes and increasing pub-
lic awareness in the region.214 
 
 
                                                 
214 This report was elaborated at the workshop. 
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Item 6: Partnership agreements/ South-South cooperation 
6.1 Design of a Thematic Programme Network for the Integrated Management of  
International River, Lake and Hydrogeological Basins in Africa 
 
During the Regional Workshop on the Promotion of a Network for the Integrated Man-
agement of International River, Lake and Hydrogeological Basins in the Context of the 
Regional Action Programme to Combat Desertification in Africa (RAP), held in Abid-
jan, 29 September - 2 October 1998, several recommendations were made to strengthen 
regional cooperation in this thematic area within the context of the Regional Action 
Programme to Combat Desertification in Africa. The workshop identified the following 
domains within which regional actions would be implemented: Technological; Social 
and Human; Environment; Institutional and Financial. 
 
For each domain, strategies were proposed and priority actions recommended for the 
implementation of the RAP. The workshop agreed on the creation of a network involv-
ing the various stakeholders for this thematic area, and made several recommendations 
regarding the institutional arrangements needed for the efficient functioning of this net-
work. The meeting also proposed a list of activities to be implemented by the network. 
 
After the creation of the network and the designation of a focal point institution, a con-
sultative meeting was held in Bonn on 23-24 March 2000, to discuss the modalities for 
operationalization of the network called Thematic Programme Network (TPN) for the 
Integrated Management of International River, Lake and Hydrogeological Basins in 
Context of the Regional Action Programme to Combat Desertification in Africa, with 
appropriate time frame for priority activities. This consultative meeting was the first one 
in the process of launching of the thematic programme networks envisaged for the RAP 
in Africa. 
 
Proceedings 
In outlining the objectives of the consultative meeting, the chair said that the meeting 
was being convened to deliberate on the next course of action with respect to the opera-
tionalization of the network. The meeting aimed to come up with plans for the launch-
ing of priority activities identified by the thematic workshop in Abidjan, and to propose 
a work plan for the institutional focal point, as well as to develop a work programme for 
this thematic area. The consultative meeting was expected to achieve the following: 
 
? To establish a concrete work programme for the network, including priority activi-
ties of the RAP adopted at the Nairobi Preparatory Regional Conference to COP3; 
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? To define practical modalities for inter-institutional/inter-agency collaboration with 
the Regional Coordination Unit (RCU) and partners, in implementing the work pro-
gramme of this thematic area; 
? To develop a timetable of activities for the TPN; 
? To elaborate the role of the focal point institution as well as the members of the 
network, and to ensure that the respective roles are clearly defined and a time frame 
is proposed for operationalization of the network.  
 
Item 1: Briefing on the Background of the Network 
The first part of the meeting focussed essentially on information related to the back-
ground of the Regional Action Programme to Combat Desertification in Africa. The 
Chairman summarized the CCD Regional Implementation Annex for Africa. He pre-
sented the objectives of the meetings held in Abidjan and Nairobi, with respect to the 
evolution of the RAP. He also covered the background information regarding the the-
matic programme networks. Some officer presented the conclusions of the meeting held 
in Abidjan and the main decisions of the Nairobi Conference. The consultative meeting 
took stock of the conclusions of the Abidjan workshop and other pertinent information 
which has come to light in the intervening period after Abidjan. The discussion brought 
the meeting up to date with all the information related to the RAP process, the other 
thematic programmes that are also under way, and the rationale behind the creation of 
the network. 
 
Item 2: Modalities for Operationalization of the TPN 
The consultative meeting consisted of pulling ideas on what is required to assure the 
network is in operation and functioning properly. The meeting drew extensively on the 
definition and the potential activities of the network. The discussion focussed essen-
tially on the respective roles of the Thematic Programme Network, the focal point insti-
tution, the Regional Coordination Unit and the members of the network. The following 
are the conclusions of the deliberations. 
 
Role of the Network 
Facilitate the elaboration and implementation of the water component of the RAP; Build 
membership to support the work programme; Assist in formulating and implementing 
policies, activities and strategies within the mandate of the RAP; Facilitate information 
streamlining within membership constituency (sourcing information, dissemination of 
information, data collection; Delineate its areas of activity; Promotion of river basin 
management (institutional, regulatory); Contribute to the formulation of IWRM (inte-
grated water resource management) strategies and facilitate sharing of IWRM experi-
ence and practices; Disseminating of early warning information (climate variability, 
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flood control, mitigation, vulnerability assessment); Sharing of experience and informa-
tion in watershed management (land use, etc...); Encourage the development, of appro-
priate tools, technologies, etc; Identify studies to be carried out by competent institu-
tions. 
 
Role of the Focal Point Institution 
The role to be fulfilled by the focal point institution was deliberated upon, and the fol-
lowing points were envisaged: Facilitate the functioning of the network (workshops, 
meetings, etc...); Act as the lead agency in the implementation of the programme of the 
thematic network; Serve as the link between the network and the CCD Secretariat 
through the Regional Coordination Unit; Serve as the link to other partners in the the-
matic programme area; Act as facilitator of the information exchange and assure that 
information is 
disseminated to the other 5 networks of the RAP; Serve as the focal agency for capacity 
development within the network; Assume the work of data base management for mak-
ing expertise of the membership known. 
 
Role of the Regional Coordination Unit (RCU) 
This is the link between the network and the CCD Secretariat; The RCU is responsible 
for the creation, the development and management of the web site for the network; Re-
sponsible for the preparation of the progress on the activities and operation of the net-
work, evaluation and monitoring mechanisms and support for the functioning of the 
network; Catalyzing resource mobilization for the network. 
 
Role of the Members of the Thematic Programme Network 
Membership should be selected according to the criteria proposed by the thematic 
workshops. The group listed the potential role of the membership. It was suggested to 
contact the members at a later stage about the role they would like to play in the devel-
opment of the network. The preliminary roles are: Share experience on the relevant ac-
tivities of the network; Participate in information collection and dissemination within 
the network; Contribute and participate in the functioning of the web site for the net-
work; Help in the identification of gaps in knowledge, and contribute to bridging them. 
 
Item 3: Action Plan for the Thematic Programme Network   
Consideration of the action plan envisaged for the thematic network was done together 
with the next steps that are necessary to make the network operational. It was agreed 
that the process of identification of programme activities would be an iterative undertak-
ing, which will involve the other actors and members of the network. The formulation 
and adoption of the programme activities of the network would also be undertaken 
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through various means, including electronic mail, in order to achieve consensus from 
the members. The Regional Coordination Unit would liaise more closely and maintain 
constant contact with the focal point institution in order to render the necessary support.  
 
Priority activities for the Thematic Programme Network 
The meeting analyzed the priority activities suggested by the Abidjan meeting in order 
to select those actions that could be implemented within the next 18 months. The fol-
lowing were selected as the priority programme activities. The programme will encour-
age the establishment of participatory pilot schemes in the basins through inter-alia: 
 
- suggesting pilot sites 
- identification of site specific activities 
- identification of sources of needed support 
- identification of key actors 
- arrangement for replication of the good results from the scheme 
 
The network will maintain an interactive data base of available expertise and specialized 
centers of excellence in the thematic area that can be easily accessible to all the mem-
bers. This should be used to address the capacity development issue of the thematic 
area. The network will develop protocols for sensitizing the public through rapid and 
timely dissemination of early warning information on climate variability, flood control, 
mitigation and vulnerability to disasters. The network will identify publications, dis-
seminate tested and innovative research. 
 
 
6.2 Launching meeting of the Thematic Programme Network for the Integrated Man-
agement of International River, Lake and Hydro-geological Basins, Accra, Ghana, 
November/ December 2000 
 
Activities 
The meeting was held in Accra, Ghana, from 29 November to 1 December 2000. It was 
jointly organized by the Secretariat of the United Nations Convention to Combat Deser-
tification, the SADC Water Sector Coordinating Unit, and the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO)/Regional Office for Africa, with the support 
of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Ghana and the Govern-
ments of Italy, Norway, Finland and Canada. It was hosted by the Ghana Government. 
Sixty-three participants attended the meeting, representing specialized African institu-
tions, intergovernmental organizations, international development organizations and 
agencies, selected CCD Focal Points from Africa, and NGOs. 
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The workshop was organized in two parts; plenary and working group sessions. The 
first plenary session was divided into the opening ceremony and a series of presenta-
tions, including that of the background document.  Participants discussed the issues in 
the working group sessions. Then, in the plenary session which followed, the outputs of 
the working groups were discussed. Finally, the main conclusions of the workshop were 
presented during the closing ceremony. 
 
The meeting was expected to achieve the following: 
? transform into concrete work programmes for the network priority activities of 
the RAP adopted at the Nairobi Preparatory Regional Conference to the 3rd Con-
ference of Parties (COP3) to the CCD; 
? Define practical modalities for inter-institutional / inter-agency collaboration 
with the Regional Coordination Unit, Focal Point and partners; 
? Develop a timetable of activities for each actor of the Network; 
? Propose means of financial and institutional support; 
? Define the role of the main cooperation partners. 
 
The network for the integrated management of river, lake and hydrogeological basins in 
the context of the regional action programme to combat desertification in Africa was 
launched in the presence of the Executive Secretary of the CCD, the Minister of Envi-
ronment,Science and Technology of Ghana, and representatives from international, re-
gional and national organizations concerned with the CCD. 
 
Participants agreed to develop their activities in the following three programme areas: 
1. Assessment of water resources and strengthening of water resources information 
systems; 
2. Capacity building / utilization, institutional strengthening and technical and sci-
entific cooperation; 
3. Institutional, legislative and regulatory and cooperation aspects. 
 
In that regard, it was recommended that the general method of work of the RAP Net-
works be mainly based on the support to the sub-regional action programmes (SRAP) 
elaborated by the sub-regional organizations. The meeting was particularly interested in 
related ongoing initiatives and areas of collaboration to achieve its goals. The meeting 
took note of the presentation made by the World Bank on the integrated Land and Water 
Management Initiative for Africa (ILWM) initiative. The workshop recommended that 
the network should discuss with other networks on how to collaborate in integrated wa-
ter resources management, and encouraged network members to collaborate with NGOs 
and other local community groups. 
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The workshop also noted that hydrogeological mapping could be used as a tool to im-
prove the knowledge base of groundwater resources within international river basins.  
Initiatives exist through, among others, the OACT, to map up major aquifers on the con-
tinent.  The workshop further recommended that several major regional initiatives be 
launched to prepare hydrogeological maps which are decision making tools.  The devel-
opment could include feasibility studies, harmonization, experience development and 
sharing and valorization of information. 
 
Members of the RAP network were encouraged to explore how they can take advantage 
of opportunities offered by the RAP network to enhance their activities; they were also 
advised to promote cooperation among themselves. 
 
Assessment 
The holding of the meeting was a further step forward in the elaboration of the Regional 
Action Programme to Combat Desertification in Africa (RAP) and the first official 
launching meeting of six identified regional thematic programme networks (TPNs), of 
which the RAP will consist. The launching meeting of the network for the integrated 
management of international river, lake and hydro-geological basins was a direct follow-up 
activity to the regional workshop on the promotion of this TPN, held in Abidjan, Côte 
d’Ivoire, in 1998.  
 
The Accra meeting actually launched a process of regional scientific and political coop-
eration in the crucial field of water management that will play a predominant role in 
implementing the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Africa. The 
proceedings were marked by very enriching discussions and a set of significant conclu-
sions and recommendations for policy making and scientific capacity strengthening. 
They show the path ahead in integrating water management programmes for the imple-
mentation of the Convention. The workshop lasted 3 days (see above). But the results of 
the undertaking are of a mid-term and sustainable nature by ensuring the effective work of 
the thematic regional network to implement the Convention. 
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Item 7: World Conferences 
7.1 Concept for a UNCCD Preparatory Conference to the World Summit on Sustain-
able Development (WSSD), March 2002215 
 
Background 
Country Parties to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification have been 
involved in the process of elaboration and finalization of National Action Programmes 
to combat desertification, as called for in the Convention, and also in conformity with 
the decisions of the Conference of the Parties. Completion of a National Action 
Programme (NAP) is a rigorous process for the country, and it is the initial step in the 
government’s commitment to put in place the tools necessary for effective 
implementation of the Convention. For those countries that have already completed 
their NAPs, the lessons learnt indicate that the process of implementation does require 
resources to catalyse it. It is instructive that political goodwill has been demonstrated on 
the part of the governments, and they have indicated that they do need support in order 
to proceed with full-scale implementation. 
 
The country Parties have at the same time been trying to approach the issue of 
partnership agreements to support implementation through a number of initiatives. For 
example, in Africa consultative forums have been held in Cotonou, Benin in February 
2000, and a follow up later in May 2001, and in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in May 2001. 
These consultative forums involved those countries that had completed their NAPs, and 
they came together to identify the best ways to concretise meaningful partnerships 
particularly with their development cooperation partners, with a view to agreeing on 
more effective ways of catalysing these efforts.     
 
The recommendations formulated by these African countries included the following: 
• Increasing representation of relevant government departments such as planning, 
finance, foreign affairs and rural development as well as civil society 
organisations in the national UNCCD implementation process 
• Integration of the UNCCD NAPs into national strategies on sustainable 
development 
• Organisation of donors consultative forums in order to conclude partnership 
agreements to support the implementation of NAPs 
 
The NAP represents an important tool for sustainable development. Parties to the 
Convention observed that while the preparatory process towards the World Summit on 
                                                 
215 Excerpts from an informal proposal sent out to UNCCD country Parties and inter-governmental or-
ganizations in December 2001 
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Sustainable Development has been set up and was progressing, the concerns for the 
UNCCD were not well articulated. Parties expressed the view that the issues of the 
Convention that are dear to them may not have a chance to find their way into this 
important process. Indeed during the preparations leading to COP5, and in the 
discussions at the Conference itself, it had been observed that the process of preparing 
reports for the WSSD through the designated task managers included broad subject 
matters, and this tended to obscure the concerns of the UNCCD. The regional 
preparatory conferences to COP5 in Africa, Asia and Latin America recalled upon the 
attention of the countries to be well prepared for the WSSD.  
 
The Parties to the Convention proposed that an appropriate avenue or opportunity 
needed to be availed where their concerns can be channelled through to the WSSD. This 
had been envisaged to take the form of concrete recommendations that can be fed 
through, among others, the Bureau of the COP. The Parties expressed to the Secretariat 
the need to organise their approach to these issues through a political platform, which 
would show their commitment to implementation of what they consider to be the only 
Rio Convention that addresses the issue of sustainable development through a bottom 
up and participatory process. 
 
A forum where a group of experts and their ministers could firm up these strategic 
concerns had been put forward, and the expression of their political commitment 
through the outcome of such a forum was envisaged. The organisation of a forum on the 
implementation of the UNCCD prior to the WSSD would provide the opportunity to assess 
the efforts made during the last 7 years, and the results achieved at national, sub-regional 
and regional  levels in the affected developing countries.  
 
Objectives 
Since several African, Asian Latin American and Caribbean countries have elaborated 
their National Action Programmes (NAPs) to a level where major activities have been 
clearly identified and in some cases are being implemented, the time was opportune for 
them to actively participate in the preparatory process and to the WSSD, with a view to 
ensuring that the goals and objectives of the Convention, particularly those relating to 
poverty eradication and sustainable development are duly reflected in the preparatory 
process as well as in the outcome of the WSSD. 
 
The Conference aimed to serve as a forum for the preparation of the WSSD. It would 
provide the national focal points and their ministers with an opportunity to discuss the best 
possible ways to deepen their collaboration and contribute to the WSSD scheduled to take 
place in South Africa in August/September 2002. The Conference would allow the 
concerned actors to coordinate their approaches and exchange views on the important 
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issues underlying the implementation of the Convention. The Conference would also help 
to identify specific inputs for the report on the implementation of the UNCCD, to be 
submitted to the Summit.  
 
Organization of the Conference 
The Conference was hosted by the Government of Cape Verde, with the assistance of the 
UNCCD Secretariat in cooperation with the UNDP field office. The UNCCD Secretariat 
would facilitate the preparation of the necessary background documentation in 
collaboration with all interested organizations. Interpretation at the Conference would be 
provided in English, Spanish and French. 
 
Participants 
Each developing country was invited to appoint two representatives: the Minister 
responsible for sustainable development issues and the national focal point designated for 
the follow-up of the Convention. A ministerial segment with the duration of one and a half 
days was organised.  
 
Further, the Conference also seeked the participation of representatives of international 
organizations, regional, sub-regional and non-governmental organizations, as well as of 
donor countries.  
  
The sub-regional and regional organizations were invited to appoint one representative 
each (15 participants). The major competent international organizations (ADB, AsDB, 
FAO, GEF, IDB, IFAD, UNDP, UNEP, WMO, World Bank) were invited to appoint 
representatives. The network of non-governmental organizations (RIOD) was invited to 
appoint five representatives coming from the three regions concerned. With the addition of 
the resource persons from the UNCCD Secretariat, the Conference would involve some 
150 participants. 
 
 
7.2 Conference proceedings216 
 
Forum on the Implementation of the UNCCD preparatory to the World Summit on Sus-
tainable Development (WSSD), Praia, Cape Verde, 5 – 8 March 2002. 
  
Introduction 
At the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992, the international community, recognizing the need for urgent 
                                                 
216 Official document. Issued by the UNCCD Secretariat in 2002. 
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action to reverse the trend towards desertification, resolved to prepare a Convention to 
Combat Desertification. The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification 
(UNCCD) in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, par-
ticularly in Africa, was adopted on 17 June 1994 and entered into force on 26 December 
1996.  As of January 2002, 178 Parties have deposited their instruments of ratification 
with the Depository.   
 
Ten years after Rio, the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) aims to 
adopt concrete steps and to identify quantifiable targets for the better implementation of 
Agenda 21. The Summit will take place in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 26 August 
to 4 September 2002. Several heads of state and government, national delegates and 
leaders from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the private sector and other ma-
jor groups within civil society are expected to participate in the Summit, and to take 
actions towards meeting important challenges, including addressing the relationship 
between desertification and poverty in the context of the UNCCD.  As this Convention 
is the only legally binding instrument emanating from a direct recommendation of the 
Rio Conference, it is expected that its implementation will benefit from special attention 
at the occasion of the World Summit on Sustainable Development. 
 
Preparations for the WSSD 
UN General Assembly resolutions have provided the basis for preparations for the 
Summit. General Assembly Resolution 55/199 invites relevant organizations and bodies 
of the United Nations and international financial institutions involved with the imple-
mentation of Agenda 21, including conventions relating to the Conference, to partici-
pate fully in the ten-year review of progress achieved in the implementation of 
Agenda 21, including in the preparation of reports for submission to the Commission on 
Sustainable Development at its tenth session (CSD-10) and the Summit, in order to re-
flect their experience and the lessons learned and to provide ideas and proposals for the 
way forward for the further implementation of Agenda 21 in relevant areas. The pre-
paratory meetings for the Johannesburg Summit have taken place at national, regional 
and global levels.  Many of these meetings have emphasized the importance of strength-
ening the implementation of the UNCCD in the context of the Summit.    
 
The intergovernmental WSSD Regional Preparatory Committees for Africa, Asia and 
the Pacific, Europe and North America, Latin America and the Caribbean, and West 
Asia were held in late 2001.  These committees identified land degradation and deserti-
fication as one of the major challenges to be addressed by the Summit. The African 
Preparatory Conference for WSSD was held in Nairobi, Kenya, from 15 to 18 October 
2001, attended by approximately 300 government delegates and observers.  The African 
Committee noted that the implementation of the UNCCD should be an urgent priority in 
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the post-Johannesburg era.  The African Ministerial Statement identified fifteen priority 
areas for action, including eradication of poverty, agriculture and food security, natural 
resource management, energy, human development, financing for sustainable develop-
ment, financing of the Convention by the Global Environment Facility (GEF). In their 
statement, the African ministers invited the Summit to acknowledge the UNCCD as a 
sustainable development convention and to proclaim it as a prime tool in the eradication 
of poverty in Africa.  In this regard, they emphasized the need for substantial increases 
in the resources of the GEF as well as the need to make it more responsive to the needs 
of Africa in the context of the implementation of the UNCCD. The High Level Regional 
Meeting for the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Phnom Penh, Cam-
bodia, from 27 to 29 November 2001 produced two important outcomes: The Phnom 
Penh Regional Platform on Sustainable Development in Asia and the Pacific and the 
Chairman’s summary of the meeting.  
 
Intensive consultation was carried out from July to November 2001 in subregional 
meetings of government representatives and stakeholders, two consultative round table 
meetings of eminent persons from the region, and meetings of government representa-
tives in Bangkok.  The social, economic and environmental issues identified in the con-
sultation process and reflected in the platform include poverty eradication, impacts of 
globalization, capacity-building, agriculture and food security, desertification and land 
degradation, biodiversity, climate change, energy and water resources.   
 
The platform noted that land degradation/desertification, being closely related to pov-
erty issues, is a severe constraint to sustainable development.  It stressed the need to 
implement fully the UNCCD and CBD. The Chairman’s summary proposed that the 
GEF as a financing mechanism should support projects relating to desertification.  
 
The West Asia (Arab Region) Preparatory Committee meeting for the world Summit on 
Sustainable Development took place at the League of Arab States headquarters in Cairo, 
Egypt, on 24 October 2001. Approximately 140 government delegates and observers, 
including NGO representatives and representatives of international organizations, at-
tended the Arab Region PrepCom. The meeting considered the Assessment Report and 
the Arab Declaration to the WSSD for adoption and subsequent submission to the 
WSSD.  The ministers identified areas for priority action, which include poverty alle-
viation, energy, management of natural resources and means of evaluation and monitor-
ing of sustainable development programmes in the region.   
 
The Arab ministers underlined the need to promote sustainable management of re-
sources with a view to achieving water and food security, conserving biodiversity and 
combating desertification.  
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The Regional Preparatory Conference on Latin America and the Caribbean for WSSD 
was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from 23 to 24 October 2001.  The ministers identi-
fied seven areas of priority action including economic and social issues, sustainable 
human settlements, management of natural resources, multilateral environment agree-
ments, small island developing states, financing and technology transfer, and institu-
tional structure for sustainable development.  The regional preparatory meeting also 
expressed the need to promote integrated water resource management, with an emphasis 
on cross–sectoral and decentralized management as well as the need to apply economic 
and market mechanisms to deal with the increasing scarcity of water resources.  
 
A Regional Ministerial meeting for the World Summit on Sustainable Development was 
convened by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe in Geneva, Switzer-
land, from 24 to 25 September 2001. The meeting adopted a ministerial statement to be 
presented at the World Summit.  The ministers reaffirmed that the European region has 
a major role to play in global efforts to achieve sustainable development. They under-
lined that the Summit should promote better understanding of the links between envi-
ronment, poverty, trade and human security.  The ministers also urged countries for 
stronger commitment to multilateral environment agreements.  They identified several 
priority areas including air and water pollution, land degradation, climate change, deser-
tification and loss of  biodiversity. 
 
At the global level, CSD-10 provides the forum for preparations for the Summit.  Four 
intergovernmental Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings are being held during 
2001-2002.  PrepCom 1, which focused on organizational matters relating to the Sum-
mit, was held in New York from 31 April to 2 May 2001.  PrepCom 2 was held from 28 
January to 8 February 2002 in New York, and will be followed by PrepCom 3, also in 
New York, from 25 March to 5 April 2002.  The purpose of the second and third Prep-
Coms is to draft one of the final documents of the Johannesburg Summit.  This docu-
ment will assess overall progress achieved since Rio, identify major constraints and 
suggest measures to overcome these constraints.  The final PrepCom at the ministerial 
level will be held in Indonesia from 27 May to 7 June 2002.  This PrepCom will focus 
on drafting another final document for negotiation and adoption by the Summit.  This 
document is expected to reinvigorate political commitment to sustainable development 
and to address new challenges and opportunities within the framework of Agenda 21.  
 
UNCCD Preparations 
The UNCCD Regional meetings for African, Asian and Latin American and Caribbean 
focal points, held from June to August 2001, underlined the role of the Johannesburg 
Summit in enhancing support for  implementation of the UNCCD.  The meetings rec-
ognized the need for affected developing countries to be well prepared for the Johan-
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nesburg Summit, and for effective and active participation of the UNCCD focal points 
in the preparatory process and during the Summit. At its fifth session, held from 1 to 12 
October 2001 in Geneva, Switzerland, the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the 
UNCCD decided to submit to the World Summit on Sustainable Development through 
the Chairman of the Preparatory Conference, for consideration, the Chairman’s sum-
mary of the Ministerial and High-Level Interactive Dialogue sessions of the fifth ses-
sion of the Conference of the Parties to the UNCCD on “Addressing the poverty-
environment nexus through timely and effective implementation of the United Nations 
Convention to Combat Desertification” (decision 8/COP.5, paragraph 1).  
 
COP 5 also invited the Executive Secretary of the UNCCD to submit to the WSSD, 
through the Chairman of the Preparatory Conference, for consideration, decision 
3/COP.5 on the “Comprehensive report of the Ad Hoc Working Group for the in-depth 
review and analysis of reports submitted at the third and fourth sessions of the Confer-
ence of the Parties” and in particular the conclusions and recommendations of the Ad 
Hoc Working group annexed thereto (decision 8/COP.5, paragraph 2).  This document 
contains the full texts of the two documents mentioned above. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Does the spirit of Rio work in a post-postmodern world? 
 
Johannesburg and the synchronicity of realities 
 
Much has been written on the Rio process, analysis and evaluation has been provided 
throughout.217 In June 1997, at the 19th Special Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly called Rio +5, thorough stocktaking of the progess made so far in the imple-
mentation of UNCED’s results was done. Of course, this process was identified as in-
sufficient. As a result, the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) was en-
trusted with an enhanced mandate, its programmatic priorities were reset for the follow-
ing five years: climate, protection of forests, enforcement of environmental institutions. 
 
But the real Rio stocktaking took place at another occasion, decided upon by the Gen-
eral Assembly‘s 55th Session on 20 December 2000: the Rio +10 conference called 
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) taking place from 26 August to 4 
September 2002 in Johannesburg, South Africa. Preparation of the WSSD was in the 
hands of the CSD. Four PrepCom meetings were held in 2002. Part of this preparatory 
process was also the 2000 United Nations Millennium Summet bringing about the Mil-
lennium Declaration whose development goals were reenforced by the WSSD. Also the 
ministerial conference of the WTO in Doha, Katar in November 2001, and the Interna-
tional Conference on Fincancing Development in Monterrey, Mexico, March 2002, an-
ticipated the Johannesburg meeting.218 
 
The WSSD, the largest conference ever to date, provided an opportunity for a compre-
hensive review of the achievements on sustainable development since Rio. At the same 
time, it was expected to provide a new impetus for a breakthrough on urgent matters. 
Prior to the conference in Johannesburg, however, it was already clear that the record of 
the Rio decade left a lot to be desired in terms of effectiveness and achievements of the 
agreements and action plans mentioned above. This resulted in both raising expectations 
and doubts in equal measure. Would the world summit finally bring about the turning 
point in international environmental policy that many had demanded for so long? 
Would it be capable of providing the decisive impetus to cooperation on development 
issues? 
 
When it comes to assessing the record of results from Johannesburg, the skeptics are 
having a field day. In their eyes, the final document points to progress on a number of 
                                                 
217 One of the many articles on the Rio process, which has not been mentioned yet, but which I would 
like to recommend, is Swiderska, Krystyna [2002]: Implementing the Rio Conventions: Implications 
for the South/ In: iied Opinion. 
218 Under item 7, Chapter Four, the UNCCD preparatory conference for the WSSD is documented. 
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issues, but the qualifications added to nearly every conclusion leave them skeptical. 
World fish reserves ought to be protected by 2015. The most dangerous toxins to the 
environment are to be banned, but violators have no sanctions to fear. Subsidies for fos-
sil fuels should be reduced, though no strict time frame was agreed on.  
 
There are also a number of impressive sounding declarations of intent: free and democ-
ratic access to fresh water was established as a basic right, energy production from non-
fossil fuels is to be fostered, and the necessity of debt relief for the poorest countries 
was recognized. But, here too, the prospect of a breakthrough is questionable given the 
lack of concrete plans of action and clear mechanisms for imposing sanctions. The final 
documents are full of lax time frames and goals, open questions regarding financing and 
a lack of ideas of how to implement the plethora of good intentions at the institutional 
and organizational level. 
 
The German ministerial representatives Jürgen Trittin (Minister for the Environment) 
and Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul (Minister for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment) interpreted the record more positively. Above all, they noted that measures to 
ensure safe water and drinking water for the world‘s poor, one of the EU’s biggest 
goals, were achieved. According to them, another success story was the agreement by 
the US - despite a rejection of concrete time frames and quotas - to the basic goal of 
putting an end to species extinction and to reducing the dangerous effects of chemicals. 
Moreover, they described regulations for corporate liability, fisheries and a review of 
modes of consumption and production in industrialized states, as well as the mention of 
‚global publics goods‘ such as air and the oceans, as steps in the right direction. 
 
The German representatives viewed energy as a central issue. Providing access to the 
world‘s two billion people living without electricity with an environmentally sound 
form of this energy was, along with the previously mentioned issue of access to water 
resources, the other of the two major goals of the summit. According to Wieczorek-Zeul 
and Trittin, energy and water are the issues that most clearly embody the notion of sus-
tainability and are therefore the most important. The theory goes that securing basic 
provisions for electricity and water helps fight poverty, improves health, increases eco-
nomic opportunities and protects the environment, provided renewable energy sources 
are used. 
 
Yet even before the conference, the EU had lowered its sights. For example, the EU 
proposed increasing the share of electricity produced by renewable energy sources to 15 
percent by 2010, only marginally up from the current figure of 13 percent. Nevertheless, 
this modest attempt by the EU was shot down by the US and OPEC member states. 
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UNEP Executive Director Klaus Töpfer, who had helped shape the 1992 Rio summit 
when he was German Minister for the Environment, drew his own conclusions as head 
of the UN Environment Programme. Important progress was made at Johannesburg, he 
says. He was initially concerned that the summit would, in the end, reveal itself as 
merely cosmetic. In fact, Töpfer let it be known that he considers the Plan of Implemen-
tation of the WSSD - the most important final document - insufficient. 
 
Still it would be inappropriate to declare the summit a failure. First, the very fact that it 
took place is in itself important. This has helped put global environmental policy back 
on the international agenda. The identification and acknowledgement of the central is-
sues and goals of sustainable development in the final documents is also important. This 
provides an updated and nearly complete frame of reference for future initiatives and 
negotiations, be they unilateral, bilateral or multilateral. And 190 states were able to 
agree on a detailed list of actions, something that could not have been assumed prior to 
the summit. Thus, a common vision is in place and many important issues were taken 
into account. 
 
The key question is whether the plan of action, which is based on an already minimal 
consensus, will be effectively implemented. The current established institutional 
framework for international cooperation and the shrinking willingness of rich states in 
particular to cooperate on a multilateral basis leave room for doubt. 
 
It became one of the rituals of Johannesburg to criticize the US and denounce them for 
the immobility on climate change issues in particular. Upon closer examination, how-
ever, this criticism appears to be too one-sided. Japan, for example, shot down the de-
mand for more foreign aid. Brazil refused to protect its rainforest according to interna-
tional standards. And France insisted on maintaining EU agricultural subsidies. Particu-
laristic state interests characterized the global meeting.  
 
There is a firm trend discernable among OECD member states in particular of renewed 
emphasis on protecting their own interests and concern with solving national problems. 
This is counter to the notion of global governance which would entail seeking consen-
sus at the international level at the expense of particular interests. To this extent, revival 
of the wave of multilateralism of the early Nineties is currently out of sight. Explana-
tions offered for this development include the weak economy and protectionist tenden-
cies. 
 
Without doubt, there is no momentum for a global collaborative effort to solve common 
problems at this stage, however necessary and desirable that would be. Furthermore, we 
cannot and should not expect the organs of multilateral cooperation, the UN institutions, 
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to provide results that are not brought about by the member states working in concert. 
Inefficiency and chronic under-financing of the existing instruments simply adds to the 
difficulties. 
 
This could be the hour of a practical middle way, along the lines pursued by the German 
government in Johannesburg in its and the EU’s offensive on energy policy outside the 
official summit activities. Initiatives of individual states or groups of states and their 
allies of convenience in so called coalitions of the willing seems to be the only way out 
at the moment of the dilemma posed by the current gridlock in the implementation of 
important environmental and development measures. It could soon lead to first stage 
victories, for example in the area of climate protection, and overcome the extensive in-
ertia. German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder succeeded in Johannesburg in getting the 
EU and some 90 other states to sign a declaration calling for the promotion and firm 
establishment of renewable energy that was outside the framework of the summit and 
goes well beyond the conclusions of the final document.   
 
These moves forward which go well beyond the official conference results were arrived 
at parallel to the summit and are not part of the tediously negotiated final documents. 
The strength of these initiatives lies in the very fact that they are not orientated toward 
the least common denominator, rather they are manifestations of the political intentions 
of those who are truly interested in progress and change. That improves their chances of 
success. 
 
It may well be that a strategy that seeks to unite progressive states of the world would 
make the transition to global sustainability easier. If the Kyoto Protocol, which was 
roundly praised at the world summit, will take effect, although only a first step, this 
could set a new dynamic in motion that helps promote the use of better energy technol-
ogy, not just in the rich North, but also in the poor South. The second glimmer of hope 
lies in the EU and other states that want to lead the way, both at national level and in 
cooperation with developing countries, even without concrete goals set out at Johannes-
burg. The initiative announced by Chancellor Schröder can be considered an example. 
 
World summits organized by the United Nations will still need to take place given that 
they alone provide a suitable platform for global communication and interaction, not the 
least of which with civil society. The critical question remains whether the goal of get-
ting all participating countries to sign final documents, along with the corresponding 
compromises in formulations that entails, should be abandoned. If at future summits the 
international community were to free itself from the pressure for consensus, and instead 
used such summits as global forums for forming coalitions of the willing around deci-
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sive issues, the interests of those most affected by environmental destruction and under-
development might well be better served.219 
 
As early as in 2000, the German government put emphasis on the necessity to both 
strengthen and enlarge the international structures of environmental governance, which 
ought to be further developed.220 Since then, an impressive number of reform proposals 
have been submitted to the global audience, for instance, the creation of a so-called 
Earth Council, a body of moral credibility, comprising internationally renowned emi-
nent personalities, and in conformity with the Brundtland Commission, or the introduc-
tion of environmental taxation for the use of global public goods such as air, sea or 
outer space, including increased burden sharing responsabilities for the private sector. 
Another suggestion that has constantly been reiterated by German, French and other 
governments, is the empowerment of UNEP, supposed to be transformed into a special-
ized agency or even a world environmental organization.221 
 
Focusing on the UN system, global environmental governance has meanwhile become a 
widely-stretched, dense and diversified institutional framework consisting of a multi-
tude of agencies, structures and bodies - not mentioning the less formalized ongoing 
negotiation processes and conference series. The main organs of the United Nationss, 
the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) as well as the 
Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) are dealing with environmental issues, 
just like the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) of the Secretariat. 
Moreover, UNEP, UNDP, the Regional Commissions, and a number of funds, pro-
grammes and specialized agencies such as IFAD, FAO, Unicef, UNESCO, the WMO 
and others, work on the same line. Finally, we should mention the convention secretari-
ats such as UNFCCC, UNCBD and UNCCD, the UN Forum on Forests and other ad-
ministrative bodies entrusted with managing international regimes of environmental 
                                                 
219 See also Rechkemmer, Andreas [2002]: Globale Umwelt- und Entwicklungspolitik in der Krise? Nach 
dem Gipfel von Johannesburg. SWP-Aktuell 44 (Oktober). Berlin. On the issue of world conferences, 
see Fues, Thomas/ Hamm, Brigitte [2001b]: Die Weltkonferenzen und ihre Folgeprozesse: Umsetzung 
in die deutsche Politik/ In: Fues, Thomas/ Hamm, Brigitte (eds.) [2001a]: Die Weltkonferenzen der 
90er Jahre: Baustellen für Global Governance. Bonn. More on the Johannesburg Summit can be found 
in La Vina, Antonio/ Hoff, Gretchen/ DeRose, Anne Marie [2003]: The Outcomes of Johannesburg: 
Assessing the World Summit on Sustainable Development/ In: SAIS Review (Winter-Spring) Vol. 
XXIII/ 1. 
220 See Gemeinsame Presseerklärung BMU/ BMBF vom 20.12.2000, online at <www.bmu.de/presse/ 
2000>. 
221 On questions of institutional reform, reference is made to Prittwitz, Volker von [2000b]: Institutionel-
le Arrangements und Zukunftsfähigkeit/ In: Prittwitz, Volker von (ed.) [2000a]: Institutionelle Arran-
gements in der Umweltpolitik – Zukunftsfähigkeit durch innovative Verfahrenskombinationen? Opla-
den, Biermann, Frank [2000]: Zukunftsfähigkeit durch neue institutionelle Arrangements auf der glo-
balen Ebene?, and Oberthür, Sebastian [2000]: Institutionelle Innovationsperspektiven in der interna-
tionalen Umweltpolitik – both in: Prittwitz, Volker von (ed.) [2000a]. 
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concern. Last but not least, the World Bank has, of course, constantly enlarged its envi-
ronmental efforts.222 
 
This orderly disorder of agencies, bodies and regimes working in the field of environ-
ment respective sustainable development, will require particular attention in the forth-
coming years. Eleven years after Rio and one year after Johannesburg, the institutional 
picture of global environmental governance reveals o number of organizational patholo-
gies, i.e. an ineffective and certainly also inefficient multiplication of efforts due to a 
multitude of actors and agents involved. Besides the above mentioned approach, to up-
grade UNEP towards a specialized organization, a number of other proposals for reform 
have been submitted, amongst which are the so-called mainstreaming approach – green-
ing the IMF/World Bank and the WTO – or the foundation of a completely new world 
organization for sustainable development, which would render UNEP and UNDP, but 
maybe even the existing conventions and regimes, obsolete.223  
 
But is this the hour of multilateral approaches, even for their reform? In their article 
Weltpolitik zwischen Staatenanarchie und Global Governance224, Dirk Messner, 
Jeanette Schade and Christoph Weller claim that in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, 
security issues have once more dominated the global agenda, bringing forth a restora-
tion of power politics based on national interests, particularly promoted and followed by 
the United States, and even including a doctrine of preemptive military strikes. Accord-
ing to the authors, this tendency not only challenges international law, but also deeply 
undermines all efforts undertaken and already established towards the principles of col-
lective action and global governance.225 
 
The authors state: 
“Es waren die USA, die nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg die Institutionalisierung der 
internationalen Politik vorangetrieben und sich zum Motor multilateraler Zusam-
menarbeit gemacht hatten. Ihnen gelang es, durch Kooperation und Interessen-
ausgleich die Mehrzahl der Staaten in ein System einzubinden, das zwar über wei-
                                                 
222 On the UN and its organs and agencies‘ role within networks of global governance, see Reinicke, 
Wolfgang H./ Deng, Francis M. [2000]: Critical Choices. The United Nations, networks, and the fu-
ture of global governance. Washington DC. 
223 More on this subject can be found in Simonis, Udo E. [2000]: Architektur einer Weltorganisation für 
Umwelt und Entwicklung/ In: Nuscheler, Franz (ed.) [2000]: Entwicklung und Frieden im 21. Jahr-
hundert. Bonn, Simonis, Udo E. [1998b]: Institutionen der künftigen Weltumweltpolitik/ In: Messner, 
Dirk (ed.) [1998b], and Conca, Ken [1996]: Greening the UN: Environmental Organisations and the 
UN System/ In: Weiss, Thomas G./ Gordenker, Leon (eds.) [1996]: NGOs, the United Nations, and 
global governance. Boulder, CO. 
224 Messner, Dirk/ Schade, Jeanette/ Weller, Christoph [2003]: Weltpolitik zwischen Staatenanarchie und 
Global Governance/ In: Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden (ed.) [2003]: Globale Trends 2004/2005. 
Fakten, Analysen, Prognosen. Frankfurt (Main). 
225 See op. cit., p. 235. 
Global Environmental Governance  
 
135
te Strecken US-Interessen stützte, aber zugleich die zwischenstaatlichen Bezie-
hungen stabilisierte und zur breiten Anerkennung einer internationalen Ordnung 
mit den Vereinten Nationen als Mittelpunkt beitrug. Von dieser Ausrichtung hat 
sich die US-Regierung inzwischen verabschiedet.”226 
 
This movement of consequent, if not systematic, withdrawal from multilateral coopera-
tion, comprises strategic policy fields such as arms control regimes – named be the so-
called diversification of nuclear arsenals to tackle the problem of international terrorism, 
the cancellation of the bilateral US-Russian ‘ABM’ treaty, the treaty on nuclear test 
stop, and the verification regime for biological weapons -, the Kyoto protocol, the ICC 
and bilateral trade treaties to bypass and undermine the regulatory provisions of the 
WTO227. 
 
Messner, Schade and Weller recall Jochen Hippler’s term ‘selective multilateralism’, 
sometimes also called ‘multilateralism à la carte’, which could serve as an adequate 
description of the US’ and other important states’ policy towards global issues:228 
  
“Nachdem in den vergangenen Jahren viele Hoffnungen auf zivilgesellschaftliche 
Akteure, neue Formen der Kooperation und Verrechtlichung der internationalen 
Politik gesetzt wurden, scheint die Welt nach dem 11. September in die schon ü-
berwunden geglaubten Bahnen klassischer Macht-, Interessen- und Militärpolitik 
zurückzufallen.”229 
 
Are the (neo-)realists right? Do powerful states dominate an anarchical international 
system? Do powerful nations only use multilateral institutions to pursue their genuine 
interests? Is international law invalid? 
 
“Die augenblickliche Dominanz von Sicherheitspolitik, Kriegsdrohungen und mi-
litärischer Machtpolitik erweckt den Anschein, internationale Institutionen zur 
kooperativen Bearbeitung globaler Probleme hätten seit den Terroranschlägen ih-
re Bedeutung zur Regulierung internationaler Macht- und Interessendifferenzen 
verloren.” 230 
 
What about the theories of institutionalism and regime building? What about the strong 
empirical tendency towards global treaties, legal processes, and the growth of interna-
                                                 
226 Op. cit., p. 236. 
227 On this latter case see Dieter, Heribert [2003]: Abschied vom Multilateralismus? Der neue Regiona-
lismus in der Handels- und Finanzpolitik. SWP-Studie 4 (Februar). Berlin. 
228 Op. cit., p, 237. 
229 Op. cit., p. 238. 
230 Op. cit. 
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tional organizations? And what about public policy networks and the architecture of 
global governance? Empirically speaking, we are living in a period of growing interde-
pendance between unilateralism, global governance, and globalization.231 Despite all 
given hystery about the threat of new empires or aggressive unilateralism, we should 
understand that the USA and their allies had to face their limits at Johannesburg – not to 
speak about Irak here. At the end of the day, the most important result of the WSSD 
was: the crucial Rio results are maintained. And even more decisions were taken against 
the resistence of the so-called unilaterals: 
 
? equalty of environmental agreements with WTO standards 
? corporate accountability principle accepted by the UN 
? the biodiversity loss rate to be reduced until 2010   
 
“Die unkooperative Haltung der USA und anderer Regierungen gegenüber globa-
len Umweltproblemen hat einen Wandel der internationalen Politik ausgelöst. Da 
der konsequente Multilateralismus in der Sackgasse steckt, schließen sich koope-
rationsbereite Regierungen zunehmend mit anderen Akteuren zu unterschiedlichen 
Vorreiterallianzen zusammen. So entstehen neue Formen eines ‘Multilateralismus 
der verschiedenen Geschwindigkeiten’.”232 
 
Kyoto is an interesting case in this context. The protocol was initially supposed to be a 
milestone for the implementation process of UNFCCC – and thus for the worldwide 
measures to tackle the climate problem. Its ratification and entry-into-force process 
would contribute significantly to the efforts undertaken in this direction, knowing that 
Kyoto alone is not sufficient. The USA withdrew in March 2001, or ‘unsigned’ Kyoto. 
Now the global focus is on Russia. But also on China, India, and the EU. Kyoto features 
unusual and complex entry-into-force provisions. It could already fail therefore before it 
entered into force. Its first implementation phase is ment to last until 2012 – then the 
global community would take stock. But already nowadays projections foresee: instead 
of a yielded 20% emmission reduction in 2005, we are to date some 25% over 1990.233 
 
An alternative can be seen to perceive climate change as a transatlantic challenge, while 
the EU-US relation is een as its engine. Both partners are not so far away from each 
other. For instance, they agree in two major respects, i.e. engaging the private sector 
(joint industry perspectives, technological breakthrough), and engaging major develop-
ing countries.234 
                                                 
231 See also op. cit., p. 242-244. 
232 Op. cit., p. 247. 
233 Müller, Friedemann [2003]: Kyoto-Protokoll ohne USA – wie weiter? SWP-Studie 7 (März). Berlin. 
234 Ochs, Alexander [2003]: Reviving Transatlantic Cooperation towards a Global Threat. SWP paper 
(february). Berlin. 
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But is the US ready for collective responsibility sharing? The only feasable long-term 
alternative to Kyoto could be seen in more countries joining in a common strategy of 
identifying alternatives to unsustainable energy production. Such a multilateral initia-
tive-based solution would comprise global governance aspects, e.g. martket signals to-
wards investors, research and technological development.235 In any case, the US seem to 
be in a key position – no global approach is possible without them, China, India and 
Russia seem unready to join as long as the US stays out: coalitions of the willing seem 
not sufficient here. So, collective efforts must be undertaken, otherwise there is no hope 
to tackle the globl climate problem. Friedemann Müller names three points important 
for success: (a) broad consensus on the trading process of emmission rights, (b) devel-
oped countries must be on board, and (c) common research and technological develop-
ment efforts must be undertaken. He sees Europe hereby in an important negotioation 
position.236 
 
Unilateralism is perceived as one threat. Neoliberalism as another. Achim Brunnen-
gräber and Christian Stock write237:  
„Die vorgeschlagenen Instrumentarien zur Bewältigung der Umweltkrise ähneln 
sich in [den] Konzepten: marktwirtschaftliche Instrumente, die Implementierung 
internationaler Konventionen und die Schaffung neuer Institutionen wie z.B. ein 
„ökologischer Rat“ auf EU-Ebene oder eine „Global Environmental Organizati-
on“ nach dem Vorbild der GATT/WTO. Der Schwerpunkt der Überlegungen liegt 
auf politischen Kontroll- und Veränderungsmaßnahmen zugunsten erhöhter Effi-
zienz beim Ressourcenschutz...“  
 
The authors criticize a notorious conceptual one-sidedness for neo-liberal sake. They 
address economic growth and environmental protection as contradicting principles, 
while sustainable development is just a lable to camouflage ongoing neoliberalism. And 
according to the neo-marxist viewpoint of Ulrich Brand and Christoph Görg, the con-
cepts of regime building and global governance simply failed since ‘environment’ is, as 
an issue, too deeply inter-woven with social, political and economic circumstances, 
which notoriously dominate priority setting and decision-making processes.238 Despite 
                                                 
235 See Müller, Friedemann [2003], p. 6. 
236 Op. cit. A different, more civil society ankle is provided in Fricke, Gerald [2001]: Von Rio nach 
Kyoto. Verhandlungssache Weltklima. Berlin. Recommended be also Tänzler, Denis/ Carius, Alexan-
der [2003]: Perspektiven einer transatlantischen Klimapolitik/ In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B27 
(30. Juni). 
237 Brunnengräber, Achim/ Stock, Christian [1999]: Global Governance: Ein neues Jahrhundertprojekt?/ 
In: PROKLA, Heft 116, 29. Jg., Nr. 3. (here p. 462-463) 
238 Brand, Ulrich/ Görg, Christoph [2002b]: „Nachhaltige Globalisierung“ - Sustainable Development als 
Kitt des neoliberalen Scherbenhaufens/ In: Brand, Ulrich/ Görg, Christoph [2002a]: Mythen globalen 
Umweltmanagements. Münster. 
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all contradictions, empirical studies admit advanced institutionalization of global envi-
ronmental governance, even as of today. Some 900 intergovernmental agreements have 
been decided upon. And noone would seriously neglect the growing role of private ac-
tors, scientific networks, and NGOs – seconded by new economic instruments such as 
certificates trading.239  
 
It seems to me that an adequate label for the present phase in international relations 
would be synchronicity of realities. We might as well feel tempted to speak of parallel 
worlds. While some empirical findings suggest that unilateralism and coalitions of the 
willing are a paradigm for contemporary international order, which would remind us 
much of the Westphalian system, others speak openly about an age of emerging empires 
– implying even pre-Westphalian conditions. On the other hand, global governance, 
particularly in the field of environment and sustainable development, is definitely prac-
tised by a multitude of actors world-wide. Analytically speaking: It’s all of it in combi-
nation - postmodern, modern and pre-modern paradigms are alive. While nation-states 
will remain dominant actors for some time240, be it as unilateralists, multilateralists or 
partners, governance will in any case, in a further globalizing world, comprise new ave-
nues and strategies for joint implementation, type II outcomes or informal agreements, 
be they hierarchical, i.e. between states only, or horizontal, i.e. in the form of networks 
and partnerships.241 
 
 
 
                                                 
239 See also Helm, Carsten/ Simonis, Udo E./ Biermann, Frank [2003]: Weltökologie und globale Um-
weltpolitik/ In: Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden (ed.) [2003]: Globale Trends 2004/2005. Fakten, 
Analysen, Prognosen. Frankfurt (Main). On market based means for the public sector, reference is 
made to the classical Osborne, David/ Gaebler, Ted [1992]: Reinventing government: how the entre-
preneurial spirit is transforming the public sector. Reading, MA. 
240 On the nation-state‘s relevance for environmental governance see Jänicke, Martin [2003a]: Die Rolle 
des Nationalstaats in der globalen Umweltpolitik/ In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B27 (30. Juni). 
241 Refer to Hamm, Brigitte (ed.) [2002]: Public-Private Partnership und der Global Compact der Verein-
ten Nationen. Duisburg. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Conclusion 
 
In this study, I have dealt with the phenomenon of change in international relations. 
This requires thoughts on the parameters and variables of the same. While the United 
Nations and its agencies are to be seen as variables in the network of international ac-
tors, they immanently react to system-wide change, whose current parameters are the 
emerging conditions of a globalized and partly privatized world. This being said, it is 
not surprising that innovation comes from within the organizations – they do learn.  
 
The UNCCD has been interpreted as a case of conceptualized postmodernity in interna-
tional relations. Whether or not such preconditions would be fertile or futile was not to 
be foreseen at Rio, when through Chapter 12 of Agenda 21 the Convention was in-
voked. The Earth Summit took place at a momentum when postmodern concepts and 
tools for IR had a say in the global arena. These philosophies and approaches highly 
influenced the drafting process of UNCCD, and out came a legally binding treaty with 
remarkable contents, notably the referred to bottom-up approach, cross-sectoral policy 
frames, and a new understanding of partnership for development. 
 
My first step was to highlight some of those so-to-speak post-Westphalian concept 
fragments and governance tools within the conceptual context of the Convention, i.e. its 
very text. And this upon the basis of understood postmodernity: what it refers to and 
what it is about. 
 
The second step consisted of the provision of a mixed portfolio of empirical examples 
from the UNCCD implementation process. These examples were selected to examine 
how the high-flying principles and guidelines of the Convention’s text are or are not to 
be declinated down to grassroot levels. Hereby, I followed a heuristical approach: the 
sample stories, concepts and reports flash highlights on best practises, lessons learnt and 
problems faced at various levels, e.g. the drafting and adoption of a National Action 
Programme (NAP), the Secretariat’s efforts to motivate and enhance quality in the 
elaboration of national reports, and their evaluation process, etc. Moreover, looks were 
taken into theory and practice of organizing national synergy workshops on joint im-
plementation of the Rio Conventions, an inter-sectoral, multi-donor driven initiative by 
the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and various cases of partnership agreement 
formation, both between North and South and South and South. Finally, UNCCD’s 
preparations and strategic orientation towards the Johannesburg Summit in 2002 were 
featured. 
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The deliberations of this study are based on the insight that postmodernity in interna-
tional relations is foremost a normative concept, having its most concrete output in the 
concept of global governance, silently implying a constructivist perspective. But post-
modern concepts also describe certain developments at the global front and explain why 
we do have something like collective action, supreme international legislation and prin-
cipled networks comprising non-state actors and supranational agencies alike. 
 
The UN Convention to Combat Desertification as a case shows that implementing post-
modern concepts must face limits, constraints and partial failure, since we live in a time 
of synchronicity of political realities in a highly segmented and fragmented setting of 
actions and communications. It seems scholars have to get used to this shattered picture 
of cohabitation between unilateralism, empire-ism, coalitions of the willing, type II out-
comes and horizontal, non-hierarchical policy networks. 
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Acronyms 
 
 
ACP  Africa, Carribean and the Pacific 
AMU  Arab Maghreb Union 
BMU Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit  
(Germany) 
BMZ  Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung 
(Germany) 
CBD  UN Convention on Biological Diversity 
CEMAC Communauté économique et monetaire de l’Afrique Centrale 
CILSS  Sahara-Sahelian Interstate Committee 
CSD  UN Commission on Sustainable Development 
DESA  Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization   
GEF  Global Environment Facility 
IGAD  Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
PACD  Plan of Action to Combat Desertification 
PRSP  Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
SADC  Southern African Development Community 
UNCCD United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
UNEP  United Nations Environment Programme 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNITAR United Nations Institute for Training and Research 
UNU  United Nations University 
WBG  World Bank Group 
WMO  World Meteorological Organization 
WTO   World Trade Organization 
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